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The world of veiled human events is often a world of unconfirm-
able truths. Communities past and present have faced difficult dilem-
mas concerning the assessment of individual behavior from the stand-
points of morality and custom. The contemporary preoccupation with
child sexual abuse surely has many parallels with the preoccupations
of other times, such as witchcraft and heresies....
... As we do today, they had to rely on what experts, using their
special devices, told them were the signs of the very private phenom-
ena they sought to regulate and suppress. In our opinion, our means
of discerning the portents are no better than they have ever been,
relative to prevailing moral standards, in the history of human af-
fairs.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical data demonstrates that gay men and lesbians are the least likely
persons to sexually abuse children.2 These scientific conclusions have not,
however, dissuaded the public and the courts from automatically condemning a
gay or lesbian person accused of child sexual abuse prior to application of
even the most rudimentary principles of fairness and due process of law.
Lamentably, accusations of child sexual abuse are becoming more
prevalent in custody and visitation battles regardless of the accused parent's
sexual orientation.3 The mere allegation of such an unspeakable act,4 raised in
1. Thomas M. Homer & Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in
Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: I. Predictable
Rates of Diagnostic Error in Relation to Various Clinical Decisionmaking Strategies, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 217, 251-52 (1991) [hereinafter Homer & Guyer I].
2. E.g., Robert L. Barret & Bryan E. Robinson, Gay Dads, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 157, 161 (Adele Eskeles Gottfried & Allen W.
Gottfried eds., 1994) (stating that "at this time it appears that children living with heterosexual
parents are more at risk of incest than children living with gay fathers"); Patricia J. Falk, The Gap
Between Psychosocial Assumptions and Empirical Research in Lesbian-Mother Child Custody
Cases, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 131, 142-43
(Adele Eskeles Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds., 1994) (noting that child sexual abuse in the
United States has been committed overwhelmingly by heterosexual males); Carole Jenny et al,
Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 44 (1994) (conclud-
ing that a heterosexual is 100 times more likely to abuse a child than is a homosexual).
3. E.g., Gordon J. Blush & Karol L. Ross, Sexual Allegations in Divorce: The SAID Syn-
drome, 25 CONCILIATION Crs. REV. 1, 1 (1987) (noting that "[mIore and more reports of sexually
abused children are being made" and warning that "an entirely different set of dynamics and vari-
ables may exist" when allegations are made in the context of a family which "has become dys-
functional" due to the divorce process); Gerald Cooke & Margaret Cooke, Dealing with Sexual
Abuse Allegations in the Context of Custody Evaluations, 9 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 55, 65
(1991) (concluding that clinical experience indicates a rising number of sexual abuse allegations
during custody evaluations).
4. The devastation caused by sexual abuse of a child is often viewed as irreparable. See,
e.g., Sarah E. Romans et al., Sexual Abuse in Childhood and Deliberate Self-Harm, 152 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1336 (1995) (discussing a study which found a clear statistical correlation between
child sexual abuse and deliberate self harm as an adult, including involvement in further abusive
relationships); Kenneth R. Silk et al., Borderline Personality Disorder Symptoms and Severity of
Sexual Abuse, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1059, 1062 (1995) (reporting that persons sexually abused
as children often experience "chronic feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness," are unable to
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initial divorce and custody proceedings or in subsequent actions to modify
custody and visitation orders, immediately reverses the "innocent until proven
guilty" principle. Stated differently, "[tihe field of child sexual abuse
assessment has become sensationalized, creating a climate wherein allegations
alone are quickly raised to the status of evidence signifying abuse. Through
this bootstrap transformation allegations are then used to establish
culpability." 5
In this sensationalized climate, the allegations of sexual abuse alone cause
a de facto shifting of the burden of proof to the accused in both civil and
criminal cases.6 The difficulties inherent in proving a negative-that is, in
proving that the accused did not do the specific act or acts on which the
sexual abuse allegations are based-further inflate the accused's evidentiary
burden to a nearly insurmountable level. 7 But the bar is raised even higher
when the sexual orientation of the accused parent is non-heterosexual.8 In this
scenario, the accused must disprove not only the specific acts alleged but also
overcome the stereotypes of homosexuals as perverts, sexual deviants, and
child molesters.9 These widely held erroneous views, by themselves, may
attach to other persons "in satisfying and safe ways," and develop a firm "belief in a malevolent
object world" where people seek only to satisfy their own needs at the expense to others); Vicky
Veitch Wolfe et al., The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A PTSD Formulation, 20 BEHAV.
THERAPY 215, 226 (1989) (concluding that "sexually abused children display both global adjust-
ment problems and problems specific to the sexual abuse, including sex-associated fears and intru-
sive thoughts").
5. Thomas M. Homer & Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in
Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: II. Prevalence
Rates of Child Sexual Abuse and the Precision of "Tests" Constructed to Diagnose It, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 381, 387 (1991) [hereinafter Homer & Guyer Ill. See generally HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD ET AL.,
ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 121-52 (1988) (discussing the justice system and accusa-
tions of child sexual abuse and concluding that societal condemnation of persons accused of child
sexual abuse creates a substantial risk of persons being falsely accused and convicted).
6. This article deals primarily with civil cases, although many of the principles discussed
are equally applicable to criminal complaints. For an excellent overview of concerns regarding
expert witnesses in criminal prosecutions for child sexual abuse, see Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael
H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecu-
tions, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027 (1994), and Diana Younts, Note, Evaluating and Admitting Ex-
pert Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 41 DUKE LJ. 691 (1991). See also
DANIEL W. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE §§ 13.06-.10 (2d ed. 1994)
(addressing sexual and general child abuse); Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the Peo-
ple Who Believe the Children?: The Need For A New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Excep-
tion Statute, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 207 (1995).
7. This burden is arguably impossible to satisfy. "Because it is always possible that a given
individual-even one randomly drawn from the general or a specific population-has sexually
molested a child, an incontrovertible proof that that individual has not molested a child is impossi-
ble." Thomas M. Homer et al., Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in Child Custody
Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: IlI. Studies of Expert Opin-
ion Formation, 26 FAM. L.Q. 141, 170 (1992) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Homer et al.].
8. Such is the case with gay, lesbian, and possibly bisexual and transgendered parents.
Since the "homosexual" aspect of a bisexual parent's life is more controversial than the heterosex-
ual aspect, most of the analysis herein regarding biases against a homosexual parent also applies
to a bisexual parent. Specific biases that may stem from being transgendered or bisexual, however,
are outside the scope of this article.
9. For an interesting discussion of the stereotypes of gay individuals as child molesters and
sex-crazed maniacs, see RICHARD D. MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION 1-4 (1994). These stereo-
types are born of the myth "that gays and lesbians are predators and defilers of America's youth,"
Doug Arey, Gay Males and Sexual Child Abuse, in SEXUAL ABUSE IN NINE NORTH AMERICAN
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seem adequate grounds for condemnation regardless of the actual evidence of
record. 0
While tilting at windmills on the legal battlefield, the accused is also
trying to nurture her parental relationship with the child at the center of the
controversy. This goal is virtually unachievable due to the immediate and
severe restrictions imposed upon an accused parent's contact with her child,
restrictions which "inevitably alter the child-parent relationship to a degree that
can, in many cases," irreparably damage the relationship."
This article examines the critical role played by experts in the legal battles
which erupt when child sexual abuse is alleged. In light of the courts' reliance
on expert testimony to determine the veracity of the charges, additional
safeguards must be utilized to test the qualifications of a proffered expert and
the admissibility of the expert's opinions. As more thoroughly explained
throughout this article, such safeguards are especially critical when the
accusations are leveled against a gay or lesbian parent. Indeed, many of the
safeguards proposed herein are designed to detect the existence and
corresponding impact, if any, of an expert's anti-gay animus on the opinions
she offers to the trier of fact. Some of the suggestions, such as requiring that
the expert have sufficient familiarity with the empirical data on lesbian and
gay parents, are aimed at eliminating heterosexual partisanship 2 which may
inappropriately influence an expert's decision even absent a specific anti-gay
bias. 3
CULTURES 200, 209 (Lisa Aronson Fontes ed., 1995), and are "promiscuous by nature," Kim I.
Mills, Security Clearance OK'dfor Gays, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 5, 1995, at A7 (quoting statements
made by U.S. Rep. Bob Doman of California in opposition to security clearances for gay and
lesbian government employees). See also Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens, and
Lezzies: The Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GEN-
DER & L. 33 (1995) (discussing the historical discrimination against homosexuals before the Sto-
newall Riots of 1969); Judith G. Fowler, Homosexual Parents: Implications for Custody Cases, 33
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 361 (1995) (discussing impact of negative stereotyping on gay
and lesbian parents seeking custody of their children); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (presenting a framework for examin-
ing legal and social conceptions of sex, gender and sexual orientation).
10. See e.g., People v. Mercado, 592 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that evidence
which inferred that defendant had been expelled from military school due to an alleged homosexu-
al encounter was intended to and may have in fact led the jury to believe that defendant "had a
propensity for child abuse"). In dissenting from the denial of defendant's leave to appeal his con-
viction for sexually abusing his daughter and son and arguing for reversible prosecutorial miscon-
duct where the prosecutor asked defendant if he was a homosexual, Judge Cavanagh observed: "It
would require unconvincing naivete not to recognize this innuendo as a deliberate appeal to the
widespread prejudice in our society that homosexuals are generally more likely to sexually molest
children." People v. Kosters, 467 N.W.2d 311, 315-16 (Mich. 1991) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
11. Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 386. For a thoughtful discussion of the impact of
custody litigation on a family, see Martha L. Deed, Court-Ordered Child Custody Evaluations:
Helping or Victimizing Vulnerable Families, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 76, 78-79 (1991).
12. The "heterosexual norm" through which many people view the world is founded in an-
cient religious and cultural beliefs that a family unit consisting of a man, a woman, and their
offspring is "the foundation of all human community." The Ramsey Colloquium, The Homosexual
Movement, in HOMOSEXUALITY: DEBATING THE ISSUES 31, 35 (Robert M. Baird & M. Katherine
Baird eds., 1995).
13. Although the author is not convinced that pro-gay bias is a problem in such cases, im-
plementation of the safeguards should also detect any pro-gay bias which may have caused the
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The author does not take the position that allegations of sexual abuse
against gay or lesbian parents are always false. This article is premised,
however, on four firmly-held convictions.
First, the proliferation of false allegations of child sexual abuse in custody
and visitation disputes demands extremely close scrutiny of the source and
content of such allegations. 4 As one court opined regarding false allegations
of sexual abuse:
The introduction of sexual abuse charges into bitterly contested
custody actions seems to have become epidemic. Yet, as one expert
in this case testified, such allegations are unsubstantiated in as many
as eight of ten times. We do not know in how many of these
instances one party has falsely raised these allegations to gain an
advantage. We do know that such a deed speaks mightily to the
character of one responsible for it. 5
Second, any person-including a mental health professional 6  or
judge-who plays a role in convincing a child that her parent has sexually
abused her when no such abuse has occurred is herself causing severe
emotional abuse to the child and must be stopped. 7
Third, while gay and lesbian parents have made tremendous strides in the
last decade in being recognized as heading legitimate family units, 8 they still
experience significant discrimination in visitation and custody matters. 9 The
expert to inappropriately manipulate, intentionally or inadvertently, her gathering of factual data
and professional analysis in the case.
14. See RICHARD M. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME 126 (1992) ("Many
of these accusations are conscious and deliberate, and the accuser knows quite well that the spouse
did not in any way sexually molest the child."); Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 220-21 (re-
porting that about 80% of allegations of sexual abuse in the context of domestic relations cases
are unsubstantiated); Rosalyn Schultz, Evaluating the Expert Witness: The Mental Health Expert
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 9 AM. J. FAM. L. 1, 2-3 (1995) (explaining that many reports of
child sexual abuse are true, but that allegations made by adults in the context of custody deter-
minations are especially difficult to evaluate). But cf Nancy Thoennes & Patricia G. Tjaden, The
Extent, Nature, and Validity of Sexual Abuse Allegations in CustodylVisitation Disputes, 14 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 151, 161 (1990) (concluding that false sexual abuse allegations are not
disportionately high in custody and visitation cases).
15. Kohlman v. Kohlman, No. 920T046, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4481, at *16 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 24, 1993).
16. "Mental health professionals may create or help perpetuate false allegations because of
their biases, assumptions, and poor interviewing procedures, all of which can lead to misinterpreta-
tion of their findings." Schultz, supra note 14, at 2.
17. See Kathleen M. Quinn et al., Resolved: Child Sex Abuse is Overdiagnosed, 29 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 789 (1989) (suggesting that sexual abuse is
overdiagnoseddue to inadequate investigations by experts).
18. In cases where non-biological parents have been allowed to adopt the children of their
same-sex partners, for example, the courts have described lesbian-headed households in extremely
positive terms. See generally Robert M. Horowitz & Hiromi Maruyama, Issues in Gay and Les-
bian Adoption, 15 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 2 (1994-95) (discussing state adoption laws affect-
ing adoptions by gays and lesbians). See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass.
1993) (stating that more than a dozen witnesses testified that the mother and her lesbian partner
participated equally in raising Tammy "and that the three form a healthy, happy, and stable family
unit"); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that adoption was in
child's best interests because the child "is part of a family unit that has been functioning success-
fully for the past six years," and because having another legally-recognized parent would signifi-
cantly increase the child's level of emotional and financial support).
19. In jurisdictions which do not expressly condemn homosexual parents, the gay or lesbian
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discrimination is. found not only in the courts' express moral condemnation of
the parents' "chosen lifestyle," but also in the insidious discrimination
disguised as "exercises of discretion" by the courts on evidentiary rulings,
credibility determinations, and fact finding regarding the relative fitness of the
parents.2"
Fourth, expert witnesses play a critical role in custody and visitation mat-
ters. And while there is no such thing as a completely "neutral" expert wit-
ness, modem evidentiary standards demand that courts take very seriously the
task of identifying expert witness bias. The tremendous discretion afforded
trial courts regarding fact and expert witness testimony creates the opportunity,
as well as the temptation, for the court to abuse its discretion by accrediting
the particular "expert" who agrees with the court's personal opinion and re-
jecting experts who do not." Judicial discretion is especially broad in domes-
tic relations cases:
Divorce law has traditionally relied on judicial wisdom to achieve fair
results. Instead of bright-line rules, legislatures have typically given
judges in the divorce court almost unlimited discretion, bounded only
by indeterminate standards or lists of factors that may be considered.
Judicial discretion has also been enhanced by the rarity of jury trials
in divorce cases; in almost all divorce actions the judge both deter-
mines the facts and interprets the law.22
In sum, the role of the courts and the experts is to safeguard the rights of
the parents to enjoy a meaningful relationship with their children and to
protect the children from abuse of any nature. No just society can tolerate
parent will not be denied custody or experience restricted visitation unless there is a "nexus" be-
tween the parent's sexual orientation and harm to the child. See, e.g., Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642
N.E.2d 1007, 1008, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (overruling the trial court's grant of custody to
lesbian mother conditioned upon her "not co-habitating with women with whom she is maintain-
ing a homosexual relationship" and "not engaging in homosexual activity in the presence of the
children" due to lack of evidence that mother's behavior would adversely effect her sons); Van
Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (holding that absent a showing of "some har-
mful effect on the children," mother's cohabitation with another women was not sufficient to deny
custody); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983) (stating that the best
interest of the child remains paramount and that "homosexuality in and of itself is not a bar to
custody or to reasonable rights of visitation"). In theory, the burden of proof is on the person
asserting the claimed harm; in reality, once the parent's sexual orientation is at issue, a significant
burden shifts to the homosexual parent to show that his or her sexual orientation will not harm the
child. See generally Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the
Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 497 (1984); David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 31 (1993).
20. See discussion of court's presumptions regarding gay and lesbian parents infra Part II.D.
21. The author is not the only one to hold this view. See, e.g., Homer et al., supra note 7, at
166.
22. Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Dis-
cretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 403-04 (1996). Garrison observes that "[i]f any
single thing is apparent from this inquiry . . . , it is that the results of discretionary decision mak-
ing are by no means uniform." Id. at 505. Garrison also concludes that one of the "consistent
themes" revealed by her research is that the judges' individual values and the social climate in
which the decisions are rendered affect the judges' decrees regarding property division, alimony,
and child support issues. Id. at 511. Garrison did not analyze child custody and visitation
decisions.
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discrimination, whether blatant or insidious, against any class of parents or
children, especially when such discrimination discourages individuals from
seeking redress in the courts to vindicate their rights.23 As one family law
judge opined, "[wihen managing child abuse cases, we must always keep in
mind that an erroneous finding of guilt can be almost as damaging to the child
and her family as an erroneous dismissal." 4
On one level, this article serves as a litigation primer for attorneys
representing gay or lesbian parents accused of sexual abuse. 5  More
importantly, however, it is an appeal to judges and persons retained as experts
in such cases to acknowledge and, if necessary, to reconsider their views on
sexual orientation and the undue influence that these views may have on the
outcome of their opinions when child sexual abuse is alleged.26
Section II of this article sets forth the legal standards for determining
whether a proffered witness is qualified to offer an expert opinion, whether the
proffered expert's testimony should be admitted, and, if properly admitted,
whether the expert's testimony should be deemed credible. Section II also
identifies presumptions and prejudices which courts may possess regarding
homosexual parents and acknowledges the controversy surrounding the correct
methodology for diagnosing child sexual abuse and the impact this discord has
on a court's evidentiary decisions regarding experts. Section III presents a case
study of Hertzler v. Hertzler,"7 which illustrates the travesty resulting from a
trial court's failure to set aside its own prejudices and presumptions and to
adhere to the proper evidentiary standards. Section IV compares the
evidentiary standards articulated in Section II and the lessons learned in
Hertzler, urging that heightened standards should be used for expert witnesses
when a gay or lesbian parent is accused of child sexual abuse; it also proposes
additional safeguards for insuring relevant and reliable expert testimony in
such cases. A brief conclusion is set forth in Section V.
23. Anecdotal evidence from the author's legal practice and from other attorneys' experienc-
es strongly indicates that gay and lesbian parents often concede custody or agree to substantially
limited visitation to avoid a lengthy legal battle in a system which they perceive as substantially
biased against them. This conclusion is difficult if not impossible to verify empirically because
there is no objective method for ascertaining the motivations of parents who quietly consented to
custody and visitation arrangements rather than openly dispute the matters in court.
24. Jeffry H. Gallet, Judicial Management of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 23 FAM. L.Q. 477,
478 (1989).
25. Many of the observations and recommendations, however, may apply to cases involving
allegations of sexual abuse against a heterosexual parent.
26. No one is totally free of biases. The key to fair adjudication of legal disputes is recog-
nizing those biases and working to overcome them. "There is no doubt that none of us, judges in-
cluded, are able to refrain absolutely from introducing our own outlook and value system into
decisions or opinions. However, we must be aware of this and strive to make [as] objective an
analysis as possible of the facts before us." Judge Saviona Rotlevy, Expert Evidence: The Court's
Expectations, in ETHIcs & CHILD MENTAL HEALTH 272, 277 (Jocelyn Y. Hattab ed., 1994); see
also Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (1994) (discussing the effect of
judges' personal biases on their decision making process and the judicial system). Judge Nugent
believes that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a judge to set aside all internal and external influ-
ences when adjudicating cases, id. at 6, especially child custody cases, id. at 40-41, and that judg-
es bear responsibility for being sensitive to their biases and obtaining the education necessary to
overcome them, id. at 58-59.
27. 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).
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II. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN ADJUDICATING CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS
The role of expert witnesses in our adversarial system has long been the
subject of debate." Some view experts as barking seals or hired guns who
will perform as commanded by the party who retained them." Others
perceive experts as critical actors in the search for truth, especially when
technical, scientific, medical, or other issues arise which are beyond the ken of
juries and judges." Regardless of one's perception of experts, they have
become a permanent point of reference in our legal landscape.3
Cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse set the stage for a
classic battle of the experts. Disagreement among professionals regarding the
proper theories and methodology for diagnosing sexual abuse allows for
diametrically opposed-yet apparently well-founded--expert opinions in a
given case. Moreover, the judge's discretionary decisions on the admissibility
and relative credibility of the expert testimony will forever alter the lives of
the litigants and the alleged victim. 2 Thus, especially keen attention must be
paid by trial and appellate courts to the evidentiary standards which govern
expert testimony. As two experts in the area of child sexual abuse and the law
warned:
The clinician-expert constitutes the thirteenth juror or phantom judge
in any tried case of child sexual abuse. Privileged by the rules of
evidence that admit their opinions, experts give free-ranging and often
unreasoned opinions based on biases, prejudices, and assessment
heuristics that are merely idiosyncratic. Frequently, they present their
data selectively so as to make their opinions seem inevitable, when in
fact they are not.33
A. The Requisite Qualifications for Expert Witnesses
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which allows a witness to qualify as an
expert based on "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,""
28. Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in
American Courts, 31 JURIMETICS J. 375, 376-77 (1991).
29. Id. at 376 (describing expert witnesses as "well-paid prostitutes"); see also Eymard v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Experts whose opinions are
available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law.").
30. Champagne, supra note 28, at 376.
31. See generally Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert
Witnesses in the Courts-Part 11: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (1994).
32. "The decision to accept expert testimony in custody and visitation proceedings is gener-
ally within the discretion of the trial judge. The discretion extends to the qualification of experts,
the number of experts, and the admissibility of testimony .... SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-1I.
33. Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 406.
34. FED. R. EVID. 702 reads in its entirety: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
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reflects the general rule used in all state codes of evidence. 5 A trial judge
has extremely broad discretion in determining whether a particular witness
qualifies as an expert, based on one or more of these five factors.36 The result
of such discretion is that the judge's decision regarding a particular witness,
while not completely unfettered, will rarely be reversed on appeal.37
"One unique aspect of child custody and visitation litigation is that there
is a broader range of categories of witnesses courts will recognize ... than in
many other types of cases."" This phenomenon is especially true when
allegations of child sexual abuse have been raised. Medical doctors,
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses, and others representing a
wide range of clinical and academic experience have been allowed to offer
expert opinions on the veracity of child sexual abuse claims.39
B. The Standards Governing Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony
After qualifying a witness as an expert on child sexual abuse, the court
must independently determine the admissibility of the substance of the expert's
opinions. State courts primarily use two approaches to determine admissibility
of expert scientific testimony.'
The older standard, based on a 1923 District of Columbia opinion, Frye v.
United States," requires a threshold finding that the science and methodology
on which the expert bases her opinion are generally accepted in the expert's
particular discipline. 2 The alternative approach, articulated in the Supreme
Court's 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,43
purports to reject the Frye standard in favor of what is commonly termed a
"more liberal" avenue for the admission of expert testimony." Closer
35. FAUST F. Rossi, EXPERT WITNEssES 6 (1991).
36. The trial court's broad discretion has been respected in this country for more than a
century. Stillwell Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, 130 U.S. 520, 527 (1889) (stating that the qualification of a
witness is a preliminary question for the judge and it is conclusive "unless clearly shown to be
erroneous"); accord Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974) ("[T]he District Court has
wide discretion in its determination to admit and exclude evidence, and this is particularly true in
the case of expert testimony.").
37. Rossi, supra note 35, at 8.
38. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5.
39. Homer et. al, supra note 7, at 142-43; John E. B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1989).
40. Custody and visitation disputes are resolved by state courts because federal courts tradi-
tionally refuse to accept jurisdiction over domestic relations cases, even when diversity or other
federal court jurisdictional requirements are met. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, The Domes-
tic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine,
36 B.C. L. REv. 669 (1995) (examining the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction).
41. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
42. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
43. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (rejecting the Frye standard). A number of courts have referred
to Daubert as being more lenient than Frye regarding the admission of expert testimony. See also
Lisa M. Agrimonti, Note, The Limitations of Daubert and its Misapplication to Quasi-Scientific
Experts: A Two-Year Case Review of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 35 WASHBURN L.J.
134, 135 (1995) (concluding that Daubert "increased the number of ways by which scientific ex-
perts could qualify"). See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[B]y loosen-
ing the strictures on scientific evidence set by Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea that there should
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examination of the Frye and Daubert standards, however, reveals significant
similarities and suggests that reliability and relevance are the threshold
requirements of admission of expert testimony regardless of the standard
used.' Moreover, characterization of Daubert as creating a "more liberal" or
"easier" test than Frye is at least misleading if not altogether erroneous.'
1. The Frye Stanaard
The Frye decision affirmed a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
offered to establish the truthfulness of a defendant being prosecuted for
murder.47 The testimony was based on the results of a systolic blood pressure
test.' The court held that the lack of the test's general acceptance in the par-
ticular field from whence it came was fatal to the admissibility of the test re-
sults. 9 The Frye court readily conceded that its standard did not establish a
bright line test for admissibility:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."
The Frye "general acceptance" requirement has been and is still being
applied to various psychological methodologies and theories, including rape
trauma syndrome, the psychological profiles of sexual offenders, and post
traumatic stress disorder." Admissibility of an expert's diagnosis of child
be a presumption of admissibility of evidence."); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993)
("It is not lost upon us that this new standard serves to remove some of the barriers in the admis-
sion of expert testimony in many fields, including child sexual abuse cases.").
45. Divergent views have been offered on the impact of Daubert. Some have warned that
Daubert will result in courts and juries being inundated with "junk science." See, e.g., Charles R.
Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word "Expert" Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 547-50 (1994).
Others prophesied that the decision will have minimal impact due to the incorporation of the ele-
ments of Frye into the Daubert standard. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading
Cases: Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 107 HARV. L. REV. 254, 258 (1993). Another concern
is that Daubert is being used more broadly than the Supreme Court intended due to courts "misap-
plication of the decision to quasi-scientific experts" such as attorneys, police officers, and accoun-
tants. Agrimonti, supra note 44, at 140-56.
46. Daubert did not create an easier test than Frye. Rather, Daubert "is more lenient in that
it allows more, and more novel, science into evidence, but it can be much more difficult in that,
absent judicial notice, it requires a much more difficult, expensive, and time consuming founda-
tion" for admission of expert testimony. G. Michael Fenner, Evidence Review: The Past Year in
the Eighth Circuit, Plus Daubert, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 641 (1995).
47. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1014.
51. See also United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
trial court properly denied criminal defendant's request to have an expert examine him to deter-
mine if he met the profile of a sex offender because neither courts not scientific community had
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sexual abuse in a jurisdiction which uses Frye depends on the level of general
acceptance of the various methodologies, theories, and syndromes on which
the expert relied in reaching that diagnosis. 2 The requisite general acceptance
can be established through peer-reviewed publications in the relevant disci-
plines, previous judicial recognition, protocols established by professional
associations, and testimony by the experts on their peers' attitude regarding the
methodology or theory at issue.53
Critics of the Frye general acceptance test claim that it is too restrictive.
Many critics argue that this common law standard was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975"4 and the subsequent ad-
option of similar rules in a majority of the states.55 The Supreme Court
agreed with these arguments in its 1993 Daubert opinion, and rejected the sin-
gle-factor Frye general acceptance test in federal courts.56 Although state
courts which previously followed Frye are not bound by Daubert,57 a number
of them have adopted it,5" while others have explicitly rejected it in favor of
accepted profile as valid diagnostic technique); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49-50 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that psychiatric testimony regarding mental facility of the defendant satisfied
Frye standard because it was generally accepted); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp.
1072, 1077-78 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that testimony of expert based on post traumatic stress
disorder and rape trauma syndrome was not admissible to prove that alleged rape occurred be-
cause, inter alia, the conditions were not accepted in scientific community as proof that an event
occurred, but rather were accepted only as tools for diagnosis and treatment of patients), affd, 894
F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990). See generally JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 203, at 363 (4th ed. 1992); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
52. For an extensive discussion and critique of the application of Frye to expert testimony in
child sexual abuse cases, see Myers et al., supra note 39, at 23-29.
53. Giannelli, supra note 51, at 1205-07; Myers et al., supra note 39, at 23-29.
54. In United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), for example, the court wres-
tled with the admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. The
court concluded that the literal language and spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence, paired with
the difficulties encountered by courts in applying the Frye standard, compelled rejection of the
general acceptance test in favor of a more flexible standard. Id. at 1237. The test articulated in
Downing required a multi-step analysis which relegated general acceptance to a permitted but not
required inquiry for determining the reliability of the evidence. Id. The Downing decision influ-
enced the Supreme Court in Daubert. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 & n.12.
55. States with provisions governing expert witness testimony that are similar to FED. R.
EVID. 702 are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebras-
ka, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. GREGORY D. JOSEPH, ET AL., EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE
STATES § 51.5 (1994).
56. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
57. There are at least two reasons why state courts are free to adopt or reject Daubert. First,
14 states, including 10 which adopted Frye, do not have an evidentiary rule directly analogous to
FED. R. EVID. 702. See JOSEPH, ET AL., supra note 55, at § 51.5. Thus, a Supreme Court ruling
specifically interpreting Rule 702 is arguably irrelevant. Second, even where a state's evidentiary
code is modeled after the federal rules, the Supreme Court's interpretation of a rule of evidence is
not binding unless grounded in constitutional principles, which the Daubert decision is not. See,
e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1182-83 (Ariz. 1993) (noting that states are not bound by the
Supreme Court's "non-constitutional construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
58. Jurisdictions which utilize the Daubert standard include: Arkansas, see Jones v. State,
862 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Ark. 1993); Delaware, see Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del. 1993);
District of Columbia, see Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 652 (D.C. 1995); Iowa, see
Hutchison v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1994); Kentucky, see
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retaining the Frye standard. 9
2. The Daubert Factors
The Daubert plaintiffs alleged that prenatal ingestion of the prescription
drug Bendectin caused serious birth defects for which the drug manufacturer
should be held liable." Defendant's motion for summary judgment was sup-
ported by the affidavit of a "well-credentialed expert," physician and epidemi-
ologist Dr. Steven H. Lamm.6 Dr. Lamm supported his conclusion that
Bendectin is not a cause of birth defects in humans with extensive citations to
published epidemiological studies.62 Plaintiffs countered with affidavits from
eight experts, "each of whom also possessed impressive credentials." '63 The
conclusions of plaintiffs' experts that Bendectin could cause human birth de-
fects were based on studies linking Bendectin to malformation in animals,
analyses of chemical structure of Bendectin compared to other substances
known to cause human birth defects, and the "re-analysis" of previously pub-
lished epidemiological studies.' 4
The trial court found plaintiffs' proof insufficient to withstand defendant's
motion for summary judgment because the methodology employed by
plaintiffs' experts was not, in the court's opinion, generally accepted in the
discipline to which it belonged." The trial court reasoned that since epidemi-
ological study was the method most widely accepted by the scientific commu-
nity for proving causation, and because the peer-reviewed and published epide-
miological studies cited by defense expert, Dr. Lamm, all negated a finding of
causation between Bendectin and human birth defects, plaintiffs' evidence
based on re-analysis of such data was not admissible. 6' Relying on Frye and
its progeny, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of
plaintiffs' evidence for lack of general acceptance in the relevant scientific
Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Ky. 1994); Louisiana, see State v. Foret, 628 So.
2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993); Montana, see Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc., 870 P.2d 51, 56 (Mont.
1994); New Mexico, see State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993); Oklahoma, see Taylor
v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328-29 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); South Carolina, see State v. Dinkins, 462
S.E.2d 59, 60 (S.C. 1995); South Dakota, see Department of Soc. Servs. v. McCarty, 506 N.W.2d
144, 147 (S.D. 1993); Texas, see E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549,
556 (Tex. 1995); Vermont, see State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226, 229 (Vt. 1993); West Virginia, see
Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993); and Wyoming, see Springfield v. State, 860
P.2d 435, 442 (Wyo. 1993). Wisconsin adheres to a standard virtually identical to Daubert which
was articulated in State v. Walstad, 351 N.W.2d 469, 485-86 (Wis. 1984).
59. States which continue to adhere to Frye include Arizona, see State v. Bible, 858 P.2d
1152, 1182-83 (Ariz. 1993); Florida, see Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993);
Maryland, see Keene Corp. v. Hall, 626 A.2d 997, 1004 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Nebraska,
see State v. Dean, 523 N.W.2d 681, 692 (Neb. 1994); New York, see People v. Wesley, 633 N.E-
.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994); and Washington, see State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 48 n.1 (Wash. 1994).
See generally JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 55, at § 51.5.
60. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 583.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 583-84.
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community.67 The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, stat-
ing that the "austere" general acceptance standard of Frye was "absent from
and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence."'
On remand, the Supreme Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to replace
Frye with a multifaceted approach designed to insure the relevancy and reli-
ability of the proffered expert evidence.' While acknowledging that
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence,"7 the Daubert Court directed inferi-
or courts to undertake additional gatekeeping measures to exclude specious
and potentially misleading expert testimony.' Simply stated, the Court sought
to draw the line between "shaky but admissible" and inadmissible expert testi-
mony.
The first step in the Daubert line-drawing exercise is determining the
relevance of the proffered expert testimony to the issues in the case." Rele-
vancy is established, the Court explained, if there is a "fit" between the expert
scientific testimony and the issues in the case.73 No fit exists, however, unless
the scientific testimony is based on valid scientific methodology and data.74
The Court further explained the relationship between relevance and scientific
validity as follows:
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid
scientific "knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if
darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact
[and is thus relevant and admissible]. However (absent credible
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a
certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an
individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that
night [and thus is not relevant and not admissible]. 5
The Court declined to provide a "definitive checklist or test" in favor of
offering "general observations" for determining scientific validity of an
expert's testimony.76 The proper focus, the Daubert Court cautioned, "must
be solely on principles and methodology [employed by the expert], not on the
conclusions that they generate."77 A key inquiry identified by the Court is
67. Id. at 584.
68. Id. at 589.
69. Id. at 589-90.
70. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
71. Id. See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard & William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper:
The Role of the District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1457 (1994) (stat-
ing that district courts' role as "gatekeepers" will limit the expansion of opinion testimony).
72. The Daubert relevance requirement is based on the general provisions of FED. R. EVID.
401 and 402, which allow admission of relevant evidence and exclude irrelevant material, and on
FED. R. EVID. 702, which permits expert testimony if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S at 587-91.
73. Id. at 591.
74. Id.
75. Id. (bracketed materials added).
76. Id. at 593.
77. ld. at 595 (bracketed materials added).
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whether the methodology or theory employed by the expert can and has been
tested,78 a factor referred to by social scientists as "falsifiability."7 9 Publica-
tion of the theory or methodology in a peer-reviewed journal, identification of
the known or potential rate of error of the technique employed by the expert,
and consideration of the general level of acceptance of the theory or method-
ology in the relevant discipline also bear on the reliability inquiry." Thus, the
Daubert Court did not reject the Frye "general acceptance" standard whole-
sale; rather, it described general acceptance as "an important factor in ruling
particular evidence admissible."'" The Court further explained that a tech-
nique known to the relevant scientific community, but which has only gar-
nered minimal support, "may properly be viewed with skepticism."82
Application of the Daubert standard to expert testimony in a case involv-
ing child sexual abuse thus demands a highly nuanced inquiry into the meth-
odology employed by the proffered experts, with the general level of the
methodology's acceptance-which would serve as determinative under
Frye-being only one of several important criteria of admissibility. The
expert's skill and integrity in the selection, execution, and application of her
chosen method of diagnosing sexual abuse must also be closely scrutinized be-
fore the evidence is deemed sufficiently reliable and thus admissible.
The question has been raised as to whether Daubert should apply to the
"soft" sciences such as behavioral and social science data offered in child
sexual abuse cases, or only to the "hard" sciences which were actually at issue
in Daubert.83 Others have cautioned that if Daubert applies to all cases in-
78. Id. at 593. The testing requirement is based on the work of two philosophers of science,
Sir Karl Popper and Professor Carl Hempel, who identified "falsibility"-that is, the ability to test
and the actual testing of a theory-as the factor which "distinguishes science from other fields of
human inquiry." Id.
79. See generally James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psycho-
logical Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10, 12-14 (1995); Ralph Underwager & Hollida
Wakefield, A Paradigm Shift for Expert Witnesses, 5 ISSUES CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS 156,
158-60 (1993).
80. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
81. Id. at 594. Incorporation of the Frye general acceptance standard into the Daubert crite-
ria for applying the Federal Rules of Evidence to expert testimony arguably creates an internal
inconsistency, since the Daubert Court specifically held that "the Frye test was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. at 587. Unlike the Frye test, however, the determi-
nation of admissibility under Daubert is not limited to the single criterion of general acceptance.
In applying the Daubert criteria on remand, for example, the Ninth Circuit examined each of the
Daubert criteria, but affirmed its earlier ruling made under Frye that the expert testimony offered
by plaintiffs to establish the causal link between Bendectin and birth defects was inadmissible.
Daubert v. Men-ell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit interpreted
the Supreme Court's pronouncements as follows:
[Tihe proponent of expert scientific testimony may attempt to satisfy its burden through
the testimony of its own experts. For such a showing to be sufficient, the experts must
explain precisely how they went about reaching their conclusions and point to some
objective source-a learned treatise, the policy statement of a professional association, a
published article in a reputable scientific journal or the like-to show that they have
followed the scientific method, as it is practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of
scientists in their field.
Id. at 1319. See generally John S. Mills, Case Comment, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on Remand: The Ninth Circuit Loses Its Way in the "Brave New World," 29
GA. L. REv. 849 (1995) (discussing the application of Daubert on remand).
82. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
83. See C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry:
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volving experts, "criticisms of the use of expert testimony by psychiatrists and
psychologists will become more aggressive," especially on grounds of reliabili-
ty (or lack thereof).,4
Courts have recognized, however, that the gatekeeping function of the trial
judge established by Daubert is readily applicable to all expert testimony, and
is not limited to expert evidence grounded in the hard sciences. s5 For many
reasons parsed throughout this article, the author believes that the judge's
gatekeeping role as established in Daubert is workable and indeed necessary
to screen for credibility and bias in expert testimony regarding child abuse
allegations.8 6
3. The Commonality of Frye and Daubert Criteria
The differences between the Frye and Daubert standards for the admissi-
bility of expert testimony can and have been debated at length. 7 Both stan-
dards, however, require a threshold showing that some agreement exists
among the relevant discipline's members regarding the particular methodology
and theories used by the expert before that expert's opinion is deemed admis-
sible. Under Daubert, further examination of the expert's data and methodolo-
gy is required to uncover potential cracks in the dam through which a stream
of unreliability may seep. In addition, the courts must apply other evidentiary
standards to expert testimony, including the requirement that even reliable,
relevant evidence should "be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 8
Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 211, 227 (1995); Agrimonti,
supra note 44, at 136.
84. Showalter, supra note 83, at 226.
85. See generally Krista L. Duncan, Note, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics"? Psycho-
logical Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753 (1996) (addressing
application of Daubert standard to combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder, rape trauma syn-
drome, battered woman syndrome, and battered child syndrome). See, e.g., Berry v. Detroit, 25
F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995).
86. For the view that the Daubert criteria are not sufficient to guide a court's determination
of the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony, see Showalter, supra note 83. Showalter pro-
poses a series of specific "gatekeeping" functions for the trial court when this type of expert evi-
dence is proffered. The series parallels the suggestions made in this article, such as increased
scrutiny of the expert's qualifications, an in-depth analysis of the facts on which the expert based
her opinion, and an intense review of the methodology employed by the expert. Id. at 236-37. The
primary difference between Showalter and this author is that this author believes Daubert already
mandates each of these steps. See, e.g., Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342
(D. Neb. 1994) (applying Daubert criteria to testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists offered
in civil case alleging that the plaintiffs, seven mentally retarded individuals, were physically, emo-
tionally, and sexually abused by their teachers), affd, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995).
87. See, e.g., Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1995) (concluding that "Daubert did not contemplate a revolutionary
change in the practice of the federal courts"); Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for
Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994); Nancy A. Miller, Daubert and Junk
Science: Have Admissibility Standards Changed?, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 501 (1994); Joseph Sanders,
Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387 (1994);
Simard & Young, supra note 71, at 1457.
88. FED. R. EVID. 403. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence." Id.
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Regardless of the evidentiary standard applied, the trial judge undertakes a
significant burden in determining the validity of an expert opinion predicated
on scientific analysis. The judge may be particularly tempted to abandon care-
ful review of scientific principles in favor of crediting the expert's conclusions
which coincide with the judge's personal beliefs. Professor Shelia Jasanoff,
Chair of the Department of Science and Technology Studies at Cornell Uni-
versity, aptly observed that courts evaluating scientific testimony "inescapably
give up the role of dispassionate observer to become participants in a particu-
lar construction ... of scientific facts." 9 She further cautioned that judges
faced with complex scientific evidence may "shape an image of reality that is
colored in part by their own preferences and prejudices about how the world
should work."' As more fully illustrated through the textual treatment of the
Hertzler case, the reshaping of reality is a distinct possibility in cases involv-
ing allegations of sexual abuse by a gay or lesbian parent.9
C. The Standards for Determining the Credibility of Expert Witness
Testimony
After a court has qualified an expert as a witness, the court must indepen-
dently assess the credibility of the expert's testimony regarding the allegations
of sexual abuse. As one judge explained:
The Court eventually decides on the basis of facts stated by ordinary
witnesses and, where necessary, on the basis of the conclusions of
expert witnesses. From this it becomes apparent that the expert
witness' conclusion, like every other fact, is not unequivocal proof,
and it may be contradicted by other evidence. Even as far as the
expert evidence is concerned, the Judge evaluates it according to
criteria of veracity and credibility, including the professional ability
of the witness, the manner in which his opinion is drafted and the
Court's impression of the witness in the witness box.92
In determining the expert witness's credibility, either in isolation or in
comparison to the testimony of other expert and lay witnesses, the court's
exercise of discretion is even broader than its initial determination regarding
admissibility of the expert's testimony.93 Authority for this deference is
found, inter alia, in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 and its state law coun-
terparts, which provide in relevant part that in cases tried to the bench,
"[flindings of fact.., shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credi-
89. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICA-
TURE 77, 82 (1993).
90. Id.
91. See discussion of Hertzler, infra Part Ii.
92. Rotlevy, supra note 26, at 274. Although Rotlevy was commenting on the Israeli court
system, his words apply equally to the U.S. civil system.
93. See, e.g., People v. Zimmerman, 189 N.W.2d 259, 285 (Mich. 1971) (holding that the
trial court has properly exercised its discretion regarding expert testimony when, after carefully
reviewing the expert's qualification and skills, the court utilizes "good judicial common sense as
to whether the witness's testifying would be in the best interest of justice").
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bility of the witnesses. 94 Indeed, appellate courts traditionally give almost
total deference to the trial court's assessment of the relative credibility of any
witnesses,95 including experts.96 This rationale for vesting trial courts with
such a high degree of discretion regarding credibility determinations was elo-
quently explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court more than a century ago:
The judge before whom the cause was tried heard the testimony,
observed the appearance and bearing of the witnesses and their man-
ner of testifying, and was much better qualified to pass upon the
credibility and weight of their testimony than this court can be. There
are many comparatively trifling appearances and incidents, lights and
shadows, which are not preserved in the record, which may well have
affected the mind of the judge.., in forming opinions of the weight
of the evidence, the character and credibility of the witnesses, and of
the very right and justice of the case.97
But while the reasons for allowing deference to the trial court's credibility
may be sound, this "hands-off' standard of review also offers an invitation for
the trial court to base its credibility evaluation of an expert on Whether the
expert's opinion is consistent with that reached by the judge herself.98 In J.P.
v. P.W.,9 for example, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court
had complete authority to determine that the social science evidence indicating
no significant difference between heterosexual and homosexual parents was
not credible, even though no contradictory evidence was adduced on that is-
sue."r In Professor Jasanoff's words, the judge's determination as to which
expert provides the most credible opinion on the sexual abuse allegations may
be based on the judges "own preferences and prejudices" regarding gay par-
ents rather than the relative strength of the scientific methodology underlying
the experts' opinions."'
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
95. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 291 (11. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
trial court judge is in the best position "to observe and judge the witnesses' demeanor and credi-
bility"); Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("We will not re-
weigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses."); Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881, 882
(La. Ct. App.) ("The factual findings of the trial court, particularly where those findings are based
on an evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and will not be dis-
turbed unless clearly erroneous."). Interestingly, a New York court of appeals had no compunction
summarily reversing a trial court's credibility assessments where the lower court's credibility de-
terminations vindicated rather than condemned the gay parent accused of sexually molesting his
children. In re Michael C., 566 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
96. As one court observed: "The trial court was simply not required to accept the opinions
of experts. ... There was evidence intrinsic to this record and the knowledge of the trial court
which would seriously damage the credibility of the witnesses [including that of the experts]."
J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
97. McLimans v. City of Lancaster, 15 N.W. 194, 195 (Wis. 1883).
98. For a compelling statistical demonstration as to why a judge relying on her own conclu-
sions can never be more accurate than an expert's opinion on the veracity of sexual abuse allega-
tions, see Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 241-44.
99. 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
100. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793.
101. Jasanoff, supra note 89, at 82. Examples of the "preferences and prejudices" often dis-
played by courts regarding gay and lesbian parents are discussed immediately infra Part Il.D.
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D. Assumptions made by Courts Regarding Gay and Lesbian Parents
A parent's gay or lesbian orientation often results in denial of custody and
severe restrictions of visitation rights.'O2 Although modem courts have been
more respectful of the constitutional rights of gay and lesbian parents to asso-
ciate with their children, a non-heterosexual parent's sexual orientation still
takes center stage under the rubric of the "best interest of the child" determi-
nation." 3 Moreover, the best interests standard "gives substantial discretion
to a judge to make his own implicit predictions and impose his own value
judgments about which parent might better serve the child's needs or inter-
ests. ' ' "M Bottoms v. Bottoms"5 is a case in point.'"
Sharon Bottoms' mother, Kay, challenged Sharon for custody of Sharon's
two-year-old son.0 7 In her petition for custody, Kay claimed that Sharon had
abused her son by once hitting him hard enough to leave a mark on his leg,
had neglected him, and was endangering his well-being by living in a lesbian
relationship.' 8 The trial court granted Kay's petition, holding that Sharon's
lesbian relationship constituted illegal and immoral conduct which automati-
cally rendered her an unfit parent."°
The intermediate appellate court reversed due to the absence of evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption favoring parental custody.'"' Contrary to
the trial court's interpretation of the law and facts, the intermediate appeals
court found significant evidence in the record that the boy was well-adjusted
and happy and that Sharon was a good mother."' Moreover, significant so-
cial science data presented at trial supported the conclusion that the boy would
not suffer future emotional or psychological harm because of his mother's
sexual orientation." 2 Sharon's victory, however, was short-lived.
The Virginia Supreme Court reinstated the award of custody to the child's
grandmother.' The four-to-three majority repeatedly denied that it was jud-
102. See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eight-
ies--Part 2, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 275, 327-71 (1986) (discussing custody cases involving gay
and lesbian parents); Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay
Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623 (1996) (examining the relevance of sexual identity
and conduct in determining custody and visitation rights).
103. See Fowler, supra note 9, at 362-63.
104. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LE-
GAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 282 (1992). The uncertainty of the judge's application of the best in-
terests standard also "provides an uncertain backdrop for out-of-court negotiations." id. The author
is aware of a number of instances in which a gay or lesbian parent has conceded custody to a
former spouse for fear that the court will deny all custody and visitation to the non-heterosexual
parent under the "best interests of the child" rubric.
105. 444 S.E.2d 276, 279 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
106. See generally Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and the Judi-
cial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 341 (1995) (discussing the
Virginia Supreme Court's decision regarding a lesbian mother's right to custody).
107. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 280-81.
111. Id. at 281.
112. Id. at 283-84.
113. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
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ging Sharon based on her sexual orientation per se." 4 But there is little else
to explain its evaluation of the evidence of record and all of its inferences
drawn therefrom as negatively as possible toward Sharon, nor to explain its
willingness to overlook the fact that Kay was, until the time of trial, cohab-
itating with a man who had repeatedly sexually abused Sharon."' The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court also refused to consider the social science evidence ad-
mitted at trial regarding the parenting abilities of lesbian mothers. Instead, the
court reaffirmed the position taken a decade earlier "that living daily under
conditions stemming from active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose
a burden upon a child" due to the social stigma involved." 6
The dissenting justices noted that there was no evidence of record in Bot-
toms showing that the mother's homosexual conduct harmed the child, and
that "the majority improperly presumes that its own perception of societal
opinion and the mother's homosexual conduct are germane to the issue wheth-
er the mother is an unfit parent."" 7 This perspective was echoed by Char-
lotte Patterson, the University of Virginia psychology professor who, as an
expert at the Bottoms trial, presented significant empirical data on gay and
lesbian parents which directly contradicted the majority's conclusions.' If
the courts won't pay heed to the evidence, Professor Patterson asked, "with
what are we left?""' 9
As the Bottoms case illustrates, because of society's general stereotyping
of homosexuals as per se negative influences on children, "lesbian and gay
parents face judicial scrutiny that is more rigorous than that experienced by
heterosexual individuals in similar circumstances. In fact, their claims are
sometimes peremptorily dismissed by presumptions which a priori reject ho-
mosexuals as custodial parents."'2 °
Substantial empirical data on homosexual parents demonstrates that many
common assumptions courts make regarding such parents and their children
are simply false.'2' As Professor Patricia Falk points out in her comprehen-
114. Id. at 108.
115. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 278-79.
116. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108 (citing Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)).
117. Id. at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting). Similar suggestions of anti-gay bias are found by
comparing the majority decision with the dissent in White v. Thompson, 569 So.2d 1181 (Miss.
1990), where another young lesbian mother lost custody of her children to their paternal grandpar-
ents, and in the internally inconsistent Hertzler decision, discussed infra Part HI. See also Note,
Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 617, 618-621 (1989) (providing an explanation of cases predicating determination of
custody on parent's sexual orientation).
118. Chris Bull, Losing the War: The Courts Disregard Evidence in Denying a Lesbian
Mother Custody of Her Son, ADVOCATE, May 30, 1995, at 33-35.
119. Id. at 33 (quoting Charlotte Patterson).
120. David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 346 (1994). In J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989), for example, the court boldly stated that "it is established that expert testimony is not a
necessary basis for a determination that exposure to a homosexual influence will adversely affect a
child." Id. at 793. The court cited similar authority from Virginia, North Dakota, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania for the proposition that the court could take the equivalent of judicial notice that any
exposure to homosexuality harms children. Id.; see also Fowler, supra note 9, at 363 (discussing
courts' per se approach to homosexuality as an absolute bar to custody).
121. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 2.
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sive collection and analyses of these data, lesbian mothers enjoy the same or
higher degree of emotional stability and mental health than their heterosexual
counterparts, 2 and possess similar if not superior parenting skills.123 Chil-
dren living with a lesbian mother are no more likely to experience mental or
emotional difficulties than other children2 4 and do not suffer gender identity
crises.2 5 Moreover, children of lesbian mothers are no more likely to be ho-
mosexual than other children 2 6 and are not socially stigmatized by their
mother's sexual orientation. 27 Although the research on gay fathers is not as
voluminous as that available on lesbian mothers, the same results have been
indicated. 2 1 Children living with homosexual parents are not at an increased
risk to contract AIDS, even if the parent is HIV-positive 29 In addition, as
previously noted, children are much more likely to be sexually abused by
heterosexuals than homosexuals. 3 °
Despite this growing body of scientific proof that gay and lesbian parents
are as competent, if not more so, as heterosexual parents, courts still tend to
focus on a parent's homosexuality and exclude consideration of other factors
relevant to a child's best interest when deciding custody and visitation dis-
putes. '3 "Also, the courts tend to base their decisions more on the attitudes
or stereotypes of gay individuals than on the facts in any particular case."'
32
After studying a number of custody and visitation cases involving gay and
lesbian parents, one legal scholar concluded that "[t]he image that materializes
in judicial decisions is a composite of two separate stereotypes of homosexu-
als: the first, as an emblem of dangerous malum in se criminality, and the
second, as someone with a life-style devoid of any marital or familial attrib-
utes.' 3' A parent's sexual orientation should be an issue only where there
is a proven nexus between the orientation and harm to the child.134 But even
when courts "find" the requisite harm to the child, such findings are often





The courts' aversion to gay and lesbian parents reflects a fundamental
122. Falk, supra note 2, at 137-38. The American Psychiatric Association removed homosex-
uality from its list of approved mental disorders in 1973. Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff,
Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 691,
726 (1976).
123. Falk, supra note 2, at 138-40.
124. Id. at 140-42.
125. Id. at 143-46.
126. Id. at 146-47.
127. Id. at 147-51 (stating that "the majority of children were not conscious of society's atti-
tudes toward their mothers").
128. For a compilation of this research, see Barret & Robinson, supra note 2, at 157-69.
129. Flaks, supra note 120, at 361.
130. Barret & Robinson, supra note 2, at 161-62; Falk, supra note 2, at 142-43; Flaks, supra
note 120, at 359-61; Jenny et al., supra note 2, at 44.
131. Falk, supra note 2, at 136; Fowler, supra note 9, at 362-63 (noting that homosexual
parents in Canada experience same bias as their counterparts in the United States).
132. Falk, supra note 2, at 136.
133. Ronner, supra note 106, at 345.
134. See cases cited supra note 19; see also Fowler, supra note 9, at 364-65 (discussing the
"nexus" test).
135. Falk, supra note 2, at 136; Fowler, supra note 9, at 365-71.
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misunderstanding of what homosexuals do and who they are. Much of the
misunderstanding is a result of categorizing persons solely as "homosexuals"
and use of terms such as "sexual orientation." The "sexual" emphasis of this
language reduces every member of this radically diverse group to a one-di-
mensional character defined by the type of sexual behaviors in which others
assume he or she engages.'36 The terms also imply that sexual behavior is
the most important aspect of their existence, a misconception which has signif-
icant negative ramifications when a gay or lesbian parent is accused of child
sexual abuse.
In fact, the diversity within the gay and lesbian population is at least as
broad as that found in society as a whole." 7 Unfortunately, the chronic mis-
characterization of homosexuals as single-minded sexual predators is further
fueled by the invisibility of the vast majority of gay and lesbian people.
Courts, and many others in our society, think of homosexuals as flaming hair
dressers or motorcycle dykes living decadent, separatist lives in the gay ghet-
tos of San Francisco, West Hollywood, New York City, Provincetown, or Key
West. '3 In reality, gay and lesbian persons are so diverse that they remain
virtually unnoticed as they go about their lives, working hard, paying their
taxes, and taking care of their families of origin and families of choice.'39
Many gay and lesbian persons choose to remain invisible to avoid just the
kind of prejudice that the courts and others display when sexual orientation is
revealed."4 Ironically, their invisibility further perpetuates the courts' mis-
conceptions as to who homosexuals are.
As the Hertzler case illustrates, judicial reliance on assumptions as to who
gay and lesbian persons are and what they do is especially malapropos when a
homosexual parent is accused of child sexual abuse.' 4'
136. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX & REASON 293 (1992) (while discussing the numer-
ous legal disadvantages encountered by homosexuals, Posner defines homosexuals as "persons
who have a strong and basically lifelong preference for sexual relations with persons of their own
sex").
137. An author who has long studied lesbian "culture" explains: "Ask a hundred different
lesbians about identities and acts, and there will be a thousand different answers. We are not re-
ducible to any identity captured by the category lesbian, nor are we reducible to our sexual activi-
ties." RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 83 (1992)
(emphasis in the original).
138. One gay activist observes "that there is no such thing as a separate homosexual com-
munity; that gay men's lives can be as ordinary, dull or exciting as anyone else's." Nick Cohen,
Secret World of 'Outing' Group that Seeks Publicity for Others, INDEF.ENDENT, July 30, 1991,
Home News Page Section, at 3 (quoting Michael Cashman).
139. The reality is that homosexuals "are your friends, your minister, your teacher, your bank
teller, your doctor, your mail carrier, your office-mate, your roommate, your congressional repre-
sentative, your sibling, parent, spouse. They are everywhere, virtually all ordinary, virtually all un-
known." Richard D. Mohr, Gay Basics: Some Questions, Facts, and Values, in BIGOTRY, PREJU-
DICE AND HATRED: DEFINITIONS, CAUSES & SOLUTIONS 167 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1992).
140. Id.
141. See discussion of Hertzler, infra Part III.
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E. The Discord Among Experts Regarding the Diagnosis of Child Sexual
Abuse and Its Implications for the Admissibility and Credibility of Expert
Testimony
Like the courts,"42 the mental health and medical communities strive to
advance the "best interests of the child" when making evaluations for custody
and visitation purposes.'43. This hyper-elastic standard allows the experts and
the courts tremendous discretion in rendering an opinion as to the proper
boundaries of the relationship between a particular child and parent. Due in
part to this almost unfettered discretion afforded the experts, commentators
have argued that expert testimony-routinely offered by psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, and other mental health professionals-is not necessary in most custody
and visitation matters.'" Critics claim "that no empirical data exist to dem-
onstrate the usefulness of psychological theory in child custody determinations,
that ambiguous psychological theories are often used as excuses for bad legal
decisions, and that, at best, testimony based on psychological theory is simply
common sense and a superfluous use of experts."'45 Others contend that
since experts can only make recommendations based on present circumstances,
"experts are generally no better equipped or positioned than ordinary partici-
pants in the judicial system" to predict the future results of any given custody
or visitation determination."
In response, advocates of expert testimony in custody and visitation cases
counter that experts provide a wealth of information that courts would not
receive but for the expert testimony. 47 Information that might escape the
court's notice includes "the feelings, attitudes, and personality traits of the
relevant parties; the communication of emotions the parties are themselves
unable to communicate to the court directly; and the highlighting of significant
portions of the evidence that might otherwise go unnoticed or unappreciat-
ed."'"
The debate regarding the need for experts is greatly diminished in cases
142. The statutory or case law standard of "the best interests of the child" is used in all U.S.
jurisdictions to determine child custody and visitation matters. "The simplicity and flexibility of
this standard" which precludes "generalizations about its meaning or content" requires application
on a case-by-case basis and does not allow precision in predicting results in any given case.
SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-2. For the roles which expert witnesses play in the "best interests"
determination, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986).
143. The premier guideline adopted by the American Psychological Association in its Guide-
lines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings, for example, states that "[tihe prima-
ry purpose of the evaluation is to assess the best psychological interests of the child." Marc J.
Ackerman, American Psychological Association Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Di-
vorce Proceedings, 8 Am. J. FAM. L. 129, 129-30, app. at 132 (1994). The second guideline reaf-
firms that "[tihe child's interests and well-being are paramount." Id. See generally JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 142 (discussing, inter alia, the conflicts inherent in the custody
recommendations made by child care professionals); Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 247-50.
144. See, e.g., SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5; Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 247-48.
145. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5.
146. Homer & Guyer 1, supra note 1, at 247-48.
147. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5.
148. Id.; see also Sanford S. Dranoff & Mitchell Y. Cohen, Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and
Social Workers: Getting the Most Out of Experts, 10 FAM. ADVOC. 20, 21 (1987) (contending that
"the nature of custody litigation requires expert testimony").
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where sexual abuse of a child is alleged. 49 Indeed, the value of competent
expert testimony is almost universally recognized by the medical and legal
communities. 5 ' As one family law judge explained, "[blecause so many sex-
ual abuse cases involve children whose ability to recall, report, or evaluate
events is in question, there is an unusually high incidence of, and need for,
reliance on expert testimony."''
Unfortunately, the experts to whom the courts turn for guidance are divid-
ed about the proper methodology for determining whether a child has been
sexually abused and for identifying the perpetrator.' Disagreement among
medical and mental health experts on a reliable method for diagnosing sexual
abuse of children has caused various theories and methodology to wax and
wane in popularity over the years. As a result, behaviors or characteristics
viewed by one mental health professional as indicative of sexual abuse will be
viewed by another as counter-indicative of abuse.'53 Indeed, "almost any cir-
cumstance, behavior or observation can be rationalized as supporting the con-
clusion that sexual abuse occurred."'5 4 The one point on which experts agree
is that the diagnosis of child sexual abuse is an extremely controversial and in-
exact science,'55 especially in the context of custody and visitation dis-
putes.'56 As several experts explained in a collaborative piece:
The diagnosis of child sexual abuse is difficult for several reasons.
There is often little or no clear history of abuse. Sexual abuse is usu-
ally committed secretly and incidents are rarely witnessed. Young
children with limited verbal skills might be unable to describe their
experience or their account might be questionable. Even when it ap-
149. See also Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 402-03 (discussing the role of experts in
sex abuse cases). Cf Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 249-50 (arguing "that experts have no
special insights to offer beyond those of the ordinary person" when presented with the ambiguities
inherent in child sexual abuse allegations in the divorce context).
150. See generally Myers et al., supra note 39 (discussing scientific and legal standards and
conflicts which come into play when child sexual abuse is at issue). See, e.g., INGER J. SAGATUN
& LEONARD P. EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 210 (1995) (stating that "[a]
significant means of proving that child abuse has occurred is through the testimony of an expert
witness").
151. Gallet, supra note 24, at 480.
152. See, e.g., Underwager & Wakefield, supra note 79, at 160-62.
153. Id. (stating that a number of inconsistent behaviors are all construed as being "consistent
with" sexual abuse).
154. Id. at 161.
155. In one study, 129 child abuse specialists were each asked to estimate the probability that
a mother's allegations of child sexual abuse against the child's father were true. Thomas M. Hor-
ner et al., The Biases of Child Sexual Abuse Experts: Believing Is Seeing, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 281, 288 (1993). Participants were provided with extensive data about the child
and parents including videotaped presentations of the child interacting with both parents. Id. The
extremely wide range of probability estimates offered by the experts led the authors of the study
to conclude that while some of the experts were probably more accurate than others, it was impos-
sible to determine which, if any, of the experts were correct. Id.
156. In fact, "[tihe issue of sexual-abuse allegations in custody and visitation (access) disputes
is perhaps one of the most controversial issues in Forensic Child Psychiatry." George A. Awad &
Hanna McDonough, Therapeutic Management of Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody and Visita-
tion Disputes, 45 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 113, 113 (1991). Awad and McDonough suggest that
the judicial model for determining the veracity of the allegations should be replaced with a long-
term therapeutic management of all the parties involved. Id. at 120.
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pears that children are describing abuse, doubts might persist about
the veracity of their statements, particularly in the context of an acri-
monious custody dispute."'
Experts have identified a number of behavioral problems in children as
indicative of sexual molestation, with age-inappropriate sexual behavior seen
as a primary predictor of sexual abuse. 5 Common sense, as well as psycho-
logical data, seem to support the connection between sexual abuse and sexual
activity, but the association between the two is far from certain. 59 One of
the drawbacks to making this link is defining "abnormal" sexual activities or
knowledge." For example, masturbation is common in children; thus, the
issue arises as to when masturbation is so excessive as to indicate sexual
abuse.' 6' Moreover, a child's heightened sexual activity may result from
stimulus other than sexual abuse, such as clandestinely observing parents or
others engaging in sexual activity.'62 "In addition, highly sexualized behavior
is sometimes seen in children who are not thought to have been abused."'63
Sexually abused children also display a commonality of psychological
traits including aggression, high levels of anxiety and fear, depression, low
self-esteem and psychosomatic disorders such as enuresis."6M But since none
of these problems is unique to sexually abused children, the existence of one
or more of these traits does not automatically support a finding of abuse.'65
Finally, even evidence obtained during a medical examination of an al-
leged victim is subject to debate among experts." 6 This uncertainty stems
from investigators' disagreement as to what constitutes "normal" childhood
anatomy, and is exacerbated further by disagreement as to what constitutes
"abnormal" anatomy.'67 Even when evaluators agree that a particular physi-
cal characteristic is abnormal, they disagree as to whether that characteristic is
caused by sexual abuse."6 Physical abnormalities may also be due to causes
other than sexual abuse.
69
The discord among child sexual abuse experts regarding the accuracy of
various diagnostic tools should not, however, serve as an excuse for the judge
to disregard a qualified and credible expert's testimony and decide the case
157. Howard Dubowitz et al., The Diagnosis of Child Sexual Abuse, 146 AM. J. DISEASES









166. See Myers et al., supra note 39, at 34-51; Schultz, supra note 14, at 6-7.
167. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 688-89; see generally David M. Paul, The Pitfalls
Which May Be Encountered During an Examination for Signs of Sexual Abuse, 30 MED. Sci. L. 3
(1990).
168. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 689.
169. "For example, unusual vaginal irritations or discharges can result from overly zealous
cleaning, poor hygiene, or self-stimulation; genital redness may be due to bubble baths or diaper
rash; and anal discoloration may be due to hard stools." Schultz, supra note 14, at 7.
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based on his layman's perspective on the subject or, even worse, on a "gut
feeling" that the abuse did or did not occur. In view of the serious ramifica-
tions of child sexual abuse allegations and the general duty imposed on the
court as an impartial trier of fact, the court, with the aid of the respective
parties' counsel, must ensure that expert testimony admitted and deemed credi-
ble in the case is offered by competent professionals whose diagnoses are
grounded in solid scientific principles and not in the experts' bias against the
gay or lesbian parent. Accordingly, the qualifications of experts and the rele-
vance and reliability of the methodologies and theories underlying the experts'
opinions must be subject to vigorous review pursuant to the evidentiary princi-
ples of Frye, Daubert, and the rules of evidence previously discussed.
The Hertzler case, discussed immediately below, illustrates the injustice
which results when the court refuses to set aside its anti-gay bias and appro-
priately scrutinize the proffered expert's testimony according to the proper
standards.
III. THE HERTZLER V. HERTZLER170 LITIGATION
A. The Divorce and Initial Custody Agreement
Pamela and Dean Hertzler were married in 1976 and resided on the
Hertzler farm in Veteran, Wyoming. 7 ' During their marriage they adopted
two children, Joshua and Miriam,'72 immediately after the children's
births.73 Shortly after the second child arrived, tensions in the marriage be-
came acute.'74 Pamela initiated divorce proceedings and moved away from
the Hertzler farm with Joshua and Miriam in January, 1991.71
In the spring of 1991, Pamela, who had been questioning her sexual ori-
entation for some time, determined that she is a lesbian. 76 Dean did not con-
test the divorce, but just before the divorce decree was finalized in July 1991,
Pamela lied to Dean about her sexual orientation so she could keep her chil-
dren. 77 By agreement of the parties, Pamela became the custodial parent and
Dean was provided with seasonal visitation rights.
7
1
In October 1991, while living in Morrill, Nebraska, Pamela became ro-
mantically involved with Peggy Keating of Lakewood, Ohio. 179 Pamela's
170. 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).
171. Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 13, 14, 17, 780, Hertzler v. Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Dist.
Ct. Goshen Cty., Wyo. 1992) (all trial and hearing transcripts, exhibits and court orders referenced
are on file with the author) [hereinafter Tr.].
172. Id. at 780-82, 784-85.
173. Id. at 781-85.
174. Id. at 790-91.
175. Id. at 793. Dean was not angered by this situation; in fact, he offered to help Pamela
pack. Id.
176. Id. at 18-19.
177. Id. at 19, 793-94. Dean vowed to fight for custody if Pamela was a lesbian. Id.
178. Decree of July 30, 1991, at 1-2, Hertzler, No. 24-269.
179. Tr. at 19, 775-76. Peggy was a licensed social worker and certified child care worker
with a Master of Arts Degree in Psychology and 13 years of experience working with severely
emotionally disturbed children and adolescents. Id. at 553-62.
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brother told their parents that Pamela is a lesbian8 0 and, on the day after
Christmas, 1991, Pamela's parents informed Dean that Pamela was in a rela-
tionship with Peggy.' Dean immediately confronted Pamela and threatened
to sue to obtain custody of the children unless she voluntarily granted him
custody.'82
B. Modification of the Original Custodial Agreement
When Pamela acknowledged her sexual orientation to Dean and explained
that she was contemplating moving with her children to Ohio to live with
Peggy, he presented her with two "choices:" (1) she could fight to retain cus-
tody, knowing that the court might deny her any contact with the children due
to her sexual orientation; or (2) she could stipulate to a reversal of the custody
and visitation rights established by the existing court order.8 3
Feeling betrayed and abandoned by her family, Pamela sought legal coun-
sel. She was further discouraged by legal advice that a custody dispute would
likely center on her sexual orientation, would be a lengthy and perhaps devas-
tating process for everyone involved, and that her likelihood of success was
extremely slim in such a conservative jurisdiction.'84 Following an agonizing
period of debating the two "choices" presented in Dean's ultimatum, Pamela
concluded that it was in the children's and her best interests to stipulate to the
modification.8 5
With the court's approval,8 6 Dean became custodial parent and Pamela
secured the right to unsupervised visits with Joshua and Miriam every other
weekend from 7 P.M. Friday until 7 P.M. Sunday, two months visitation dur-
ing the summer, visitation on holidays including Christmas and the children's
birthdays, and any other visitation to which the parties agreed.'87
Pamela relocated to Lakewood, Ohio, and began living with Peggy. 8
She secured a job as a nurse with a nonprofit agency serving the needs of the
terminally ill and their families, and became a deacon and a choir member of
her church.8 9 Back in Wyoming, Dean continued to operate the family farm
and work part-time as an emergency medical technician (E.M.T.).'9  His
parents, Betty Jo and M.L. "Bud" Hertzler, and others provided child care for
Miriam and Joshua six days a week. 9'
After her move, Pamela maintained contact with her children through
180. Id. at 798.
181. Id. at 20-21, 56.
182. Id. at 56-57, 799.
183. Id. at 57, 107, 799-800. Dean stood by his ultimatum even when Pamela offered to ter-
minate her relationship with Peggy. Id. at 802.
184. Id. at 801-03.
185. Id. at 21, 801-03.
186. Order of Feb. 26, 1992, Hertzler, No. 24-269.
187. ld.
188. Tr. at 22, 572.
189. Id. at 13, 777-78.
190. Id. at 54.
191. Id. at 112, 325.
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letters, photo albums, packages, biweekly phone calls, and personal visits.'92
In the summer of 1992, Joshua and Miriam spent eleven weeks at Pamela and
Peggy's Lakewood home.'93 Joshua and Miriam made friends with a number
of other children in the neighborhood, including the four Durkalski chil-
dren,' 94 and enjoyed their summer in Lakewood. 95
C. Dean's Marriage to Christine
In October 1992, Dean met Christine Thompson of Wilmington, Ohio,
through "Country Connections" mail order dating service.'96 Christine visited
Dean at his farm in Veteran during the Thanksgiving 1992 weekend, and they
became engaged in early 1993.'9'
During a visit with Dean around Easter 1993, Christine concluded that
Joshua and Miriam needed additional structure and discipline and that she
would be the person to provide these things.' Christine also decided, with
Dean's approval, that she would be the children's mother and that Pamela
should no longer be considered their mother."9
Prior to the children's 1993 summer visit with Pamela and Peggy, Dean
instructed seven-year-old Joshua that his mother and Peggy (whom he referred
to as "faggots") were in a lesbian relationship, that lesbians are women who
have sex with other women, that neither Dean nor Christine approved of the
relationship, that Pamela had left Joshua to live a life of sin, and that Pamela
did not want to take care of him anymore."
That same summer the children attended Pamela and Peggy's Commit-
ment Ceremony at the Archwood United Church of Christ. The ceremony
consisted of songs, readings from the Bible, a message by the church pastor,
and blessings offered by friends and family.2"'
Dean and Christine were making final arrangements for their wedding
when Joshua and Miriam returned from the summer with their mother. 2
During this period and after their honeymoon, Dean and Christine reportedly
observed behaviors in the children-including masturbation by Miriam, gener-
al unruliness, use of "foul" language by both children, and the licking of "Go
Fish" cards and an ice tea pitcher by Miriam-which allegedly alerted them to
the possibility that the children had been sexually abused while with
192. Id. at 301-02, 804-05.
193. Id. at 115, 809.
194. Id. at 171-72, 520, 525-26.
195. Id. at 118-19.
196. Id. at 121, 306, 311.
197. Id. at 121-22, 312, 317.
198. Id. at 319-25.
199. Id. at 127-28, 163-64, 326, 333-34.
200. Id. at 126-27, 158-65. Joshua called his mother a "faggot" at the commencement of the
summer 1993 visit. Id. at 532, 811. Joshua ceased using this word when Pamela explained that it
was hurtful, but reverted to this term after visiting with Christine for a weekend. Id. at 595, 811-
12.
201. Id. at 27-28, 597-98.
202. Id. at 340-41.
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Pamela."3 Interestingly, the children's paternal grandparents did not observe
such behaviors when they cared for Joshua and Miriam during Dean and
Christine's honeymoon.2 4
D.o Gathering of Sexual Abuse "Evidence" by Dean and Christine
In the fall of 1993, Pamela resumed regular contact with her children
through letters, phone calls, packages, and personal visits. During the Thanks-
giving holiday, Pamela and Peggy spent a few days with the children at a
ranch in Wyoming. When the children returned from that visit, Joshua had a
wash-off Mario decal on each forearm and Miriam had a Bugs Bunny decal
on her chest.2"5 Dean and Christine concluded that Miriam's decal was "evi-
dence" of sexual abuse but did not report their conclusion to civil or criminal
authorities (even though Dean, as an E.M.T., was admittedly required by law
to report any suspicion of child abuse). The couple did not seek medical or
psychological evaluations of the children to confirm or repudiate their suspi-
cions or to help the children cope with this alleged trauma.2" Instead, Dean
and Christine took a picture of Miriam's decal and started gathering other
"evidence" to support their allegations against Pamela.2 7 Toward that end,
Dean and Christine began listening to Pamela's phone conversations with her
children."'
Around Christmas 1993, Dean and Christine began intercepting cards and
packages Pamela sent to Joshua and Miriam and refusing to answer the phone
when Pamela telephoned her children at scheduled times.2" Dean and Chris-
tine continued to revile Pamela to her children,2"0 telling them that she was
"an evil person living an evil life." ''
According to Dean and Christine, Miriam's masturbation became chronic
to the point that her labia were red and sore.2 2 They told her that it was a
"private" matter but did not tell her to stop this behavior;2 3 they did not take
Miriam to a medical doctor, even though Christine was frequently at the
doctor's office for a variety of illnesses during this period;2 4 and they did
not consult a physician or mental health professional until May of 1994.2"5
203. Id. at 64-66, 80-83, 284, 341-42.
204. Id. at 234-35, 265-66.
205. Id. at 69-70, 362.
206. Id. at 150-52, 174-75, 364-65.
207. Id. at 152, 282, 364.
208. Id. at 153-54.
209. Id. at 172-73. When allowed to talk, the children were very anxious about time limits
and were often distracted by movies, games, or other activities that continued despite Pamela's
repeated requests that Dean suspend such activities during the children's telephone visits with her.
Id. at 807-08.
210. Id. at 160-64, 333-34.
211. Id. at 168. They also had Joshua look up the word "abomination" in the dictionary so he
could understand the Bible's view of homosexuality. Id. at 328-29. Christine also repeatedly re-
ferred to Pamela as "WW" (meaning "wicked witch") in front of the children. Id. at 343.
212. Id. at 355.
213. Id. at 137, 354, 357.
214. Id. at 143, 147-48, 152, 358-60.
215. Id. at 369-70.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Instead, Christine repeatedly rubbed nonprescription Desitin or hydrocortisone
on Miriam's labia.2 6
Pamela, Peggy, and other child care providers never saw Miriam mastur-
bate," 7 and Miriam's paternal grandmother, who spent significant amounts
of time with both children, only witnessed this behavior once in early
1994.28 When her grandmother told Miriam to stop, she did.2 9
Long after Dean had allegedly concluded that Pamela had sexually abused
her children 2 ' and was "a detriment to their very souls, 22' he agreed to
Pamela's request for an extended three-day weekend visit in mid-February,
1994.121 In late February, 1994, Dean and Christine terminated all telephone
contact with no explanation to Pamela or the children.223 Christine also be-
gan repeated interrogations of Miriam, not yet four years old, as to whether
anyone had touched her "business," meaning her genital area.2 4 As dis-
cussed more fully below, Christine's interrogations, which occurred while she
was rubbing ointment on Miriam's labia, yielded a variety of implausible and
inconsistent answers.225
E. The Temporary Restraining Order
On March 7, 1994, Dean again refused to allow Pamela to speak with her
children at the pre-scheduled time; Pamela left a message on Dean's answer-
ing machine that she would resort to legal action, if necessary, to reinstate her
right to speak with her children.226 Immediately thereafter, Pamela's counsel
faxed a letter to Dean's attorney enumerating Dean's violations of the custody
and visitation agreement and order and asked that Dean cease and desist such
violations.227
Neither Dean nor his counsel responded to the letter. When Pamela's legal
counsel finally reached Dean's counsel by telephone, counsel learned of
Dean's plan to file a petition for a temporary restraining order (T.R.O.) the
next morning. 28 Dean sought to bar all contact between Pamela and her chil-
216. Id. at 142, 357, 360-61.
217. Id. at 533-34, 603, 809.
218. Id. at 235.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 150, 154.
221. Id. at 168.
222. Id. at 156, 821-22.
223. Id. at 170, 172-73, 828. Dean and Christine did not let Pamela talk to Joshua on his
birthday in February, 1994 and did not tell Joshua that she had called. Id. at 172-73, 828.
224. Id. at 374-75.
225. See infra Part III.G.
226. Tr. at 173-74.
227. Letter from Susan J. Becker, Attorney for Ms. Hertzler, to James A. Eddington, Attorney
for Mr. Hertzler (March 2, 1994) (on file with the author).
228. Tr. at 174. Since the motion for a T.R.O. and the motion to modify custody and visita-
tion sought to modify an existing order stemming from the original divorce decree, Pamela contin-
ued to be designated as "Plaintiff' and Dean as "Defendant" during the litigation of the sexual
abuse allegations, even though Pamela was clearly placed in the defensive posture throughout. See
Defendant Dean Hertzler's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Mar.
11, 1994). To avoid confusion, the parties are referred to by their first names throughout this
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dren, claiming that she had sexually abused them." 9
The petition informed the court of Pamela's sexual orientation and her
relationship with Peggy. The "evidence" of sexual abuse cited by Dean was
the Bugs Bunny decal Miriam had on -her chest when she returned from the
Thanksgiving visit, Miriam's purported chronic masturbation, the children's
supposed use of inappropriate language, Miriam's licking of objects such as
"Go Fish" cards and the ice tea pitcher, and other unruly behavior by Joshua
and Miriam.23°
The petition was supported solely by affidavits from Dean and Christine.
Noticeably absent were any affidavits from a medical or mental health profes-
sional supporting Dean's allegations that Miriam and Joshua had been sexually
abused or that the behaviors alleged in the petition were indicative of sexual
abuse.23'
Pamela had never witnessed the behaviors listed in Dean's petition and
was devastated by Dean's allegations.232 She and her legal counsel233 ap-
peared at the T.R.O. hearing via telephone and Dean and Christine appeared in
person with their testimony consisting of a reading of the allegations in the
petition.
Based solely on Dean and Christine's allegations, the trial court issued a
verbal T.R.O. on March 11, 1994, allowing Pamela extremely limited, super-
vised visitation with her children, one phone call per week, and barring all
contact between Peggy and the children.3 The court also indicated its intent
to hold a full hearing on the matter at the earliest possible time. In the corre-
sponding written order issued by the court on March 23, 1994, the court man-
dated that "neither party, spouse, companion, friends or relatives shall discuss
this matter with the minor children nor shall they attempt to influence the
children in any way.
'235
discussion of the litigation.
229. Tr. at 174.
230. Id.
231. See Defendant Dean Hertzler's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Temporary Restrain-
ing Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Mar. 11, 1994). This glaring omission occurred because no doc-
tors had yet examined the children, even though Dean filed the petition many months after he and
Christine had concluded that Pamela had sexually abused her children and had started "gathering
evidence" to support their claims. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203
232. Tr. at 830.
233. Pamela was provided pro bono representation by the author and Susan Laser-Bair of
Cheyenne, Wyoming.
234. Tr. at 830.
235. Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2, Hertzler, No. 24-269. Between the entry of the
T.R.O. and trial, Dean and Christine continued, in direct contravention of this order, to instruct the
children that homosexuality was a sin, that their mother was a sinner who was worse than a thief
or a liar or a prostitute, and that Plaintiff no longer wanted to care for them. Id. at 85-86, 167-69,
333. Retracted Diaries of Christine Hertzler, Ex. 3 at Apr. 30, 1994, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [herein-
after Ex. 31.
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F. The Court's Refusal to Appoint an Expert
In an effort to expedite the resolution of the sexual abuse allegations, with
the minimum amount of trauma to then eight-year-old Joshua and four-year-
old Miriam, Pamela's counsel proposed that the court appoint a single expert
to evaluate the children and the parties. Initially Dean agreed. Pamela also
moved the court for the appointment of a specific expert, Dr. Marilyn Tka-
chut.236 The court set a deadline for Dean's counsel to agree to the appoint-
ment or to file objections. Dean did not propose any other counselors and did
not file an objection to Dr. Tkachut's appointment until after the court-im-
posed deadline. Dean offered no basis for his tardy objection to Dr. Tkachut,
merely stating that "a court-appointed psychologist is unnecessary because the
parties will select their own experts." '237
Despite Pamela's protest that multiple experts would unnecessarily disrupt
the children's and the parents' lives, dramatically and unnecessarily increase
the experts' fees incurred by the parties, and delay the trial date, 238 the court
refused to appoint an expert. As more fully explained below, the court's fail-
ure to appoint a single expert exacted the dire consequences foretold by
Pamela's counsel.
G. The Repeated Interrogations of Miriam and Resulting "Disclosure"
On twelve to fifteen occasions between February and May 1994, Christine
questioned Miriam as to whether anyone had been touching her "busi-
ness." 23 9 This inquisition occurred while Christine was applying ointment to
Miriam's labia."4 Miriam's responses, recorded in Christine's diary, primari-
ly implicated her brother Joshua.24
Miriam's grandmother Hertzler also questioned Miriam once in January or
February of 1994. Miriam asked Mrs. Hertzler, "Aren't you going to look at
my business? '242 Mrs. Hertzler noticed that Miriam's labia were quite red.
When asked what caused the redness, Miriam responded quickly, "Josh did it,"
which sounded like a prepared response to Mrs. Hertzler.2 " Mrs. Hertzler
told Miriam that she should not let anyone touch her and if they did she
should "scream and holler" and tell them to "stop it, stop it."
2 4
On Tuesday, May 17, 1994, Christine talked with Mr. Lynn Rhodes, the
236. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Objection to Appointment of Psychologist 1 1, Hert-
zler, No. 24-269. Dr. Tkachut, a psychologist practicing in Cheyenne, Wyoming, had extensive
training and experience with abused children. (Dr. Tkachut's resume is on file with the author).
237. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Objection to Appointment of Psychologist 5, Hert-
zier, No. 24-269.
238. Id. IM3-5.
239. Tr. at 374.
240. Id. at 142, 372.
241. Id. at 372-75; Ex. 3 at Mar. 2 and Apr. 24, 1994. Miriam made these accusations during
a time when she frequently blamed others, her brother Joshua, and even ghosts to avoid getting
into trouble. Tr. at 176, 237, 385.
242. Tr. at 235.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 236, 238.
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"expert" retained by Dean.245 Mr. Rhodes had twice interviewed the children
and found no evidence of sexual abuse. Christine and Mr. Rhodes talked about
the need for a "breakthrough" in the case.2
That same evening, Miriam complained about her "business" being
sore.247 Christine asked Miriam why her "business" hurt, and Miriam re-
sponded, "I guess I played with it."2" Christine asked Miriam if she under-
stood that her "business" wouldn't get sore if she didn't play with it and that
she shouldn't play with it, and Miriam said she understood.249 Miriam asked
to have medicine put on her labia. °
Christine reported in her diary that the following exchange occurred while
Christine was applying Desitin to Miriam's labia on May 17, 1994:
I asked why it was hurting, she said because I played with it. I asked
when, she said a lot. I asked her if anyone ever played with her busi-
ness, she said "not anymore." She said "Josh used to." I asked if
anyone else did and she said "Mary from Ohio." I asked why did
Mary do it, she said "because I let her." I asked if Pam or Peggy ever
played with her business, she said "Yes all the time." I said are you
sure they played with it or just put medicine on it. She said
"PLAYED WITH IT" in an angry tone. I asked Miriam what she said
to Pam & Peggy when they did this, she said "I told them to stop it,
STOP IT, STOP IT & they laughed at me and did it again." "I don't
like it when they play with my business." "I used to fondle their
breasts too." This story was repeated to me 3 times (concerning Pam
& Peggy) over a 1/2 hr. time period.'
Christine admittedly spanked Miriam for behaviors Christine considered
inappropriate.252 When this "breakthrough" occurred, however, Christine
hugged Miriam and instructed her: "You need to tell Mr. Rhodes what has
happened to you. ' 253 Christine then said a special prayer with Miriam"
and hugged her again.255 Miriam thrice repeated the story implicating Pamela
and Peggy at Christine's urging, and each time Christine told Miriam "that she
needed to tell that to Mr. Rhodes." '256 Christine reported the "breakthrough"
to Mr. Rhodes the next morning and another appointment was scheduled.257
Christine also provided Mr. Rhodes with a copy of her diary entries describing
245. Id. at 376, 378-79.
246. Id. at 294, 378-79.
247. Id. at 294, 380.
248. Id. at 294, 381.
249. Id. at 294.
250. Id.
251. Ex. 3, at May 17, 1994; see also Tr. at 295, 380-84.
252. Tr. at 324.
253. Id. at 295-96, 387-89.
254. Christine prayed "God to please be with Miriam" and "help her through this time be-
cause obviously she's been traumatized by something and to please watch over her, you know,
and reassure her that she's a very special girl and I love her very much and I'm very sorry that
something like that would ever happen to her." Id. at 296, 388-89.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 389.
257. Id. 297, 388-89, 391.
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Miriam's "disclosure."
258
H. Evaluation of the Children by Mr. Rhodes
At the time Mr. Rhodes evaluated the children, the parties, and their re-
spective partners in this case, he had been working as a counselor for less than
two years and had extremely limited training, education, and experience re-
garding allegations of sexual abuse of young children. 259 His twenty-seven
years as a minister strengthened his personal views that homosexuality is mor-
ally wrong and admittedly affected his "professional" opinion rendered in the
case. 21 In fact, Dean confirmed that Mr. Rhodes had an anti-gay bias before
retaining him to evaluate the children.26'
Mr. Rhodes interviewed Joshua, Miriam, Dean and Christine on May 7,
1994 and interviewed the children again on May 17.262 When Mr. Rhodes
asked the children about sexual abuse, Miriam again blamed Joshua for
"touching her business" but did not mention Pamela or Peggy.263 Joshua re-
ported that his father and Christine fought a lot2 and that Christine spanked
Miriam frequently 265-reports that did not surprise Christine.2" Joshua stat-
ed that neither he nor anyone else had been touching Miriam's "business.""26
Mr. Rhodes's third, post-"breakthrough" interview of Miriam, on May 20,
1994, was recorded on both audio26 and video tape.2' The audio tape re-
veals that as soon as Mr. Rhodes greeted Miriam, Miriam began repeating,
almost verbatim, the story she had told to Christine which implicated Pamela
and Peggy.2""
Mr. Rhodes switched on the video camera and urged Miriam to tell him
again what "Pam and Peggy" did.27' After significant prompting, Miriam re-
peated the story, again almost verbatim.272 Miriam was distracted and used a
sing-song voice suggesting that her story was rehearsed and she was tired of
telling it.
273
While Mr. Rhodes attempted to use anatomically correct dolls to ascertain
what Pamela and Peggy supposedly did, Miriam volunteered several times that
"they haven't been touching my business. ' When asked if anyone else had
258. Id. at 391-93.
259. Id. at 407-11.
260. Id. at 398, 476-79.
261. Id. at 472-73.
262. See Report of J. Lynn Rhodes, Ex. 8, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 8].
263. Tr. at 440; Ex. 8, at 10-11.
264. Tr. at 456-57.
265. Id. at 458.
266. ld. at 345.
267. Ex. 8, at 8-9.
268. Interview by J. Lynn Rhodes with Mariam Hertzler (audio tape of May 20, 1994), Ex. Q,
Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. Q].
269. Interview by J. Lynn Rhodes with Mariam Hertzler (video tape of May 20, 1994), Ex. E,
Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. El.
270. Tr. at 426, 449; Ex. Q; Ex. 8, at 12.
271. Tr. at 426, 731-32; Ex. E; Ex. Q.
272. Tr. at 731-32; Ex. E.
273. Ex. E; Ex. Q; Tr. at 731-32.
274. Ex. 8, at 12-13; Ex. E; Ex. Q. Mr. Rhodes ignored these statements during the interview,
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played with her business, Miriam rambled off the names of Charlotte, John,
little John, Mary, and Joshua (Durkalski), friends and neighbors of her mother
in Lakewood. 75 Mr. Rhodes ignored these accusations. 76
Mr. Rhodes conducted a third interview of Joshua on May 22, 1994.277
In this videotaped meeting,278 Mr. Rhodes assured Joshua that he would not
get in trouble for anything he said and Joshua agreed to tell the truth.2 79
Joshua again repeatedly denied that anyone had sexually abused him or Miri-
am."' Mr. Rhodes "found" this videotape in his drawer during his deposition
and explained that he had not produced it in response to previous requests
because he did not believe it contained anything significant."'
Based primarily upon Miriam's "disclosure" during the taped May 20
interview282 and upon information supplied by Dean and Christine, 23 Mr.
Rhodes concluded that Miriam and Joshua had been "eroticized" and Miriam
had possibly been sexually abused; that even absent abuse, continued contact
between the children and their mother would be detrimental because it might
influence the children's sexual orientation; that further contact with Peggy
should be barred; and that contact with their mother be terminated or limited
to supervised visits. 4
I. Evaluation of Miriam and Joshua by Other Experts
The children were both examined by Pamela's expert witnesses, Dr. Larry
Bloom and Dr. Carole Jenny.2"5 Dean's family physician and witness, Dr.
Karen Brungardt, examined Miriam. 6 None of these experts confirmed Mr.
Rhodes's theory that the children had been sexually abused or that the sexual
orientation of a parent is determinative of the children's best interest when
visitation is at issue. 87 In fact, Drs. Bloom and Jenny independently repudi-
ated Mr. Rhodes's methodologies and conclusions, and even Dean's own wit-
ness, Dr. Brungardt, readily conceded that her conclusion that Miriam had
been sexually abused should be reconsidered because it was based on mis-
but, after they were brought to his attention during his deposition, he hypothesized that Miriam
was talking about the dolls when she made the disclaimers. Tr. at 446-47.
275. Ex. E; Tr. at 430-31. Miriam also incorrectly told Mr. Rhodes that each person she had
just accused of sexually abusing her was, except for baby Joshua, an adult like him. Ex. E.
276. Tr. at 448.
277. Ex. 8, at 9.
278. Interview by J. Lynn Rhodes with Joshua Hertzler (video tape of May 22, 1994), Ex. 18,
Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 181.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Tr. at 464-65; Ex. 8, at 9.
282. Tr. at 435.
283. Id. at 463.
284. Ex. 8, at 23-25.
285. Report of Larry J. Bloom, Ex. 17, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 17]; Report of
Carole Jenny, Ex. 15, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 15].
286. Tr. at 177-92.
287. See, e.g., Ex. 17, at 14-17 (questioning the validity of Rhodes's interview); Ex. 15, at 7-
10 (stating that there was no objective evidence of sexual abuse).
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leading and incomplete information provided by Dean."'
1. Dr. Larry L. Bloom
When retained as an expert in the Hertzler case, Dr. Bloom was a licen-
sed clinical psychologist and professor of psychology at Colorado State Uni-
versity with almost twenty years of experience in evaluating family dynamics
and seventeen years of experience identifying sexually abused children." 9
Dr. Bloom was also familiar with the empirical data and literature relating to
lesbian and gay parents.2" Dr. Bloom conducted comprehensive evaluations
of Pamela, Peggy, Miriam, Joshua, Dean, and Christine over a two-day period
shortly after Miriam's "disclosure" to Christine and Mr. Rhodes.29' In res-
ponse to Dr. Bloom's inquiries, both Miriam and Joshua denied that anyone
had been touching or playing with their genital areas.292 Dr. Bloom's testing
of Miriam established that she is a highly suggestible child who strives to
please adults.293 Dr. Bloom met separately with the adults and observed the
children interacting with their parents and the parents' partners.294 Dr. Bloom
also studied the audio and video tapes of the May 20, 1994, interview in
which Miriam "disclosed" to Mr. Rhodes that Pamela and Peggy had been
"touching her business."' ' Dr. Bloom found this disclosure unconvincing
due to the fatally flawed methodology employed by Mr. Rhodes, including his
failure to test for suggestibility, his failure to explore Miriam's inconsistent
statements regarding sexual abuse made during the "disclosure" and previous
interviews, and his use of leading rather than nondirective questions.2" Dr.
Bloom determined that Miriam's "disclosure" immediately upon entering the
room was the result of preparation by an adult whom Miriam was striving to
please.297
Dr. Bloom further concluded that: (1) absolutely no credible evidence
existed to corroborate Dean's allegations of sexual abuse; (2) Pamela and
Peggy encouraged and facilitated the relationship between Dean, Christine, and
the children while Dean and Christine caused parental alienation between the
children and their mother; (3) the children benefitted by spending significant
amounts of (unsupervised) time with their mother; and (4) Dean and Christine
should obtain professional counseling to put aside their own needs and biases
288. See Ex 15; Ex 17; Tr. at 202 (cross examination of Dr. Brungardt).
289. Tr. at 607, 612, 649; Curriculum vitae of Larry Jay Bloom, Ex. 16, Hertzler, No. 24-269
[hereinafter Ex. 16].
290. Tr. at 611-12.
291. Ex. 17; Tr. at 613.
292. Tr. at 637, 653; Ex. 17, at 7-8.
293. For example, Miriam readily agreed with Dr. Bloom's suggestions that Pamela and Peg-
gy are sisters and later agreed that they are mother and daughter. Tr. at 640-42; Ex. 17, at 8.
294. Tr. at 614-16. During Dr. Bloom's observations of the children with their mother and
Peggy, Dean hovered nearby. Id. at 646-47. When asked why, Dean said his diligence was neces-
sary to prevent Pamela from kidnapping her children. Id. at 617-18. Dr. Bloom was not able to
persuade Dean that kidnapping was not a possibility in the clinical setting. Id. at 618. Dean had
also told Joshua that his mother might try to kidnap Joshua and his sister. Ex. 17, at 14.
295. Tr. at 615, 648-49.
296. "Id. at 651-53.
297. Id. at 649-51.
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and focus instead on the needs of the children to value and appreciate their
mother and Peggy. 98
2. Dr. Carole Jenny
Carole Jenny, M.D., is a board-certified pediatrician who had served as
the Director of The Child Advocacy and Protection Team at the Denver
Children's Hospital for four years when she became involved in this case.2
She personally examined four or five children per week where sexual abuse
was suspected and twenty to thirty cases of emotional abuse per year.3" She
taught at the University of Colorado School of Medicine, conducted empirical
and clinical research, and has published in the field of child abuse.3"' Her
peer-reviewed, published research included work on the prevalence of child
sexual abuse by gay men and lesbians. 2
Dr. Jenny interviewed both children, physically examined Miriam, and
provided a comprehensive report of her findings and observations.3 3 Both
children reported that Dean and Christine told them that their mother was
wrong to live in a lesbian relationship, that Christine often spanked Miriam,
and that they wanted to see Pamela frequently."
Dr. Jenny talked with Dean at length but found Christine "rude and imma-
ture" and hostile. Dr. Jenny based these conclusions on Christine's rebuff of
Miriam's pleas to play with her -in the waiting room and her refusal to comfort
Miriam during the physical examination." 5 After Dr. Jenny's interview with
Miriam, Miriam ran up to Christine and spontaneously reported: "I didn't tell
her about my business, we talked about other stuff.""3 6 Dr. Jenny interpreted
this remark as evidence that Christine, who appeared embarrassed by Miriam's
statement, had been coaching Miriam and that Miriam was "checking in" with
Christine tor see if she had met Christine's expectations.3 7 Dr. Jenny found
further evidence of Christine's coaching in Miriam's hurried "disclosure" to
298. Ex. 17, at 15-17.
299. Tr. at 716, 718. The Team is a joint program of the Children's Hospital and the C. Hen-
ry Kempe National Center, a child abuse research and treatment center sponsored by the Universi-
ty of Colorado. Id. at 716. Dr. Jenny had worked as a pediatrician and served as the medical di-
rector of the Harborview Sexual Assault Center at the University of Washington for six years prior
to heading the Kempe Center. Id. at 716-17. Her curriculum vitae was introduced as Ex. 14. Id. at
720.
300. Id. at 718, 764.
301. Id. at 716-18.
302. See Jenny et al., supra note 2, at 41. Pamela was not aware of Dr. Jenny's research on
this topic when she retained her to evaluate Miriam.
303. Ex. 15, at 8; Tr. at 721-23. Prior to compiling her report, Dr. Jenny reviewed depositions
collected in the case, Christine's redacted diaries, Dean's T.R.O. Petition and his Petition to Modi-
fy Decree, answers to interrogatories, Mr. Rhodes's report, and the audio and video tapes of Miri-
am's May 20 interview by Mr. Rhod s. Tr. at 721-23. After examining the children, Dr. Jenny
also reviewed Dr. Bloom's report ant. ,e medical record submitted by Dr. Brungardt. Tr. at 722.
Dr. Jenny did not communicate with amela or Peggy.
304. Ex. 15, at 3-4. Joshua told Dr. Jenny he wanted to spend half the year in Wyoming with
his father and the other half in Ohio with his mother. Id. at 4.
305. Tr. at 724-25, 754-55; Ex. 15, at 5.
306. Tr. at 729.
307. Id. at 730-31, 770.
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Mr. Rhodes on May 20, 1994.308 Dr. Jenny's expert opinions include the fol-
lowing:
An extensive physical examination of Miriam showed no evidence of
sexual abuse or infection or inflammation in her genitals or anus.3"
* Joshua and Miriam were outgoing, "healthy and happy," and showed none
of the hypersensitivity to new people and environments indicative of sexually-
abused children; they did not suffer from post traumatic stress disorder."0
* Miriam's "disclosures" that Pamela and Peggy "played with her business"
lacked credibility due to the use of leading questions, Christine's coaching,
and the attendant rewards Miriam received only for implicating Pamela and
Peggy."'
* Christine and Dean's attempts to alienate the children's affection for their
mother and convince them that they had been sexually abused "cause[d] tre-
mendous emotional abuse and correlate[d] with a bad long-term outcome in
terms of the child's mental health and the development of mental illness,"3 2
including schizophrenia.3 3
* Miriam's masturbation may have been due to an intermittent medical
condition which compelled her to rub her already inflamed genitals, such as
strep infection in the vagina, pinworms, or an allergy.3 4
* Other behaviors which Dean and Christine deemed indicative of sexual
abuse were in fact behaviors that are age and gender appropriate for Miriam
and Joshua.3"'
* Frequent masturbation is not a specific sexual abuse behavior, but it is
common in children who are not getting their emotional needs met and feel
isolated, frustrated, lonely or bored.316
* As recorded 'in her diary, Christine's act of telling Miriam that Pamela
moved to Ohio because Pamela did not want to care for Miriam anymore was
an abusive act, as were other acts where Dean and Christine denigrated Pam-
308. Id. at 729-30.
309. Id. at 723-26.
310. Id. at 726-28.
311. Id. at 727-31.
312. Id. at 735.
313. Id. at 734-37, 745.
314. Id. at 768-69.
315. Ex. 15, at 5-6.
316. Tr. at 762.
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ela to the children.
t 7
. There was no evidence in the medical or psychological literature that chil-
dren of lesbian parents suffer psychological dysfunction or gender confu-
sion.3
o Peer-reviewed, published, empirical data compiled by Dr. Jenny and her
husband, Dr. Thomas Roesler, proved that a child is over 100 times more
likely to be abused by a parent's heterosexual partner than by someone identi-
fied as a homosexual.1 9
o Children can do very well going between two diverse environments as
long as they understand the different expectations and as long as the caretakers
in each home encourage the children to respect the rules in both environ-
ments. 2°
Based upon these and other findings, Dr. Jenny recommended that Joshua
and Miriam be allowed and encouraged to maintain unsupervised contact with
their mother and Peggy.32' Dr. Jenny further cautioned that Dean and Chris-
tine would injure the children's mental health and happiness if they continued
their campaign to alienate the children from their mother -a possibility
that Mr. Rhodes also acknowledged.323
3. Dr. Karen Brungardt
Just a few weeks before trial, Dean had Miriam examined by Dr. Karen
Brungardt, a Doctor of Osteopathy (D.O.) from Torrington, Wyoming. Dr.
Brungardt is board-certified in family practice and examines three or four
alleged victims of sexual abuse per year.324 Consistent with Dr. Jenny's
findings, Dr. Brungardt found no physical abnormalities indicative of sexual
abuse. 325 During this examination, however, Miriam repeated her story that
"Peggy and Pam" had been touching her business, but this time expanded the
touching to include her anus. Based on information supplied by Dean and
Miriam's "disclosure" during the examination, Dr. Brungardt found a "proba-
bility" that Miriam had been abused.
3 26
317. Id. at 735-43.
318. Id. at 737-38; Ex. 15, at 8.
319. Tr. at 739; Ex. 15, at 9.
320. Tr. at 740-41, 745; Ex. 15, at 9.
321. Tr. at 739-41, 744-46; Ex. 15, at 9.
322. Tr. at 745; Ex. 15, at 9.
323. Tr. at 466-69.
324. Id. at 179.
325. Id. at 185; Exhibit C: Report of Dr. Brungardt, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. C).
Dr. Brungardt noted some redness and irritation of Miriam's vagina, Tr. at 185; Ex. C, but testi-
fied that Miriam's own "small finger" would "typically not" cause this type of irritation. Tr. at
187. Dr. Brungardt's conclusion was consistent with Dr. Jenny's concern that Miriam's genital
irritation could be caused by pinworms or other intermittent medical condition. Tr. at 769.
326. Tr. at 191.
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J. The Trial
A four-day trial was held during July 1994 in Torrington, Wyoming. In
addition to the expert opinions of Drs. Jenny, Bloom, Brungardt, and Mr.
Rhodes,32 testimony was elicited from ten fact witnesses. These witnesses
included the parties, their partners and the children's paternal grandparents.
Joshua and Miriam did not testify. Pamela and Peggy called several character
witnesses and Mrs. Charlotte Durkalski, a close friend and neighbor of Pamela
and Peggy. Mrs. Durkalski, along with her husband and four children, spent
significant time with Joshua and Miriam during their summers in Lakewood.
All witnesses, including Dean, Christine and Dean's parents, testified that
Pamela had been a good parent, that she loved her children,32 and that the
children loved her. 29
Witnesses traveled from Ohio to testify as to Pamela and Peggy's integrity
and also testified concerning their own observations of the children's behavior
and the interactions of Pamela and Peggy with the children while in
Lakewood.33' None of these witnesses observed any inappropriate behavior
or anything they considered indicative of sexual abuse. 3
In addition to the substantial evidence exculpating Pamela from the sexual
abuse allegations, Dean's expert, Mr. Rhodes, admitted that he held significant
anti-gay bias which affected his "expert" evaluation in this case. Indeed, the
following exchange occurred between Pamela's counsel and Mr. Rhodes in
open court:
Q. * * * I'm just trying to separate out here what part of this report
is your conclusions and your recommendations that Pamela Hertzler
no longer have contact with her children and her partner, Peggy
Keating, no longer have any kind of contact with the children that
they have cared about and loved.... I'm trying to figure out is it
your professional judgment that leads you to these conclusions or is it
your moral judgment that leads you to these conclusions.
A. I believe I made that clear in the report, that if indeed there is
sexual abuse taking place, then there should not be any contact and I
base that on the sexual abuse and then I added the other possibility,
and I label that as my value system. I made that very clear that I was
speaking from my value system around the homosexuality. You see, I
don't see the homosexual issue as being the primary issue here. I see
that as a side issue and I think the sexual abuse is the primary issue
in the recommendation that I made.
327. The court rejected the motions and arguments of Pamela's counsel, made prior to and
during trial, that Mr. Rhodes should not be qualified as an expert witness due to his lack of quali-
fications and admitted anti-gay bias. See Tr. at 88-99.
328. Tr. at 101-02, 225, 256.
329. Id. at 225, 393, 540.
330. Id. at 507-09, 516-17.
331. Id. at 509, 517, 527-28. The witnesses also stated that they would have no reservations
whatsoever entrusting Pamela and Peggy with their own young children or grandchildren. Id. at
498, 519, 529, 540-41.
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Q. I agree with you.
A. It is an issue, the homosexuality is an issue, but it's not the pri-
mary issue. It's a secondary issue.
Q. As an issue in this case, Mr. Rhodes, if homosexuality is an issue
in this case, then the recommendations that you gave to this Court are
not expert recommendations, but the recommendations of a layman;
isn't that correct?
A. Well, you see, in the realm of morality and a religion, I'm sup-
posed to be an expert there, too.
Q. That's not what you were retained for, was it, Mr. Rhodes?
A. That's correct, and that's why I labeled that as my opinion.
Q. So let me get this straight. Your recommendations of sexual
abuse are based on your professional judgment?
A. Um-hum.
Q. Your recommendations on the termination of contact between
Pamela Hertzler and Peggy Keating and those children based on their
homosexuality is based on your moral judgment?
A. Partially.
Q. So you can't tell us what weight-what weight your professional
judgment and what weight your moral judgment had in that conclu-
sion?
A. I hadn't thought about it in those terms.
Q. So that's a no?
A. Given some time, I probably could.
Q. Can you do so now?
A. In terms of homosexuality, the greater weight would go to the
moral issue simply because there is in the professional area so much
confusion around the effects of homosexuality and how people be-
come homosexual, what happens when kids are exposed to it, there's
a lot of confusion there, so it's tough to make a professional, absolute
determination there.332
Just as Mr. Rhodes readily acknowledged his anti-gay bias, Dean's other
expert, Dr. Brungardt, admitted during trial that she had not been given suffi-
cient information with which to make a diagnosis that Miriam had been sexu-
ally abused.33 3 The information Dean supplied to Dr. Brungardt was that
Miriam had been masturbating frequently and that Miriam had disclosed to a
family counselor in Greeley that Pamela and Peggy had sexually abused
her." 4 Dean did not, however, inform Dr. Brungardt of many factors which
she considered important in determining the veracity of sexual abuse allega-
332. Id. at 476-79.
333. Id. at 193-95.
334. Id. at 193-95.
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tions. For example, Dr. Brungardt did not know that Miriam had been ques-
tioned about sexual abuse twelve to fifteen times prior to the "disclosure"
while Christine was applying medication to Miriam's vaginal area.335 Dr.
Brungardt said her awareness of some of these facts compelled her to want to
re-interview or re-evaluate her conclusion that a "probability" of sexual abuse
existed.336
K. The Trial Court's Decision
Despite the overwhelming weight of evidence favoring Pamela's inno-
cence and fitness as a mother and Mr. Rhodes's admitted bias against Pamela,
the trial court relied almost exclusively on Mr. Rhodes's "expert" opinions in
finding337 that "eroticization"33 of the children had occurred during visits
with Pamela. The court further concluded that the children were "subjected to
inappropriate sexual behavior while visiting" Pamela and Peggy Keating.339
The court's conclusion credited the testimony of Dean, Christine, and Mr.
Rhodes as to the behaviors in which Joshua and Miriam allegedly engaged and
the purported causal relation between those behaviors and sexual abuse.
The court rejected the testimony of Pamela's experts, Drs. Jenny and
Bloom, stating that it was not "useful or credible."3" The court claimed that
Dr. Jenny "simply disregarded any evidence which conflicted with her conclu-
sion that there had been no inappropriate behavior"34 and that she failed to
consider the statements Miriam made to Dr. Brungardt.342 The trial court
similarly rejected Dr. Bloom's expert opinions, stating that "Dr. Bloom
initially failed to consider the intensity of the conduct of Miriam following
visitation, but then admitted that such conduct could be an indicator of sexual
abuse. He also admitted to making over-statements and inaccurate quotations
in what I found to be important portions of his report."343 The trial court also
opined that Drs. Jenny and Bloom "focused extensively on what they believed
to be deficiencies in how the Defendant [Dean] responded to the
335. Id. at 198-99. Other information that Dean did not share with Dr. Brungardt was that
Dean had raised the sexual abuse allegations in the context of a domestic relations dispute, id. at
196, that he and Christine had been gathering "evidence" against Pamela since Thanksgiving
1993, id. at 197, that Miriam's "disclosures" had been made to a counselor retained by Dean spe-
cifically to evaluate Dean's allegations of sexual abuse, id. at 195, that Miriam also "disclosed"
the names of her brother and an Ohio family to her counselor, id. at 198, and that Miriam had
medication applied to her labia approximately 30 times before Dean contacted a doctor, id. at 201-
02.
336. Id. at 202.
337. These findings were set forth in a Decision Letter issued by the court on July 21, 1994,
and subsequently incorporated into an Order dated Sept. 8, 1994. See Decision Letter, Hertzler,
No. 24-269 (July 21, 1994) [hereinafter Decision Letter]; Court Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Sept.
8, 1994) [hereinafter Court Order I].
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situation.'"3
Other than criticizing Dr. Jenny for failing to credit Miriam's statements
to Dr. Brungardt, the court did not discuss Dr. Brungardt's testimony in its
findings.
Based upon its conclusion that the children experienced "eroticization"
and had been exposed to "inappropriate sexual behavior" while in Pamela's
care, the court restricted Pamela's visitation with her children to six supervised
Saturday and Sunday visits per year (no overnight visits), and one phone call
per week, and prohibited Peggy from all contact with the children.345 The
court ordered the parties to jointly select a counsellor and further directed that
"both parties and the children participate in counseling regarding the children's
sexual expressions, the Defendant's [Dean's] attitude toward the Plaintiff
[Pamela] as portrayed to the children, the children's relationship with each
parent and future visitation."3" The court ordered the parties and the
counsellor to file a report by January 1, 1995, "indicating the parties'
compliance with this order and any recommendations or conclusions
reached."347
The court further addressed "the impact of the Plaintiff's [Pamela's]
lifestyle on her visitation with the children."3 The court opined that
"[hiomosexuality is inherently inconsistent with families, with the relationships
and values which perpetuate families,"349 and continued:
The moral climate in which children are raised is an important factor
in child custody and visitation. The Plaintiff's open homosexual
relationship creates much of the moral climate surrounding her life.
The moral climate is probable to have an effect on the children's
development of values and character which is inconsistent with that
supported by the Defendant or society.
Because the Plaintiff's open homosexuality has and is likely to
create confusion and difficulty for the children, and because her
lifestyle is likely to negatively affect the development of the
children's moral values, and because the State has an interest in
supporting conventional marriages and families, the Court would find
it appropriate to reduce the Plaintiff's visitation with the children
even if the issues of sexual abuse or eroticization were resolved.35
Pamela filed a timely appeal of the court's decision with the Wyoming
Supreme Court.35" '
344. Id.
345. Id. at 3.
346. Id. at 4.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 5.
350. Id.
351. Wyoming has no intermediate appellate courts. WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 18.
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L. Evaluation by Dr. Rachael Moriarty and the Ensuing Post-trial
Proceedings
In compliance with the trial court's mandate that the parties and the
children obtain counseling, Pamela agreed to a counselor suggested by
Dean-Dr. Rachael Moriarty of Fort Collins, Colorado.352 In her report to
the trial court dated December 20, 1994,"'3 Dr. Moriarty concluded that the
children had not, as the trial court found, been sexually abused, and that
Dean's unrelenting efforts to convince them otherwise constituted severe
emotional abuse which would cause serious long term harm if not
terminated.354 Dr. Moriarty recommended that full visitation be restored to
Pamela, that the therapy continue for the parties and the children, and that
custody be changed to Pamela if Dean did not cease his attempts to alienate
the children from their mother.355 Braced with Dr. Moriarty's report, Pamela
petitioned the trial court for full restoration of her visitation rights as
established in the February 26, 1992, order,356 and sought a T.R.O. enjoining
Dean from continuing to alienate the children joined with a motion to show
cause why Dean should not be held in contempt for violating the previous
court orders forbidding such conduct.357
On January 31, 1995, the trial court held a five-and-one half hour hearing
on Pamela's motions.35 ' Dr. Moriarty testified, as did Pamela and two of the
social workers who had supervised her visits with Joshua and Miriam.
359
Pamela's counsel also called Dean and Christine to the witness stand.
With the aid of transcriptions Pamela obtained of her telephone
conversations with her children,3" the testimony of Dr. Moriarty, 36' and the
testimony of the visitation supervisors,362 Pamela unequivocally discredited
352. Dr. Moriarty is board certified in clinical psychology with more than 15 years experience
as a therapist and extensive training and experience in the diagnosis and treatment of sexually
abused children. Transcript of Motions Hearing, at 6-7, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Jan. 31, 1995)
[hereinafter Motions Tr.].
353. Dr. Rachel Moriarty, Ed.D., Psychological Report on the Hertzler Family, Hertzler, No.
24-269 (Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Moriarty Report].
354. Id. at 2.
355. Id. at 4.
356. Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Jan. 10, 1995).
357. Plaintiff's Motion for a T.R.O. and to Show Cause, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Jan. 10, 1995).
358. Testimony from the Jan. 31, 1995 Hearing and Accompanying Exhibits, Hertzler, No.
24-269 [hereinafter Tr. II and Tr. II Ex.].
359. Christine supplied extensive written reports to the court about what purportedly happened
during the phone calls with Pamela and during supervised visits. Tr. II Ex. 4. Her accounts were
based upon the information obtained from Joshua and Miriam when she questioned them after
each visit with Pamela. Tr. II at 123-24. For example, Christine reported that on a supervised visit
on October 16, 1994, "Pam and Miriam slept in a waterbed beneath the covers while behind a
closed bedroom door." See Tr. II at 137-38 (discussing trial Exhibit 6). The supervisor testified
that this conduct never occurred and that, in fact, Pamela was never alone with the children during
this visit. Tr. II at 137-38.
360. Tr. It at 100-29, 142-71; Tr. II Exs. 6, 7, 8. Christine testified that her reports to the
court, including numerous quotes from conversations between Pamela and her children which
supposedly upset the children, were completely accurate. Tr. II at 103, 114-15, 118. Actual tran-
scripts of the taped conversations introduced into evidence by Pamela's counsel revealed that
Christine's "verbatim" accounts were largely fictional. Tr. II Ex. 8.
361. Tr. II at 6-94, 180-88.
362. The supervisors for Pamela's visitation, Dora Zamora and Rob Branhan, were social
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Dean's and Christine's representations that any contact with Pamela, even
under supervised conditions, caused the children to act out in sexually or other
inappropriate ways.
Moreover, after being recognized by the court as an expert witness,
3 63
Dr. Moriarty testified at length about the basis for the conclusions in her
report.3" Dr. Moriarty also explained, as Drs. Jenny and Bloom had at the
initial trial, the flaws in the methodology used by Dean's trial expert, Mr.
Rhodes, in concluding that the children had been "eroticized.
3 6
1
Dr. Moriarty specifically reported on a conversation with Mr. Rhodes after
the case had been referred to her. In that conversation, Mr. Rhodes conceded
that he was not aware that Miriam had been coached by Christine to tell him
that Peggy and Pamela had sexually abused her.3" Mr. Rhodes also told Dr.
Moriarty that his conclusions were ultimately based on "a gut feeling" that the
children had been eroticized and that Peggy was somehow responsible for this
condition.3 67 Dean tried to discredit the conclusions reached by Dr. Moriarty,
the counsellor he had selected.3"
At the conclusion of the hearing on January 31, 1995,' 69 and in
subsequent writings,t37 he court expressed disappointment that Dr.
Moriarty's counseling failed to address the children's "eroticization." The
court stated:
The Court further finds that counselling [sic] did not address the
eroticization which the Court found to have occurred in its Order of
September 8, 1994, and no progress has been made in assuring that
future visitation is not accompanied by eroticization or inappropriate
sexual expression by the children. Plaintiff [Pamela] continues to
deny that the children were eroticized or exposed to any inappropriate
sexual behavior while in her care. There is no indication that the
Plaintiff recognizes any concern about the sexual activity of the
children which previously accompanied visitation, and there is no
indication that the parties will work together to prevent or address
such activity.'
The court directed continued counseling with Dr. Moriarty, although Dean
was allowed to select a different counselor for himself provided that the
person he selected was willing to work with Dr. Moriarty.372 The court also
recognized that Dean had violated previous court orders by continuing to
workers employed by the Wyoming Department of Family Services. Id. at 129-41.
363. Id. at 9.
364. Id. at 6-94; Tr. II Ex. 2.
365. Tr. II at 20-21, 58-60.
366. Id. 59-60.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 63-87.
369. ld. at 182-86.
370. Letter from District Judge Keith Kautz to Counsel, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Feb. 13, 1995);
Court Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Mar. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Court Order II].
371. Court Order II at 2.
372. Id. (requiring that a "report on the results of such counseling" be filed by the end of
1995).
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exhibit "his extremely negative attitude" toward Pamela in front of her
children, but imposed no sanctions for Dean's behavior other than again
ordering him to cease monitoring the children's phone conversations with
Pamela.373 The court recognized Pamela's parents as appropriate supervisors
for her visits with her children and marginally expanded her visitation
schedule to include one week in June and one in August, three weekends, and
the five days preceding New Year's Day.374 The court continued to bar all
contact between the children and Peggy.375
In short, the trial court's ruling on Pamela's motions did not alter its pre-
vious findings that: (1) the children had been exposed to inappropriate sexual
behavior or "eroticized" while in Pamela's care; (2) that homosexuality
renders a parent per se immoral and unfit; (3) that Pamela's visitations with
her children should continue to be supervised and severely curtailed; and (4)
that the children could have no contact with Pamela's life-partner, Peggy.
M. Appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court
Pamela's consolidated challenge to the trial court's Orders of September
8, 1994, and March 6, 1995,376 was three-fold. Pamela first argued that there
was no credible factual evidence of record that Joshua or Miriam had been
sexually abused; second, that there was no credible expert evidence supporting
a finding of sexual abuse; and, finally, that there was no evidence to support
the trial court's determination that Pamela's sexual orientation alone provided
sufficient grounds to reduce her visitation to a de minimus level377 or that
Peggy should be excluded from the children's lives.378
373. Id. at 1-2.
374. Id. at 3.
375. Id.
376. Pamela appealed the court's March 6, 1995, order and moved to consolidate it with the
pending appeal of the September 8, 1994, decision. The Wyoming Supreme Court denied Pam-
ela's motion to consolidate but subsequently granted her motion to supplement the record in her
existing appeal with the testimony and exhibits from the January 31, 1995, hearing. Thus, Dr.
Moriarty's findings and the record of the January 31, 1995, proceedings were before the Wyoming
Supreme Court but were not fully briefed by the parties.
377. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Pamela M. Hertzler, Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946
(Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-262) [hereinafter Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant].
378. As Pamela explained in her brief, courts have long recognized that children are not
harmed by maintaining a close relationship with a gay or lesbian parent. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Ashling, 599 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (reversing the trial court's order that a lesbian mo-
ther could not have other lesbians in her home when her three children visited). In Ashling, the
appeals court noted that the three children were aware of their mother's sexual preference, that the
mother had sexual relations in her home when the children were staying there but not in their
presence, and that the mother behaved affectionately toward other women in front of the children.
Id. at 476. In striking down the no-other-lesbians condition on visitation, the court stated:
We find nothing in the present record to justify such a restrictive provision. So long as
the mother's sexual practices remain discreet a requirement whatever the sexual prefer-
ences of the parties might be ... and the presence of lesbians in the home from time to
time does not of itself create difficulties for the children of a greater magnitude than that
suggested by this record, the restriction is inappropriate.
Id. (citation omitted); see also In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(refusing to limit gay father's visitation rights when evidence did not indicate that contact with
homosexuals caused any detrimental effects to child); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill.
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To facilitate the argument that Dean and Christine's factual reports about
the children's behaviors lacked credibility, Pamela explained in the text of her
brief379 and illustrated in a time-line graphic included in her appendix3"
that the behaviors of Dean and Christine were totally inconsistent with those
of parents who believed their children were being sexually abused."' Pamela
also pointed out, as had the testimony of Drs. Bloom and Jenny and empirical
data presented to the trial court in her trial and post-trial briefs, that gay and
lesbian parents are just as capable of raising healthy, well-adjusted children as
are their heterosexual counterparts.3"2 The primary thrust of Pamela's appeal,
however, was that the trial court abused its discretion383 in recognizing Mr.
Rhodes as an expert and in crediting his "expert" opinions over the testimony
of Drs. Bloom, Jenny, and Moriarty.
As to Mr. Rhodes, Pamela argued that his qualifications fell far short of
the standards required of witnesses qualified by Wyoming courts as "child
App. Ct. 1993) (reinstating lesbian mother's right to unsupervised overnight visitation with her son
at the home she shared with her partner and finding that son's attendance at a gay/lesbian pride
parade and his exposure to hugs and kisses between his mother and her partner were not detrimen-
tal); In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990) (striking down visitation restriction
on gay father prohibiting the presence of any "unrelated adult" when evidence showed father to be
a good, loving, and responsible parent); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (stat-
ing that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, mother's homosexuality alone bore no rele-
vance to parental fitness); Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1993) (allowing regularly
scheduled, unsupervised, overnight visitation with children in the home lesbian mother shared with
her partner); Large v. Large, No. 93AP-735, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5810 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 2,
1993) (holding that mother's involvement in a lesbian relationship is merely one factor to consider
when assessing the children's best interest in a custody or visitation dispute and stating that even
if the lesbian relationship imposed some difficulties on the children, expert testimony demonstrat-
ing that a loving and supportive environment, combined with a good explanation of the situation,
would allow the children to adjust to any negative situation they might encounter due to the rela-
tionship); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (overturning visitation limitations
because of a lack of evidence linking parental sexual orientation to child's disruptive behavior);
Barron v. Barron, 594 A.2d 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (upholding trial court's order allowing ex-
tensive visitation fights for lesbian mother and refusing to limit contact with mother's partner);
Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that mother's homosexuality
did not justify change in custody when evidence did not show that mother's sexual preference
harmed the child); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (striking
down restriction on gay father that would have allowed visitation only when the father's male
companion was not present).
379. Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at 38-40, Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-262).
380. Id. tbl. 1, at app.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 58-64. Pamela's position was strongly supported by amicus briefs submitted by
various organizations, including the American Psychological Association, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and several gay and lesbian legal advocacy groups. See generally M.P. v.S.P.,
404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1979) (suggesting that exposure to others' adverse
reactions to gay parents might actually better prepare children for developing their own moral
standards); Blew, 617 A.2d at 31 (noting that other people's reactions to a parent's homosexuality
should not affect child custody determination and that "[o]f primary importance to the child's
well-being is the child's full and realistic knowledge of his parents, except where it can be shown
that exposure to the parent is harmful to the child") (emphasis added).
383. In Wyoming, as in many jurisdictions, the trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether a witness is qualified to provide expert testimony. See generally Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d
1010 (Wyo. 1993); Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1991). In Wyoming, a court abuses its
discretion when "it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstanc-
es," with the ultimate question being "[w]hether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it
did." State v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 262 (Wyo. 1994).
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sexual abuse experts," '384 and that the error in qualifying Mr. Rhodes as an
expert was compounded by his bias against homosexuality which admittedly
affected his "expert" opinions in this case.385 Allowing Mr. Rhodes to mask
his private anti-gay bias behind the guise of expert opinion, Pamela reasoned,
was directly contrary to both the literal language and the spirit of the applica-
ble rules of evidence.386
Pamela also argued that the substantive testimony offered by Mr. Rhodes
did not satisfy the criteria for admissibility under Wyoming Rule of Evidence
702387 and Daubert.a8  Pamela urged that the relevance, and hence admissi-
bility, of a proffered expert's testimony hinges upon the reliability of the ex-
pert's opinion," 9 and that reliability, in turn, "[is] based on whether the un-
derlying theory is scientifically valid and pertains to the facts of the case.""
Aside from the aforementioned anti-gay bias which should have rendered the
testimony per se unreliable, Pamela argued that the fatal flaws in the method-
ology Mr. Rhodes employed to diagnose sexual abuse, which included his
failure to consider the inconsistencies in Miriam's statements regarding sexual
abuse3 1' and the impact of Christine's coaching on Miriam's "disclo-
sures," 392 independently rendered his testimony unreliable.
384. See generally MMOE v. MJE, 841 P.2d 820, 826 (Wyo. 1992) (recognizing "expert"
status in person with a Ph.D. and over 30 years experience treating over 1000 children for sexual
abuse); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 978 (Wyo. 1988) (admitting "expert" testimony by the
coordinator of a sexual assault service agency who had extensive education, training, and experi-
ence in counseling abuse victims). Mr. Rhodes, in contrast, merely had a B.A. in Bible and spent
27 years as a minister with the Church of Christ. He had obtained his M.A. in counseling in 1992
and had only examined five or six children for the purpose of determining sexual abuse when he
did the evaluations in this case. He was not yet licensed as a counselor and still had to be super-
vised by a licensed counselor, but his supervisor did not directly review Mr. Rhodes's methodolo-
gy or conclusions in this case. Tr. at 88-89, 408-11.
385. Mr. Rhodes's report stated that he saw no characteristics in Pamela, other than lesbian-
ism, that would make her an unfit mother. Ex. 8, at 15.
386. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
expert opinion inadmissible to the extent that it is personal opinion); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co.,
826 F.2d 420, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding physician's personal opinion of causation inadmis-
sible); Staggs v. Commonwealth, 877 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Ky. 1993) (finding expert witness's per-
sonal opinion irrelevant and far more prejudicial than probative when the testimony did not aid the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence).
387. Identical to its federal counterpart, Wyoming evidence law allows expert testimony "if
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." WYo. R. EvID. 702.
388. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993). The Wyoming Su-
preme Court adopted this position in Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 443 (Wyo. 1993).
389. Springfield, 860 P.2d at 443 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580).
390. Id.
391. See B.L.E. v. V.A.E., 791 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding "fragmentary
and unrevealing" audiotapes of child's statement insufficient to support allegations of sexual abuse
against father); Jane P. v. John P., 515 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (finding no
credibility in statements of three-year-old twin girls regarding alleged sexual abuse by their father
where the statements ranged from claims that the "touching" occurred "lots of times" in "all the
rooms" of the father's house to statements completely denying any "touching" by the father).
392. See B.L.E., 791 S.W.2d at 430 (finding no evidence of sexual abuse where child's state-
ments could have been the result of coaching by the mother and the influence which may have
resulted from the mother's reward of hugs and kisses any time the child made statements implicat-
ing the father as an abuser); O.J.G. v. G.W.G., 770 S.W.2d 372, 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (up-
holding joint award of custody where evidence indicated that statements by child that father had
sexually abused her were prompted by the mother); Swift v. Swift, 557 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (N.Y.
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Pamela further demonstrated that the trial court's characterization of Dr.
Jenny's testimony was completely contrary to her lengthy written report and
trial testimony in which she addressed each of the behaviors of which Dean
and Christine complained and explained why such behaviors did not indicate
sexual abuse.393 Pamela also challenged the trial court's concern that Dr. Jen-
ny failed to consider Miriam's statements to Dr. Brungardt on two levels.
First, Pamela argued, the trial court's finding was factually incorrect; Dr. Jen-
ny had considered Miriam's statements but found this "evidence" suffered
from the same flaws-primarily the repeated coaching of Miriam-which
rendered Miriam's "disclosures" to Mr. Rhodes invalid.394 Second, Pamela
pointed out that the court's finding was inconsistent because Dr. Brungardt
readily conceded that she would have to reconsider her own crediting of Miri-
am's statements in light of the facts that were withheld from her during her
examination of Miriam.395
Pamela challenged the trial court's dismissal of Dr. Bloom's conclusions
by demonstrating the direct contradiction between the trial court's character-
ization of Dr. Bloom's testimony, which included a charge that Dr Bloom
admitted "making overstatements and inaccurate quotations," and Dr. Bloom's
actual testimony at trial.396
Due to the procedural posture of the case, Dr. Moriarty's testimony was
not fully briefed to the court.397 In her Reply Brief to her original appeal,
however, Pamela summarized how Dr. Moriarty, who was Dean's chosen
expert, had independently confirmed the findings of Drs. Bloom and Jenny
that no sexual abuse had occurred and that the actions of Dean and Christine
were harming the children. 8 Pamela also noted Dr. Moriarty's criticism of
the methodology employed by Mr. Rhodes in concluding that the children had
been eroticized' 9Y
Finally, Pamela focused on the lower court's own language as proof that
the court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the competent
App. Div. 1990) (invalidating claims of abuse based on a showing at trial of mother's strong mo-
tivation to influence her three-year-old daughter that her father had sexually abused her).
393. See Dr. Jenny's report, Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, at 6, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (July 6, 1994);
Tr. at 716-74 (Dr. Jenny's direct and cross examination).
394. Tr. at 747-52.
395. Id. at 193-202.
396. Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at 47-49. Pamela pointed out, for example, that Dr. Bloom did
not admit (nor was he ever asked to admit) to making any "overstatements," and that while he
conceded to mistakenly placing a few words in quotes regarding the number of persons Miriam
accused of molesting her during Mr. Rhodes's videotaped interview, the content of the statement
was correct despite the errant quotation marks. Id. at 48 (citing Tr. at 680).
397. As previously noted, the Wyoming Supreme Court granted Pamela's Motion to Supple-
ment the record of her pending appeal with the transcript and exhibits of the January 31, 1995,
hearing. See supra note 376. Since the court did not order additional briefing regarding Dr.
Moriarty's findings or the proceedings of January 31, 1995, the only textual treatment on those
topics is contained in Pamela's Motion to Supplement and her Reply Brief submitted in the origi-
nal appeal. See Appellant's Motion to Supplement at 2-3, Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995)
(No. 94-262); Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-5, Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-262)
[hereinafter Appellant's Reply Br.].
398. Appellant's Reply Br. at 4.
399. Id.
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expert testimony on the subject of sexual abuse. The trial court stated: "Be-
yond the testimony of experts, I find that it has been demonstrated by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Miriam and Joshua have been exposed to
sexual behavior inappropriate to their ages while visiting with Plaintiff."'
Pamela argued:
When the court's statement is read in light of its condemnation of gay
and lesbian parents in the second half of its Decision Letter, two
things become readily apparent. First, the judge erred in rejecting the
compelling evidence presented by Plaintiff's experts who possess
decades of experience in the delicate area of child sexual abuse in
favor of his own amateur analysis. Second, all conclusions reached by
the trial judge were tainted by his belief that any exposure to a gay or
lesbian parent constitutes exposure to "inappropriate sexual behavior."
A review of the record in this case established that the only way the
court could independently conclude that Plaintiff had exposed her
children to "inappropriate sexual behavior" is if, perhaps even uncon-
sciously, the court embraced the stereotypes of homosexuals as sexual
perverts and child molesters which have long been disproven by solid
empirical data."°
N. The Wyoming Supreme Court's Decision
By a 3-2 decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
restrictions on Pamela's visitation.' In an opinion devoted primarily to vili-
fying both Pamela and Dean for their continued attempts "to reduce the chil-
dren to mere proselytes of conflicting lifestyles" 3-a castigation unwarrant-
ed of Pamela based on the record before the court-the supreme court held
that the trial court erred as a matter of law by qualifying Mr. Rhodes as an
expert and erred in its factual findings based on the testimony of Mr. Rhodes,





In addition to these errors of law and fact, the supreme court found that
the trial court's diatribe about homosexuality and family values constituted an
inappropriate indulgence in "an essentially personal viewpoint in derogation of
Pamela's lifestyle."'45 The trial court's views on homosexuality were not
supported by the "expert" testimony of Mr. Rhodes, the supreme court deter-
mined, since Rhodes's "acknowledged homophobic bias vitiate[d] any value
his testimony might have [had] as a factual basis for the district court's cri-
400. Decision Letter at 3 (emphasis added).
401. Appellant's Reply Br. at 9. See generally GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (Fredrick W.
Bozett ed., 1987); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbians and Gay Parent, 63 CHILD DEV.
1025 (1992); Julie Schwartz Gottman, Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 14 MARRIAGE &
FAM. REv. 177 (1989).
402. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 952 (Wyo. 1995).
403. Id. at 952.
404. Id. at 950-5 1.
405. Id. at 951.
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tique of homosexuality."'
Despite these major flaws in the trial court's decision, the supreme court
found no error in the trial court's summary rejection of the evidence presented
by Pamela's experts. The supreme court itself dismissed the quality and quan-
tity of this expert evidence in two short paragraphs:
Dean and Pamela both called expert witnesses to bolster their
cases. The district court rejected testimony of Pamela's experts, find-
ing it neither particularly useful nor credible. Our deference to that
decision cannot be extended to the district court's inappropriate reli-
ance on the testimony of Dean's expert, Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes'
categorical bias against homosexuality, compounded by his truncated
professional experience, necessarily relegate his views to the dubious
stature reserved by the district court for the opinions of Pamela's
experts.
Entirely discounting the "expert" testimony, we nonetheless dis-
cern a substantial basis in the record upon which to sustain the dis-
trict court. Searching the record for abuse of discretion, we cannot
say, under the circumstances revealed, that the district court's deci-
sion was either arbitrary or capricious.'
The supreme court's wholesale rejection of expert testimony in deference
to the trial court is ironic at best and dangerous at worst. As previously dis-
cussed, the supreme court renounced the trial court's reliance on Mr. Rhodes
due not only to Mr. Rhodes's lack of qualifications but also because of his
bias; the court further recognized that the trial court's personal bias improperly
influenced its decision. Despite the finding, the court gave complete deference
to the trial court's conclusory rejection of Pamela's compelling expert evi-
dence without addressing the need for experts in a case involving child sexual
abuse, the standards for expert witnesses, or the admissibility and weight that
should have been afforded Pamela's trial experts Drs. Bloom and Jenny. Also
conspicuously absent is any discussion of the testimony of Dean's chosen
counselor and child sexual abuse expert, Dr. Moriarty, which was presented at
the hearing held six months after the trial court issued its initial ruling. The
dangerous message conveyed through this opinion is that judges can disregard
credible expert testimony and decide cases based on their own personal beliefs
without fear of reversal on appeal.
The supreme court justified its affirmance of the specious trial court opin-
ion by repeatedly retreating to the degree of "discretion" afforded the trial
court in visitation and custody matters."8 Indeed, the supreme court specifi-
cally held that the trial court's blanket condemnation of homosexuality did not
present "indices of malice or prejudice sufficient to cast doubt upon the
court's capacity to remain 'open to the conviction which evidence might pro-
duce."'" It concluded by stating that "although we cannot condone the dis-
406. Id. at 950.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 951 (citations omitted).
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trict court's indulgence of a personal viewpoint, we likewise cannot reverse a
discretionary decision which is reasonable and benefits from substantial sup-
port in the record."41
The majority opinion begs the question of what "support" there is in the
record-much less "substantial support"--for the severe restriction of
Pamela's visitation rights other than the (now-discredited) testimony of Mr.
Rhodes and the trial judge's own conclusions based largely on his personal
bias.
The two dissenting justices answered this fundamental question by observ-
ing simply that there was no evidence to support the majority's affirmation of
the trial court's restrictions. Specifically, the dissent opined that the personal
bias of the judge and the "categorical bias" of Mr. Rhodes, Dean, and Chris-
tine mandate "that the district court's decision must be reversed and this mat-
ter remanded for a new trial presided over by a judge who does not hold such
views."4"' Moreover, the dissent criticized the majority for exceeding its re-
view function by engaging in fact finding, and then finding "facts" not sup-
ported in the record:
As I understand the evidence, the cause of the children's inappro-
priate behavior is found in the father's and Christine's "zealous
machinations," not the mother's.
The record quite clearly reveals that the father and Christine
worked long and hard at alienating these children from their mother.
They should have been held in contempt for what they have done;
instead, they are, despite the spin placed on it by the majority, re-
warded for their outrageous behavior." 2
In addition to the inherent flaws in the majority's reasoning illuminated by
the dissent, there is yet another irony underlying the Hertzler decision. The
majority's recitation of the "facts," including the statements that Pamela was
trying to indoctrinate the children to her lifestyle and that this supposed indoc-
trination was harming the children, finds little support in the record except for
the testimony and report of Mr. Rhodes. Thus, while purporting to reject all
expert testimony in this case, the majority relies upon-and thus gives cred-
ence to-the one "expert" they found uniquely unqualified to render an opin-
ion in this case.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
It is evident, from the kinds of testimony given by experts in the
mental health and medical fields, and from the untested and therefore
undocumented reliability and validity of the evaluative techniques,
that few safeguards exist for people, whether parents or surrogate care
providers, who are wrongly but vigorously accused of having molest-
410. Id. at 952.
411. Id. at 953.
412, Id. at 954.
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ed a child under their care or supervision."3
A comparison of the general evidentiary standards governing expert wit-
nesses with the particularly flawed application of those standards by the Wyo-
ming courts in Hertzler suggests that a three-tiered examination of a proffered
expert testimony is necessary in cases where gay or lesbian parents are ac-
cused of child sexual abuse. At each level of evaluation, the trial court must
be sensitive to the corrupting impact that anti-gay bias may have had on the
information obtained by the expert and the conclusions gleaned by the expert
from the information. This author advocates that any degree of bias should be
sufficient to prevent a witness from being qualified as an expert; at a mini-
mum, demonstrations of bias should substantially undermine the credibility of
the expert witness.
First, it must be established that the proffered expert possesses significant
experience in diagnosing sexual abuse and is familiar with the empirical data
regarding gay and lesbian parents. Second, the expert's sources of factual
information must be carefully examined for reliability in light of the emotion-
ally charged atmosphere in which the allegations are made and investigated.
Third, the methodologies and theories which the expert applied to the factual
information must be compared to the accepted practices in the expert's field.
It is, of course, highly unlikely that any witness will readily admit person-
al bias or concede the possible impact of bias on his testimony. Thus, a court
reviewing proffered expert testimony must look for indicia of bias which ma-
terialize, for example, "in testimony that is emotionally delivered, resistant to
change in light of new facts, or delivered with absolute certainty."4 4 Subtle
distortions of fact, inappropriate emphasis on minor details, and demonstra-
tions of either overt hostility or excessive leniency toward a party also suggest
that the expert "may be acting out of personal beliefs and attitudes rather than
professional expertise."4  Due to the importance of this screening process
for assuring full and fair adjudication of child sexual abuse allegations made
against a gay or lesbian parent, each tier is discussed more fully below.
A. Heightened Scrutiny of the Expert's Qualifications
Qualifying an expert on the basis of "knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing or education"" 6 allows a significant range of witnesses-from medical
doctors to social workers-to qualify as "experts" on the issue of child sexual
abuse in any given case."7 But as Mississippi's highest court advised,
"[c]ourts should proceed cautiously when considering the admissibility of
expert testimony on child sexual abuse. It is vitally important that profession-
413. Homer & Guyer It, supra note 5, at 382.
414. Stephen A. Newman, Assessing the Quality of Expert Testimony in Cases Involving Chil-
dren, J. PSYCHIATRY & L., Summer 1994, at 181, 205.
415. Id.
416. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also discussion supra Part I.A.
417. See discussion supra Part II.A.; see also Newman, supra note 414, at 184-86 (cautioning
that many so-called experts on child sexual abuse do not possess the requisite experience and
other qualifications necessary to make competent determinations).
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als offering such testimony be highly qualified. Courts should insist on a thor-
ough showing of expertise before permitting individuals to testify as ex-
perts."4 8 Some courts have taken this admonition to heart by recognizing,
for example, that the "mere fact that one is a licensed and practicing physician
hardly suggests expertise in child sexual abuse."4 '9
More specifically, courts should require a proffered child sexual abuse
expert to demonstrate competency in at least two categories.42 The first cate-
gory, "technical expertise," requires a showing that the expert possesses spe-
cialized skills in eliciting accurate information from the accused and the child;
principle tools of expertise include, for example, proper interviewing tech-
niques42' and the proper use of anatomically correct dolls. 22 The other
category, "cognate expertise," is satisfied by a showing that the expert pos-
sesses extensive knowledge in the areas of child development, sexuality and
related relevant topics.423
In addition to ascertaining an appropriate degree of theoretical and practi-
cal experience in the field,424 courts should make several additional threshold
inquiries of a witness proffered as an expert when a gay or lesbian parent is
accused of child sexual abuse. First, the witness should be extensively voir
dired to ascertain the extent of any personal bias he has against gay and lesbi-
an parents in general and the accused in particular. This is critically important
because an expert's attitude about a targeted individual may well be framed by
418. Goodson v. Mississippi, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Miss. 1990). For a list of appropriate
voir dire questions for child abuse experts, see Schultz, supra note 14, at 2.
419. Goodson, 566 So. 2d at 1145 n.2.
420. See Homer et al., supra note 7, at 142-44.
421. Common errors in interviews for determining whether a child was sexually abused in-
clude "using peer pressure and rewards, suggesting answers, supplying sexual knowledge and
vocabulary, offering information from other child interviews, and forcing children to continue
unwanted interviews." Newman, supra note 414, at 202-03.
422. Homer et al., supra note 7, at 143. The use of anatomical dolls is one type of "play
therapy" used to help children of tender years communicate with a therapist or interviewer. The
interviewer asks the child questions about the dolls, observes the child's physical handling of
them, and then draws conclusions as to whether the child has been sexually abused. Use of the
dolls has proven controversial due to the physical construct of the dolls which may include exag-
gerated sexual organs and the subjectivity inherent in the interviewer's interpretation of the child's
play with the dolls. See Newman, supra note 414, at 198-201; Judy S. DeLoache, The Use of
Dolls in Interviewing Young Children, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS 160,
160-78 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995) (concluding that little empirical data exists showing
that the dolls are effective in determining whether a child has been sexually abused); see also
discussion of dolls infra Part IV.B.I.b.
423. Homer et al., supra note 7, at 143. Empirical studies, however, reveal that even when an
expert satisfies both categories of expertise, there remains in any given case a significant likeli-
hood of a false-positive finding of child sexual abuse. Id. at 144.
424. Although actual experience may be relevant in determining whether a particular individu-
al meets the legal criteria for an expert witness, there is "a considerable and consistent body of
research that runs contrary to the belief that experience improves clinicians' diagnostic or predic-
tive accuracy." David Faust, Use and Then Prove, or Prove and Then Use? Some Thoughts on the
Ethics of Mental Health Professionals' Courtroom Involvement, 3 ETHICS & BEHAV. 359, 373
(1993). The counter-intuitive finding that experience does not necessarily correlate with compe-
tence stems from the lack of feedback regarding a clinician's judgments, biases caused by self-
fulfilling prophesies, and systematic errors in a clinician's practice that are never uncovered. Id.
Psychologist Faust concludes that "given the current conditions under which we practice in the
mental health field, there are strong empirical and theoretical reasons to question the stereotype
that experience is the best teacher or even an effective one." Id.
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the expert's attitude toward the individual's defined population.425 Second,
the witness should be questioned as to whether the parent's sexual orientation
affected the selection and execution of a diagnostic methodology or influenced
his ultimate opinions in the case. Third, the witness should be required to
demonstrate significant familiarity with empirical data regarding the parenting
skills of gay and lesbian parents. No witness should be deemed an expert if
the responses to these lines of inquiry reveal, as they did in Hertzler, that the
professional opinions are contaminated by personal bias against gay or lesbian
parents or are otherwise inherently unreliable due to insufficient knowl-
edge.426
Some may argue that these areas of inquiry are inappropriate for deter-
mining expert status of a witness because a witness's bias affects only the
credibility-and not the admissibility-of the witness's testimony. The more
compelling argument, however, is that an expert's opinion contaminated by his
personal beliefs is not, as required by federal and state evidentiary rules and
the case law interpreting those rules, an opinion based on "scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge [which] will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."427 Moreover, a biased
opinion is arguably irrelevant,4 2 and, even if relevant, properly excluded as
being more prejudicial than probative. 429 And, as the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, "[p]rivate biases might be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. ' '4  Allowing an individual to
provide "expert" testimony contaminated by personal anti-gay animus legiti-
mizes that bias in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's mandate and
425. Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 395.
426. Several courts have rejected "expert" evidence where the witness did not have the requi-
site knowledge regarding homosexuals to offer a credible opinion in the case. See, e.g., Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1131 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (discounting testimony of psychologist who
favored retaining Texas sodomy statute because expert's opinions were neither based on his inde-
* pendent research nor supported by literature in his field regarding the attributes of homosexuals),
rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 n.2
(Mass. 1983) (finding that because of expert psychiatrist's personal experience regarding his theo-
ries and the lack of supporting medical literature, his testimony that mere association between
minor child and homosexual parent would harm child was not credible).
427. FED. R. EvID. 702. See, e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360
(6th Cir. 1992) (stating that an expert opinion is inadmissible to the extent that it is a personal
opinion); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding a physician's
unsupported personal opinion of causation inadmissible); Staggs v. Commonwealth, 877 S.W.2d
604, 606 (Ky. 1993) (finding expert witness's personal opinion was irrelevant and far more preju-
dicial than probative because the testimony did not aid the finder of fact in understanding the
evidence).
428. The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., reiterated that
relevancy is the threshold requirement for all evidentiary determinations including the admissibili-
ty of a proffered expert's testimony. 509 U.S. 579, 586-93 (1993).
429. FED. R. EVID. 402 and its state law counterparts provide that, in general, relevant evi-
dence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, while FED. R. EVID. 401 and many of
its state law counterparts define relevant evidence as that which makes an important fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403 and its state law counter-
parts provide that even relevant evidence may be excluded for a variety of reasons, including
unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. Under these standards, an expert's attempt to cloak
his personal biases in the guise of a professional opinion renders that opinion irrelevant, and even
if deemed relevant, make it more prejudicial than probative.
430. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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numerous rules of evidence.
Such contaminated testimony is also forbidden pursuant to the ethical
constraints adopted by the many disciplines from which experts on child sexu-
al abuse are routinely selected.43" ' For example, the "Guidelines for Child
Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings," adopted by the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) in 1994,432 caution "psychologists to be aware
of personal and societal biases '433 relating to sexual orientation and further
mandate that psychologists "must not rely on their own bias or unsupported
beliefs when rendering opinions. '434 A psychologist who cannot overcome
his bias is instructed to withdraw from the evaluation.433 Although the APA
guidelines are described by their drafters as "being aspirational in intent,'
436
psychologists "who do not follow them will be operating outside the standard
of practice as set forth by the parent organization" which governs their profes-
sion.437
Similar guidelines apply to social workers, counselors, and others who are
among the 60,000 members of the American Counseling Association (ACA).
A position paper authored by the ACA's Human Rights Committee states that
members should "engage in [an] ongoing examination of his/her own attitudes,
feelings, stereotypic views, perceptions and behaviors that might have prejudi-
cial or limiting impact on ... gay/lesbian persons,""43  and should be active
in trying to educate others and eliminate discrimination against gay and lesbian
individuals.439
431. For an excellent overview of the ethical constraints on the role of the mental health and
other expert witnesses, see Special Issue: The Ethics of Expert Witnessing, 3 ETHICS & BEHAV.
223 (1993); see also Diane H. Schetky, Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry, in ETHICS & CHILD
MENTAL HEALTH 265, 266 (Jocelyn Y. Hattab ed., 1994) ("The psychiatrist needs to consider
whether her own strong personal beliefs preclude involvement in a particular case. Homophobia or
bias towards mothers having custody would preclude an objective assessment of a gay father seek-
ing custody of his child."); Sari H. Dworkin & Fernando Gutierrez, Counselors Be Aware: Clients
Come in Every Size, Shape, Color, and Sexual Orientation, 68 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 6, 7 (1989)
(noting that many therapists lack knowledge about their gay, lesbian and bisexual patients in direct
violation of their ethical standards as members of the American Association for Counseling and
Development).
432. See generally MATHILDA B. CANTER ET AL., ETHICS FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS-A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE APA ETHICS CODE (1994) (explaining, among other things, the importance of Stan-
dard 1.08, which requires respect for human differences including those based on sexual orienta-
tion; Standard 1.10, which mandates nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation among
other factors; and Standard 7.01, defining professionalism as including knowledge and competence
for expert witnesses especially where specialized knowledge of a specific population is required).
433. Ackerman, supra note 143, at 130, app. at 133. The APA revoked the membership of a
psychiatrist for violating its ethical principles when the psychiatrist misrepresented the empirical
data regarding homosexuality in a variety of forums. See Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social
Science in Gay Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of Historical Context, Justificatory Cita-
tions and Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 65 n.247 (1994) [hereinafter Falk, Preva-
lence of Social Science].
434. Ackerman, supra note 143, at 131, app. at 133.
435. Id. app. at 133.
436. Id. at 129.
437. Id.
438. Position Paper of the Human Rights Committee of the American Association for Coun-
seling and Development 1 (1987), quoted in Dworkin & Gutierrez, supra note 431, at 6. The ACA
previously operated under the name of the American Association of Counseling and Development.
439. Id.
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In sum, the failure of an otherwise qualified expert to follow the standards
of ethics and professionalism established by her own discipline provides suffi-
cient grounds for excluding her proffered testimony because such testimony
fails to satisfy the "generally accepted" criterion of Frye and Daubert.
The third line of suggested inquiry before qualifying a witness as an ex-
pert-i.e. whether the expert is familiar with the empirical data on gay and
lesbian parents-is also critical. Knowledge of this data indicates an appropri-
ate sophistication regarding the overall atmosphere in which the allegations of
sexual abuse have been raised. Moreover, the witness will undoubtedly be
asked to comment on whether the parent's sexual orientation, even absent the
allegations of sexual abuse, is harmful to the child. A witness unfamiliar with
the data on gay and lesbian parents does not possess the knowledge base nec-
essary to form a credible opinion on that issue. In this respect, requiring famil-
iarity with empirical data on gay and lesbian parents is simply a logical exten-
sion of the "cognitive expertise" prerequisite for qualification as an expert wit-
ness.
B. Heightened Scrutiny of the Sources of Factual Information Upon Which a
Proffered Expert's Opinion is Based
Expert opinion is based upon facts. Inaccurate facts "directly lead to erro-
neous opinions."' Unfortunately, the procedures commonly used by experts
and others to gather the facts surrounding allegations of child sexual abuse are
commonly rife with opportunities for inaccuracy. As one family law judge
with substantial experience in child sexual abuse cases concluded: "[e]xperts,
with the best of intentions, often come to their conclusions using incompetent
and incomplete evidence, without regard for even the most basic due process
safeguards.""'
Civil cases in which allegations of child sexual abuse are raised often
share a common sequence of events."2 The child first makes a statement
suggesting inappropriate sexual behavior by the accused. The child's state-
ments may be spontaneous, but more frequently are given in response to prob-
ing and potentially coercive questioning by the accuser or other adult. The
following scenario is not uncommon:
Mistrustful and/or sexually preoccupied parents might misperceive
innocent bathing or toileting of the child by the estranged spouse as
evidence of sexual molestation. Washing, powdering, or drying of the
genital or anal area may be viewed as genital or anal fondling. In
these situations, the child might respond positively to the question,
"did Daddy touch your private parts?'" 3
440. Rotlevy, supra note 26, at 274.
441. Gallet, supra note 24, at 480.
442. See generally Ralph Underwager et al., Interrogation as a Learning Process, in ACCUSA-
TIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 19, 19-30 (Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager eds., 1988).
443. Arthur H. Green, Factors Contributing to False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in
Custody Disputes, 15 CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES 177, 179 (1991).
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Next, the adult to whom the information is revealed-often a person who
is not an expert on sexual abuse-interprets the information as evidence of
sexual abuse. The accuser's attorney then rephrases and reinterprets the state-
ments to support allegations in civil pleadings. After litigation is commenced,
the child undergoes extensive physical and psychological evaluations by pro-
fessionals retained as experts by the parties. Finally, the experts offer conflict-
ing opinions as to whether the child's statements and behavior confirm or
negate the veracity of the allegations.
Throughout this process, the child is encouraged to tell and retell the story
as remolded by a series of interpreters. Ultimately, the retelling and reinterpre-
tation of the child's original statement and previous and subsequent behaviors
yields a result about as reliable as the child's game of "telephone," where a
message is whispered from player to player until the communication made to
the last player lacks even a remote resemblance to the content or import of the
initial statement. An expert's reliance on this potentially distorted message
from the child is further suspect due to its nature as classic hearsay.'
This "tell and interpret/retell and interpret" process is further complicated
when the accused is a gay or lesbian parent. The child may be receiving con-
tradictory information from the accuser and other adults regarding the meaning
of the parent's sexual orientation and the definition of inappropriate "sexual"
conduct. For example, the child may be told that two women holding hands,
hugging, or engaging in other innocuous demonstrations of affection are en-
gaging in homosexual conduct, with the emphasis on the "sexual" aspect of
the behavior. 45 Thus, the child may answer in the affirmative when asked if
his lesbian mother engages in "sexual" conduct with him, even though the
only contact between the child and mother was holding hands and hugging.
The potential for miscommunication and the resultant metamorphosis of
wholly innocuous conduct into allegations of child sexual abuse requires ex-
tremely close examination of the sources of factual information on which the
witness relied in forming his expert opinions and the methods the expert em-
ployed to harvest those facts. Sources of particular concern are the child al-
leged to be the victim of sexual abuse, the accuser, the accused, and other fact
witnesses. An expert's "[flailure to utilize these appropriate sources reduces
444. In the context of a criminal conviction for child sexual abuse where Confrontation
Clause rights are implicated, the U.S. Supreme Court warned that trial courts have a duty to ascer-
tain the reliability of a child's hearsay statement which forms the basis for an expert's opinion that
the abuse occurred; the reliability is to be assessed based upon the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement which "render the declarant particularly worthy of be-
lief." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990). See generally Clay Edwards, Note, The Reliabil-
ily of Out-Of-Court Statements by Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Evaluating Consistency Via the
Process of Disclosure, 33 J. FAM. L. 685 (1994-95) (presenting a thorough discussion of the hear-
say and other evidentiary rules governing a child's statements).
445. For homosexuals as well as heterosexuals, "[mlisinterpretation of normal caretaking
practices involving physical or affectionate contact between parent and child during bathing,
toileting, dressing, hugging, or kissing is often at the core of the abuse allegation." Green, supra
note 443, at 177.
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the value of any resulting opinion" considerably.'8 On the other hand, elicit-
ing accurate facts from these sources requires skill, patience, and the ability to
be a gatherer and observer of objective information rather than a reconstruc-
tionist seeking to build a factual base to support preconceived conclusions. ' 7
The failure of an investigator to look for explanations other than sexual abuse
for the child's statements and behaviors is one of many shortcomings indicat-
ing potential bias and incompetence of the expert."8
1. The Child
"Despite problems associated with children's disclosure, experts in the
field of child maltreatment agree that the history obtained from the child is
usually the most important evidence in diagnosing sexual abuse.""' 9 But
while social scientists agree that information received directly from the child
may be the most important information available in any given case, it may
also be the most unreliable.45 The unreliability is not predicated on lack of
faith in a child's veracity per se, but rather the child's "vulnerability, immatu-
rity, and impressionability." '45 Reversing a nursery school teacher's convic-
tions for child sexual abuse in the extremely high profile case of New Jersey
v. Michaels, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:452
Woven into our consideration of this case is the question of a child's
susceptibility to influence through coercive or suggestive questioning.
As the Appellate Division noted, there is a constantly broadening
body of scholarly authority [which] exists on the question of
children's susceptibility to improper interrogation. The expanse of
that literature encompasses a variety of views and conclusions.
Among the varying perspectives, however, the Appellate Division
found a consistent and recurrent concern over the capacity of the
interviewer and the interview process to distort a child's recollection
through unduly slanted interrogation techniques. The Appellate Divi-
sion concluded that certain interview practices are sufficiently coer-
446. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-7.
447. See Newman, supra note 414, at 214-17 (explaining, inter alia, the importance of fact
finding and the difficulties inherent in determining past events).
448. See Schultz, supra note 14, at 4.
449. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 688; see also Chery Hysjulien et al., Child Custody
Evaluations: A Review of Methods Used in Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 32 FAM.
& CONCILIATION Crs. REv. 466, 473 (1994) (stating that the interview is "one of the most impor-
tant methods used in child custody evaluations").
450. See Goodson v. Mississippi, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990) (excluding doctor's
testimony about allegedly "sexually traumatized" victim when doctor lacked specialized knowl-
edge and evidence did not support reliability of expert opinions regarding sexual abuse).
451. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1372, 1376 (N.J. 1994). For an excellent overview of the
social science and legal challenges to determining the reliability, and hence admissibility, of child
testimony, see LucY S. McGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LE-
GAL SYSTEM (1994).
452. For a detailed description of the prosecution of Margaret Michael Kelly for child sexual
abuse, see Robert Rosenthal, State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels: An Overview, I
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 246 (1995). The same volume of this publication also contains the
amicus brief presented by the "Committee of Concerned Social Scientists" and a number of relat-
ed articles on the use of expert testimony in the prosecution of Michaels.
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cive or suggestive to alter irremediably the perceptions of the child
victim.453
The manner in which an expert questions a child regarding sexual abuse
allegations is of utmost concern in evaluating the reliability of the expert's
opinions based upon those interviews. "Recent research clearly shows that the
skill of the interviewer directly influences whether a child related a true mem-
ory, discusses a false belief, affirms details suggested by others, embellishes
fantasies, or provides no information at all. 454 Based on this scientific evi-
dence and courtroom experience, courts have also concluded that improper
child interview techniques can cause "memory". to be created for events which
never occurred and "that once tainted the distortion of the child's memory is
irremediable. 455
Accordingly, information provided directly by the child to the expert must
be carefully evaluated for contamination by persons who may have, intention-
ally or inadvertently, coached the child into saying-and possibly bel-
ieving-that certain events oc curred. An effective evaluation "requires a highly
nuanced inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding those inter-
views. Like confessions and identifications, the inculpatory capacity of state-
ments indicating the occurrence of sexual abuse and the anticipated testimony
about those occurrences requires that special care be taken to ensure their
reliability."456
a. Common Interview Errors
Asking the same question repeatedly is among the most common and
most serious interview errors. "When a child is asked a question and gives an
answer, and the question is immediately asked again, the child's normal reac-
453. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376 (citations omitted). Margaret Kelly Michaels was sentenced
to 47 years in prison after a jury convicted her of 115 counts of sexual assault on twenty children
entrusted to her care as a nursery school teacher. The intermediate appellate court reversed the
convictions and remanded for retrial, inter alia, because the techniques used to. interrogate the
alleged victims were extremely coercive and suggestive. See State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 517
(N.J. Super. 1993). The appellate court also held that if the state decided to retry Michaels, it
would first have to hold a pretrial "taint hearing" in which the testimony of the alleged victims
would be examined to determine whether the interrogation itself distorted the children's memories
and caused them to fabricate their "memories" of sexual misconduct by the defendant. Id. at 516.
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously upheld the appellate court's finding regarding the
impropriety of the techniques used to interview the children and the necessity of a "taint" hearing
prior to a retrial. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380. On December 2, 1994, the state announced its deci-
sion not to retry Michaels. The announcement came almost 10 years after the initial indictment
was returned and after Michaels had already spent five years in prison. See Evelyn Nieves, Prose-
cutors Drop Charges in Abuse Case from Mid-80s, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at 25.
454. Nancy E. Walker & Matthew Nguyen, Interviewing the Child Witness: The Do's and the
Don'ts, the How's and the Why's, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1587, 1588 (1996).
455. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1378. In an impassioned dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836 (1990), Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, urged courts to
protect innocent persons charged with sexually abusing children and provided a lengthy overview
of the problems which stem from children's suggestibility regarding sexual abuse allegations. Id.
at 867-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Carol B. Cole & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Memory of
Children, in CMLDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 178, 190-99 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1987)
(reporting that it is possible to create a memory in a child through improper interview techniques).
456. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1375. See generally Walker & Nguyen, supra note 454.
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tion is to assume that the first answer was wrong or displeasing to the adult
questioner."4 7 Additionally, "[t]he insidious effects of repeated questioning
are even more pronounced when the questions themselves over time suggest
information to the children." '458 Leading questions also render responses in-
herently unreliable,459 as does lack of neutrality by the interviewer.'
The interviewer's bias regarding the facts of the case provides another
common source of interview error:
The bias results in the interrogator more readily picking up informa-
tion that supports his beliefs and ignoring or not responding to details
which suggest a different direction or falsity of the assumptions....
Statements that contradict or do not fit into his beliefs will be seen as
lies or evasions or confusions. This is particularly evident in the inter-
rogation of children when a child says that nothing happened. The
interviewers almost universally just keep on plowing ahead, repeating
the question, asking other questions about the hypothesized, believed-
in event, and finally eliciting from the child the desired response. 6'
These bias-based flaws were well-documented in Mr. Rhodes's videotaped
interview of, Miriam in the Hertzler case." Moreover, a highly nuanced in-
quiry into the Hertzler case suggests that an expert's anti-gay bias can taint
the interview process in several other important respects. The interviewer may
focus only on responses which tend to inculpate an accused gay or lesbian
parent and disregard exculpatory information.: 3 Ambiguous information may
be construed as supporting the interviewer's preordained conclusions. The
interviewer may also overlook important messages that the child is trying to
convey-for example, that the accuser instilled the child's answers or that
someone other than the parent sexually abused the child.
To determine whether the interview was contaminated due to the expert's
anti-gay bias, a proffered expert should be voir dired extensively to determine
whether she adequately tested the child for suggestibility and coaching or, as
Mr. Rhodes erred in the Hertzler case, simply accepted the child's inculpatory
statements as true and ignored the child's exculpatory comments.' Addi-
457. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377 (citing Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Effects of
Question Repetition on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 975 (1991)). See generally Jean Montoya, Something Not so Funny Happened on the
Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARiz. L. REV. 927 (1993)
(documenting the numerous errors made during interviews of children where sexual abuse was
suspected).
458. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377.
459. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813 (1990).
460. "Neutrality is crucial to ensure the evaluator remain as impartial and objective in provid-
ing information to the courts, which will guarantee the best-interest-of-the-child standard is met."
Hysjulien et al., supra note 449, at 473-74 (citations omitted).
461. Underwager et al., supra note 442, at 31.
462. See supra notes 268-273 and accompanying text.
463. The Michaels court recognized that "an interviewer's bias with respect to a suspected
person's guilt or innocence can have a marked effect on the accuracy of a child's statement."
Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also accepted this reality.
See Wright, 497 U.S. at 813.
464. See supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text.
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tional specific inquiry should be made as to whether the expert explored the
child's understanding of the accused parent's sexual orientation, the sources of
information as to the parent's homosexuality, and the child's interpretation of
the impact of the parent's sexual orientation on the child. An expert's failure
to test the child's capacity for veracity and failure to gather information on the
child's perspective on the parent's sexual orientation should render the witness
unqualified to offer expert testimony based upon information received from
the child. Moreover, the court should substantially discount the reliability of an
expert's conclusions unless the expert videotaped the child's interview and can
show that appropriate questions were asked and the child's responses were
accurately reported. 65
b. Use of Anatomically Correct Dolls
An expert's use of anatomically correct dolls to elicit information from
the child must be closely scrutinized by the trial court. In this controversial
method of diagnosing sexual abuse, the expert observes the child playing with
anatomically correct dolls.' A display of age-inappropriate sexual knowl-
edge is interpreted as indicative of sexual abuse.
Substantial "[d]isagreement exists among researchers both as to the repre-
sentative characteristic of the dolls and conclusions that may be drawn from
children's play with them."'" Critics claim that the use of dolls is highly
suggestive' and that the dolls are at best therapeutic tools which do not
meet the criteria for scientific proof.69 Other commentators note that the
dolls are used for at least seven different functions ranging from "Icebreaker"
or "Comforter" to "Diagnostic Test""47 and that "any critique of the dolls
must take into account the specific function or role that the dolls serve in a
particular evaluation and the skills of the individual interviewer.""47 A few
courts have excluded testimony based on use of the dolls, but many courts
have deemed this evidence reliable.472 The American Professional Society on
the Abuse of Children advises that aberrant behavior with the dolls might sug-
gest that additional investigation is needed, but should not be considered a
465. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812-13.
466. For an excellent discussion of presentation the effectiveness and pitfalls of using dolls in
diagnosing child sexual abuse, see Younts, supra note 6, at 708-20.
467. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-21. See generally Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat,
Putting the Anatomical Doll Controversy in Perspective: An Examination of the Major Uses and
Criticisms of the Dolls in Child Sexual Abuse Evaluations, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 113
(1994).
468. David C. Raskin & Phillip W. Esplin, Statement Validity Assessment: Interview Proce-
dures and Content Analysis of Children's Statements of Sexual Abuse, 13 BEHAV. ASSESSMENT
265, 270 (1991) (stating that dolls, puppets, drawings, and other techniques used to elicit informa-
tion during an interview with a child "frequently distract the child from the task of providing
complete and accurate descriptions, and they can be suggestive, provoke fantasy, and lack a scien-
tific basis").
469. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-21; Schultz, supra note 14, at 5.
470. Everson & Boat, supra note 467, at 115-18.
471. Id. at 126.
472. See Margaret Bull Kovera et. al, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects
of Expert Evidence Type and Cross-Examination, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 653, 655 (1994).
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conclusive diagnosis of sexual abuse.473 As one expert explained:
The principal misuse of dolls occurs when ambiguous or equivocal
doll play behavior is the basis for a diagnosis of child abuse. In es-
sence, a clinician attempts to translate the child's behaviors into a
verbal account of an experience. Even the foremost proponents of the
utility of anatomically detailed dolls concede that the risk of inter-
viewer error when using doll play as a diagnostic test is unacceptably
high.
474
As demonstrated by Mr. Rhodes's use of dolls during a videotaped inter-
view with Miriam in the Hertzler case,47 there is an added twist to unreli-
ability when a gay or lesbian parent is at issue. While the variety of human
sexual activities belies defining a particular sexual act as "gay" or "straight,"
experts who utilize the dolls generally focus on any increased sexual
knowledge demonstrated by the child as evidence of sexual abuse. Simply put,
the fact that a child might be able to demonstrate how a male and female doll
would have sex does not indicate that they have learned this information from
a homosexual. If anything, it should tend to alert the evaluator that the het-
erosexual parent should also be considered a source of the child's sexual
knowledge.
2. The Accuser
The individual alleging child sexual abuse obviously offers key informa-
tion for the expert retained to evaluate such allegations of sexual abuse. Quite
frequently accusations come from a former spouse with unresolved feelings of
anger and rejection stemming from the separation or divorce. "[T]he frequency
of false accusations under these circumstances is quite high, especially because
of the vengeance and exclusionary benefits to be derived from such an accusa-
tion."476 Feelings of anger may be especially intense when the spouse who
decided to end the marriage has entered a new same-sex relationship.
The expert's evaluation of the accuser may reveal, among other things,
"any gross psychopathy, ulterior reasons for seeking custody such as punishing
the other parent or resolving unmet needs from some unrelated situation, or
unrealistic expectations about parenting." '477 In very rare instances, a thor-
ough evaluation will reveal that the accuser is suffering from Delusional Dis-
order or another mental illness which prevents her from distinguishing reality
from fiction47 and that the delusional parent has transferred her beliefs to
the child.479 In most cases, however, the "mistaken or false allegations are
473. See Newman, supra note 414, at 201, 228 n.67.
474. McGOUGH, supra note 451, at 246 (citing Everson & Boat, supra note 467).
475. See supra notes 268-273 and accompanying text.
476. GARDNER, supra note 14, at 126.
477. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-8 (citations omitted).
478. See Martha L. Rogers, Delusional Disorder and the Evolution of Mistaken Sexual Alle-
gations in Child Custody Cases, 10 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 47, 47-48 (1992) (reporting that
"Delusional Disorder leading to accusations of sexual molestation is not a new or recent phenome-
non," and that other mental conditions of the accuser which should be considered include Affec-
tive Disorders, Schizophrenia, Brief Reactive Psychosis, and Paranoid Personality Disorder).
479. The child's dependence and intimate involvement with a parent who suffers from a delu-
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initiated by a parent who, rather than being psychotic, may have had overval-
ued ideas or may have evidenced less severe perceptional distortions that led
to a mistaken view of what transpired. ' '""o
It is tempting to paint the accuser as a vindictive villain willing to sacri-
fice the welfare of his children and to commit perjury to wreak vengeance on
his former spouse. The problem with such labeling is the paradox that the
accuser may be making the false allegations in good faith. The accuser may be
convinced, based on archaic stereotypes, previously unexamined religious or
moral tenets, or other sources of misinformation, that exposure to a gay or
lesbian parent causes sexual harm to the child. The accuser may believe, for
example, that a gay or lesbian parent is incapable of refraining from having
sexual contact with a child, especially a child of the same sex. The accuser
might also believe that the child's exposure to the gay or lesbian parent's
"lifestyle" will cause the child to become homosexual.
Such unfounded but emotionally charged fears may cause a parent to
become hypervigilant. An accuser who has no accurate knowledge of behav-
iors indicative of child sexual abuse might begin seeing "evidence" of sexual
abuse in every good-bye hug or kiss or other innocuous physical contact be-
tween the gay or lesbian parent and the child." In the Hertzler case, for ex-
ample, a washable Bugs Bunny tattoo was perceived as concrete evidence of
sexual abuse by the accusers. 2 Behaviors common in a child experiencing a
family breakup, such as crying, throwing tantrums, or otherwise acting out
when the child leaves one parent to be with the other, are also interpreted as
indicating that something awful must be responsible for the child's behavior.
Thus, it may be ignorance and overzealousness, rather than evil intent, that
motivate the accuser to level sexual abuse allegations against the gay or lesbi-
an parent. Such accusers rarely reconsider these conclusions even when faced
with compelling expert evidence that the child has not been sexually abused.
On the other hand, the accuser may intentionally raise false allegations of
sexual abuse to punish the other parent and to play into the possible bias and
prejudice of an expert or judge against gay and lesbian parents. Accusers in
this category have rightfully been the object of judicial scorn:
A parent who will deliberately use such means to further selfish inter-
ests is acting in his or her interests, and not in the child's interest.
Civilized people abhor and condemn sexual child abuse. Bringing
false charges of parental sexual abuse of children, and the deliberate
use of children as pawns to try to validate the charges, is equally
despicable and condemnable. 3
sional or similar disorder may cause the child to believe the accusation that the other parent has
been sexually molesting her. id. at 48-49.
480. Id. at 48.
481. A New York state family court judge reported his observations that while sometimes the
allegations of sexual abuse are manufactured by a parent or child, there are numerous cases where
the accusers are not lying but rather have misconstrued the facts. Gallet, supra note 24, at 482-83.
482. See supra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
483. Becker v. Becker, 613 So. 2d 275, 279 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (the parties are not related to
the author) (finding the mother's false allegations of sexual abuse so detrimental that "the result-
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While attempting to assess the accuser's motivations for bringing the
sexual abuse allegations, the expert must carefully assess the extent to which
an anti-gay animus or other improper motivation has colored the accuser's
perceptions. The court should not qualify a witness as an expert where the
witness has unquestionably relied on the accuser's view of the facts without
seeking collaboration of the facts from other credible sources. 4
3. The Accused
Allegations of child sexual abuse devastate the accused's life from the
very moment the accusations are uttered. The accused may lose current em-
ployment and career opportunities. The accused may also be subject to scorn
and ostracism by family, friends, and acquaintances, incur substantial legal ex-
penses, and find herself defending against criminal charges while embroiled in
the civil custody or visitation litigation. 5 In addition, the lesbian or gay par-
ent must deal with the consequences of having his or her sexual orientation
made public. Even if the accused is ultimately vindicated, the damage caused
by the accusation will never fully be repaired. 6 The most serious long-term
ing damage" to the children was "incalculable"). The court further concluded that the mother's use
of the children as pawns in her battle against her former husband warranted termination of her
domiciliary custody. Id.; see also Hartman v. Hartman, 621 N.E.2d 917, 920 (I11. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to father where the
mother falsely alleged that the father had sexually abused their child); Mullins v. Mullins, 490
N.E.2d 1375, 1390-91 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that the permanent custody of parties' two
children was properly transferred to father where mother had made false allegations of sexual
abuse and where mother attempted to alienate children from their father by, inter alia, requiring
them to call their new stepfather "daddy" and their birth father by his surname). In an extreme
case, a parent who falsely accuses his co-parent of sexually-abusing their child may be found
civilly liable for damages under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Rich-
ard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing Severe Emotional Dis-
tress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1253, 1254-55 (1994) (describing a recent
Texas case which could set a trend for other jurisdictions). A false accuser could also be prosecut-
ed for perjury, or even be sanctioned for tampering with witnesses. See Victor I. Vieth, Broken
Promises: A Call for Witness Tampering Sanctions in Cases of Child and Domestic Abuse, 18
HAMLINE L. REV. 181 (1994) (advocating prosecution of accused persons who attempt to improp-
erly influence child's testimony and noting the same standard could be used for accusers). The
growing body of potential sanctions for the "despicable" act of making false allegations of child
sexual abuse has also been expanded by state legislative action. For example, Minnesota law man-
dates that the court specifically consider, when determining the child's best interest, evidence that
a parent has made false allegations of sexual abuse. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (l)(a) (West
1990). California allows an award of costs against a party raising false allegations of child abuse
or neglect. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3027 (West Supp. 1996).
484. In a number of cases where no corroboration existed on the allegations of abuse, courts
have ordered a psychiatric examination of the accuser to test the accuser's veracity on the subject.
See SHUMAN supra note 6, at 13-25 and cases cited therein.
485. Once the allegations of child sexual abuse are made in one forum, such as a domestic
relations court, the accused may have to simultaneously defend herself against criminal charges,
disciplinary proceedings brought by professional licensing and disciplinary boards, and investiga-
tions by social services agencies.
486. For example, a person charged with sexual or other abuse of a child may be listed as a
"suspected" child abuser in a state child abuse registry even if the charges are found to be unsub-
stantiated. This registration could affect the accused's ability to obtain or maintain professional
licenses and to obtain employment. See Jill D. Moore, Comment, Charting a Course Between
Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV.
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effect may be the damage to the relationship between the accused and her
child. To protect the child while the case is pending, the court will often allow
limited, supervised visitation."
The short duration of these visits and the requirement that a "supervisor"
be present communicates to the child that the parent has done something
wrong and must be watched. In worst case scenarios, this message is amplified




Not surprisingly, a person accused of child sexual abuse may display a
high degree of righteous indignation and even hostility toward the accuser, the
court, and everyone associated with the legal proceedings, including the ex-
perts retained to evaluate the sexual abuse allegations. While such reactions
are certainly understandable, they can also be misread by the expert as being
overly-defensive and thus indicative of guilt. Conversely, an accused whose
innocence causes him to appear nonchalant about the charges may also be
perceived by the expert as reacting inappropriately, and thus not credible in his
denial of guilt. The accused is faced with a classic catch twenty-two situation
regarding any emotional display. Again, a court should view with extreme
skepticism any expert who condemns the accused based upon the accused's
negative reaction to the expert."
4. Other Fact Witnesses
Relatives, friends, neighbors, employers, pastors, social workers, investi-
gators, co-workers, acquaintances, and other individuals with varying degrees
of loyalty to one or both parties often play critical roles in custody and visita-
tion litigation both inside and outside of the courtroom. Those who had ample
opportunity to observe the accuser and/or the accused with the child may pro-
vide information to the expert about what they saw and heard, and may also
offer inferences or conclusions they drew from their observations.
Any witness's recounting of past events is, of course, always suspect due
to the unreliability of human memory.4' As the Texas Supreme Court re-
2063, 2111-20 (1995); Michael R. Phillips, Note, The Constitutionality of Employer-Accessible
Child Abuse Registries: Due Process Implications of Governmental Occupational Blacklisting, 92
MICH. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (1993).
487. Visitation is usually supervised by social workers or other child care workers approved
by the court, who often charge an hourly rate paid by the accused. The supervised visitation pro-
tects the accused (as well as the children) from additional allegations of inappropriate conduct
stemming from the supervised visitation, but also sends the message to the child that she is unsafe
in the presence of the accused.
488. This type of destructive behavior has come to be known as the "Parental Alienation
Syndrome." See generally Cheri L. Wood, Comment, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dan-
gerous Aura of Reliability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 136 (1994).
489. For a discussion of the impropriety of an expert relying on "evidence" that the accused
meets the "profile" of a sexual abuser, see infra notes 547-562 and accompanying text.
490. See generally ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEwTrNESS TESTIMONY:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that memories of a particular event are inaccurate
reports and are highly vulnerable to revision and distortion due to after-acquired information);
ELIZABTH F. LoFrus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUsED, THE
EYEwITNEss, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL (1991) (documenting numerous
cases where persons convicted of crimes based on eyewitness testimony were later fully exonerat-
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cently observed:
Memory is a multifarious, complex, usually reconstructive process. It
does not retrieve information the way a video recorder or computer
does. Everything sensed is not stored; recall of picture perfect images
is not automatic. A variety of social, psychological, and developmen-
tal factors commonly cause distortions at each stage of the pro-
cess. 9
The inherent inability of each witness to relate past events accurately may
be compounded if the individual was surprised, disappointed, or disgusted by
the revelation of the accused's sexual orientation. Indeed, the accused's failure
to reveal her sexual orientation prior to the allegations may be interpreted as
indicative of a lack of integrity. Persons who might have otherwise provided
extremely positive information about the accused's parenting style may start
questioning whether they really knew the accused at all. Others may view the
sexual orientation itself as a fatal flaw which renders the accused per se unfit
to be in the company of her own child. Still others may seek to distance them-
selves from the accused based on fear of guilt by association with a gay or
lesbian individual and/or with an accused child sexual abuser.
Accordingly, rampant homophobia and the guilty-until-proven-innocent
aspect of child sexual abuse allegations may significantly distort the informa-
tion provided by fact witnesses to the expert. Any expert who fails to demon-
strate a high degree of awareness of the potential for such distortion as she
ascertains the "facts" on which to base her expert opinion should not be al-
lowed to offer those opinions at trial.
In addition, the expert's technique in interviewing the fact witnesses can
suffer from the same defects which distort the interview of the child.492
Thus, the expert should be thoroughly examined regarding the content of these
interviews.
5. Conclusions Regarding the Expert's Sources of Factual Data
Experts must exercise discretion and judgment in determining which facts
should inform their expert opinions. Nothing in this article is intended to sug-
gest that the judge should attempt to re-evaluate every credibility determina-
tion made by an expert in a particular case. On the other hand, a court does
not adequately perform its gatekeeping function regarding expert testimony
unless it closely assesses the sources of the expert's factual information and
the methodology used by the expert to elicit that information, especially when
the source is the child. And in cases where the "facts" on which the expert
relies are-as in the Hertzler case-provided by individuals with demonstrated
anti-gay bias and a child who has been repeatedly coached by the accuser, any
ed for the crimes).
491. S.V. v. R.V., No. 94-0856, 1996 Tex. LEXIS 30, at *51 (Tex. March 14, 1996) (citations
omitted).
492. See generally Stephan Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concern-
ing the Psychiatry of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. Prr. L. REV.
547 (1984) (discussing various problems involving distortions of witness recollections).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
expert opinion based thereon fails to pass the threshold test for reliability.
Accordingly, the witness who forms opinions based on unreliable factual infor-
mation should not be qualified as an expert.
C. Heightened Scrutiny of the Expert's Interpretation of the Factual Data
Experts presented with the same factual basis for child sexual abuse alle-
gations in a particular instance offer a wide range of opinions as to the proba-
bility of child sexual abuse.493 This reality mandates that courts adopt "an
extremely cautious stance toward expert interpretation of material generated
by the fact-finding process,"494 even if the process itself is deemed compe-
tent.
Obviously, an expert's "interpretation" of factual data is inextricably inter-
twined with the expert's method of gathering data. One need look no further
than the Hertzler case where Mr. Rhodes disregarded the children's exculpato-
ry statements and selectively relied upon their inconsistent inculpatory state-
ments as verification of an interconnection between data gathering and inter-
pretation of that data.
Nonetheless, scrutiny of an expert's interpretation of data is necessary to
screen for anti-gay bias and to assure the proper evidentiary standards of trust-
worthiness as demanded by Frye and Daubert. Caution is required because
"[d]eterminations of whether a child has been sexually abused can be flawed
not only by mental health professionals' biases or assumptions, but also by
their use of unreliable assessment procedures. This leads them to misinterpret
their findings, which clearly can have significant repercussions for everyone
involved."495
Pursuant to Daubert, careful screening of the expert's assessment proce-
dures "entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodol-
ogy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether it can be ap-
plied to the facts at issue."'  As the attorney who argued the Daubert
plaintiffs' case before the Supreme Court deduced, "the Daubert opinion re-
quires that the focus in determining reliability be on the methodology em-
ployed by experts, not the conclusions they have reached."497 In Frye par-
lance, the court must make sure that the expert's selection of a methodology
and ensuing application follow the generally accepted practices in the relevant
discipline.
Methodologies with the greatest potential for abuse due to the expert's
preconceived, subjective view of the allegations of sexual abuse, include in-
appropriate interviewing techniques and use of anatomically correct dolls, both
discussed previously.498 The use of expert testimony regarding a child's ve-
493. Homer & Guyer H, supra note 5, at 402.
494. Id. (emphasis in original).
495. Schultz, supra note 14, at 1.
496. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
497. Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The "Prestige"
Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 869 (1994).
498. For a discussion of the interviewing process, see supra Part IV.B.I.a. For a discussion of
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racity, reliance on psychological "syndromes" as a method for diagnosing
child sexual abuse, and the use of a personality "profile" to determine an
accused's guilt or innocence deserve additional attention.'
1. Expert Opinion of a Child's Veracity
When the child testifies, experts are sometimes offered to evaluate child-
ren's ability and propensity for telling the truth.s"e An exhaustive analysis of
the issues surrounding the testimony of the child5"' is outside the scope of
this article, but a brief discussion is provided below regarding expert testimony
concerning the child's veracity.
Expert opinions on the veracity of any witness's statements are suspect,
inter alia, because they invade the province of the finder of fact-whether it
be the judge or the jury-to independently assess the credibility of each
witness.5" Some argue that courts' reluctance to allow an expert to opine on
children's veracity is firmly (but misguidedly) based in the archaic rule that
witnesses could not testify on the "ultimate issue" in a case."' in civil cases,
Federal Rule of Evidence 704 and many state rules expressly reject this posi-
tion and provide that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference other-
wise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact.' '""s
Under modern rules of evidence, an experts' testimony regarding chil-
dren's propensity for truthfulness might be admissible if the expert relied upon
a methodology that had attained general acceptance in the relevant social sci-
ence community, and if the testimony otherwise satisfied any required eviden-
tiary standards in the particular jurisdiction. The "if' part of this scenario
cannot be satisfied at present, since "there is as yet no widespread agreement
among researchers that an empirically valid test exists for determining the
truthfulness of a particular child.""5 5
Evidentiary reliability is particularly suspect when children's statements
regarding sexual abuse are being evaluated."°6 However, a set of protocols
known as "statement validity assessment" (SVA) is showing some degree of
reliability for evaluation of children's statements of sexual abuse."° 7
the use of anatomically correct dolls, see supra Part IV.B.I.b.
499. For a comprehensive analysis of the complications inherent in applying the Daubert stan-
dards to psychological syndromes, see Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 10 n.3.
500. See generally McGOUGH, supra note 451, at 233-67.
501. The multitude of evidentiary problems surrounding the admissibility and credibility of a
child's testimony in sexual abuse and other cases are exhaustively addressed in McGOUGH, supra
note 451, at 23-188 and in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS (Maria S. Zaragoza
et al. eds., 1995). For an extensive collection of publications addressing the legal and psychologi-
cal issues associated with children's testimony, see generally CHILD WITNESSES BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Tarlton Legal Bibliography Series No. 38, Kristin A. Cheney ed., 1993).
502. MCGOUGH, supra note 451, at 239; see Gallet, supra note 24, at 483 & n.15; United
States v. Whitted, II F.3d 782, 785-86 (8th Cir. 1993).
503. MCGOUGH, supra note 451, at 236-40.
504. FED. R. EVID. 704; see also Whirred, 11 F.3d at 785 (stating that expert's opinion is not
inadmissible merely because it contains conclusions on the ultimate issue).
505. McGOuGH, supra note 451, at 249-50.
506. Id. at 250-52.
507. Id. at 252. The precursor of SVA, Statement Reality Analysis, was used in Germany for
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"Statement analysis is based on the premise that descriptions of events
that were actually experienced differ in content, quality, and expression from
those that are invented.""5 8 SVA involves a three phase analysis of the state-
ments to the interviewer which were made by the alleged victim.5"
In the first phase, the interviewer gathers as much information as possible
about the victim, the accused, the family's history and current situation, and
previous allegations of sexual abuse."' The interviewer uses this information
to develop various hypotheses such as (1) the allegations are basically true; (2)
the allegations are true, but the child has identified the wrong perpetrator; or
(3) the child has been coached by another to make an entirely false accusa-
tions. ' Developing these hypotheses helps avoid "problems of self-fulfilling
expectations that arise when an investigator has only one hypothesis.""5 2 Af-
ter the hypotheses are framed, the "trained and skilled investigative interview-
er"51 3 conducts a videotaped session with the child during which the abuse
issue is explored in a non-suggestive and age-appropriate manner." 4
In phase two, the interviewer performs a "Criteria-Based Content Analy-
sis" (CBCA) from the transcript of the child's statements during the video-
taped interview." 5 The 18 criteria are grouped into three categories: "general
characteristics," such as logical structure of the child's statements and quantity
of details as to time, place and other aspects of the alleged abuse; "specific
contents," including the reproduction of speech-i.e., quoting the ac-
cused-using language not appropriate for a child, unusual but realistic details,
and description of the child's feelings or thoughts during the incident; and
"motivation-related contents," such as spontaneous corrections or additions and
admissions of lack of memory or knowledge. 6
In the third phase, the evaluator systematically addresses each point on a
"Validity Checklist" which is designed to prevent "premature conclusions
based on bias or preconceived notions"5 7 and to foster "a systematic consid-
eration of all necessary and available information that may contribute to a
fully informed and reasoned conclusion." 5 The points which the interviewer
must consider further to validate a child's statements and his own hypothesis
of the case include the cognitive and emotional limits of the child, the child's
years before being imported to the United States and other countries. Raskin & Esplin, supra note
468, at 267.
508. See, e.g., David C. Raskin & John C. Yuille, Problems in Evaluating Interviews of Chil-
dren in Sexual Abuse Cases, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 184, 195 (Stephen C.
Ceci et al. eds., 1989).
509. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 268; see also Charles R. Honts, Assessing
Children's Credibility: Scientific and Legal Issues in 1994, 70 N.D. L. REV. 879 (1994) (discuss-
ing SVA in light of modern evidentiary concerns).
510. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 271.
511. Id. at272.
512. Honts, supra note 509, at 889.
513. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 269.
514. Id. at 270-71, 273-78; Honts, supra note 509, at 889.
515. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 278.
516. Id. at 279, tbl. 1.
517. Id. at 286.
518. Id.
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affect during the interview, level of suggestibility, motivations for reporting,
influence by others, the quality of the interview itself based on accepted stan-
dards, and contradictory evidence from other sources. 9
The reliability, and hence admissibility, of SVA evidence has been
exhaustively addressed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.52° What is
evident, even from this abbreviated explanation, is that many of the factors
and criteria applied to the child's statements, such as the appropriateness of
the level of detail or the child's general cognitive and emotional states, are not
objectively quantifiable. Thus, despite the laudable goal of SVA to remove
biases and preconceived notions of the evaluator, there is still sufficient room
for subjective interpretations-and thus conclusions-in any given case. At a
minimum, however, SVA provides a useful guide for courts to determine
whether appropriate techniques were used by an expert in interviewing the
child, gathering information from other sources, and analyzing the data.
Additionally, an expert often lacks sufficient information to apply whatev-
er criteria is chosen. As one author explained:
[W]hen a clinician purports to "diagnose" truthfulness, he or she is
often relying on the absence of recantation, inconsistency, or other
obvious hallmarks of falsity during the evaluation session. The expert,
however, usually lacks critical information necessary for a thorough
assessment of the impact of prior suggestive interviewing of the child
or other contaminants of the child's account.52" '
In sum, expert testimony which purports to gauge the truthfulness of a
child's statements of sexual abuse must be carefully screened for trustworthi-
ness as required by Daubert, Frye, and other evidentiary benchmarks. Any
bias in an expert, including anti-gay sentiment, which would compound the
weakness inherent in his testimony must also be exposed through voir dire to
determine whether the partisanship affected his proffered opinion of the child's
veracity.
2. Reliance on Syndromes as a Diagnostic Tool
The proliferation of allegations of sexual abuse in domestic relation dis-
putes has itself been described as a "syndrome., 2 2 But even more frighten-
ing is a display of a phenomena aptly dubbed the "syndrome syndrome," '523
in which a number of characteristics and behaviors of the alleged victim and
the accused have been grouped into various syndromes and disorders which
purportedly prove or disprove that sexual abuse occurred. These include Paren-
tal Alienation Syndrome (PAS),524 Sexually Abused Child Syndrome
519. Id. at 287, tbl. 2.
520. See generally Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468; Honts, supra note 509.
521. McGOUGH, supra note 451, at 250.
522. The phrase coined for such cases is the "Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce Cases
Syndrome" or the "SAID Syndrome." See, e.g., Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 219-20 & n.9.
523. See generally David Wallace, The Syndrome Syndrome: Problems Concerning the Ad-
missibility of Expert Testimony on Psychological Profiles, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1035, 1036-37
(1985).
524. Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is a disorder identified by Richard Gardner, M.D., a
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(SACS)5 25 Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS),526
and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (or Syndrome) (PTSD)"'
A "syndrome" is "a cluster of symptoms that appear together regularly
enough to be considered associated. Unlike diseases, syndromes have no speci-
clinical professor of child psychology. See generally GARDNER, supra note 14. PAS is character-
ized by a child's preoccupation "with deprecation and criticism of a parent... that is unjustified
and/or exaggerated." Id. at 59. The syndrome is the result of "brainwashing" and "programming"
of the child by one parent against the other parent and other situational factors. Id. at 59-60. Alle-
gations of sexual abuse have become "a common addition" in such cases. Id. at 126. As one court
observed, "explicit vilification or criticism of the person charged with wrongdoing is another fac-
tor that can induce a child to believe abuse has occurred" when in fact it has not. State v.
Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377 (N.J. 1994) (citations omitted). For an interesting discussion of the
difference in admissibility of PAS under Frye as compared to Daubert, see Wood, supra note 488,
at 1394-97.
525. See Schultz, supra note 14, at 7. Child behaviors associated with this syndrome "include
excessive masturbation, fears, depression, pseudomaturity, inappropriate sexual play, sleep distur-
bances, and bed wetting." Id. As Schultz and others point out, "[c]hildren's behavioral symptoms
alone are not sufficient grounds for deciding that they have been sexually abused." Id. (citations
omitted).
526. Dr. Roland Summit defined CSAAS as consisting of five behaviors which, if present,
indicate that a child has been sexually abused: helplessness; secrecy; entrapment and accommoda-
tion; delayed, conflicted and unconvincing disclosure of abuse; and retraction of the disclosure.
Roland C. Summit, M.D., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 177, 181-88 (1983). Among the many flaws critics find in CSAAS is that it was devel-
oped as a way to provide therapy for children and not as a tool to diagnose sexual abuse. See gen-
erally Rosemary L. Flint, Note, Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syndrome: Admissibility Re-
quirements, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171 (1995); Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to
Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383 (1989) (discussing CSAAS and problems with its
use); Myers et al., supra note 39, at 67-69 (same); Schultz, supra note 14, at 7-8 (suggesting that
CSAAS is helpful but only in limited situations and not as a general tool for diagnosing sexual
abuse); Underwager & Wakefield, supra note 79, at 162 (arguing that evidence of CSAAS is inad-
missible under Daubert). See also K.A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Chil-
dren: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies 113 PSYCH. BULL. 164 (1993) (noting
that certain behaviors relied upon for CSAAS are frequently found in nonabused children as well
as abused children); Newman, supra note 414, at 193-97 (describing Dr. Summit's responses to
criticisms of CSAAS). Courts have been hesitant to recognize CSAAS as proof that sexual abuse
occurred. See Kovera et al., supra note 472, at 654; SAGATUN & LEONARD, supra note 150, at
222 (discussing cases in which the syndrome testimony was admitted and rejected); see also Stew-
ard v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 491-97 (Ind. 1995) (discussing the admissibility of CSAAS in vari-
ous jurisdictions). The use of expert testimony based on CSAAS was viewed by an intermediate
appellate court as an independently sufficient reason for reversing the conviction of Margaret
Kelly Michaels, a case discussed supra at notes 452-458 and accompanying text. See generally
Mary Ann Mason, The Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome: The Other Major Issue in State of New
Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 399 (1995).
527. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the only one of the aforementioned syndromes recog-
nized in DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [herein-
after DSM-IV] which is the bible of mental health professionals. "The essential feature of Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity." DSM-IV at 424.
Frequent reexperiencing of the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli associated with the event and
numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent increased arousal are characteristic symptoms of
this disorder. Id. Children's responses to the event also "must include disorganized or agitated
behavior," id., and may also include repetitive play reenacting the traumatic event. Id. at 426.
Since the diagnostic criteria for PTSD is premised on the knowledge that the traumatic event did
in fact occur, id. at 427, the mere existence of some of the PTSD symptoms cannot be cited to
prove the occurrence of the event. S.V. v. R.V., No. 94-0856, 1996 Tex. LEXIS 30, at *61 (Tex.
Mar. 14, 1996) ("Obviously, a PTSD diagnosis cannot establish the occurrence of a trauma that it
presupposes" or prove who caused it if one did occur.).
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fied temporal course, nor is a pathological nature necessarily clear. Therefore,
syndromes vary in the certainty with which they allow inferences about etiolo-
gy.,
528
By definition, a "syndrome" does not provide information about the cause
of the. symptoms or behaviors comprising the syndrome.529 Grouping a series
of behaviors under the rubric of a "syndrome" may create a helpful tool for
designing an appropriate treatment milieu for a child demonstrating the behav-
iors, but the collection should not be used as a post hoc certification as to the
cause of the behaviors. Accordingly, an expert's testimony that a child's be-
havior is "consistent with" sexual abuse should be a red flag to any lawyer or
judge evaluating syndrome testimony. Simply put, a syndrome-based correla-
tion between a certain behavior and sexual abuse does not mean that sexual
abuse occurred. 3 One commentator offered this apt analogy: "The symptom
of headache is consistent with being hit over the head with a blunt instrument,
but blunt instruments do not cause most people's headaches."53' And, as
New Hampshire's highest court explained in rejecting the use of CSAAS evi-
dence to prove that a child had been abused, "[m]any of the symptoms consid-
ered to be indicators of sexual abuse, such as nightmares, forgetfulness, and
over-eating, could just as easily be the result of some other problem, or simply
may be appearing in the natural course of the children's development." '32
Moreover, the proliferation of syndromes makes any syndrome-based
diagnosis of sexual abuse vulnerable to attack by comparison to a syndrome
not used by the testifying expert. Direct conflicts between certain syndromes
prove especially troublesome. While one syndrome cites a particular symptom
as highly indicative of abuse, another syndrome relies on the same symptom
as evidence that no abuse occurred. For example, an expert making a diagno-
sis based on CSAAS criteria perceives a child's delayed and unconvincing
disclosure of abuse and a subsequent retraction as proof that sexual abuse
occurred; in contrast, an expert relying on PAS syndrome views those same
behaviors as evidence that the accusing parent has brainwashed the child to
make false sexual abuse allegations against the other parent. 33 In short, se-
528. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 11.
529. "Some judges .... perhaps mislead by testifying experts, persist in calling the syndrome
an accepted diagnosis. And courts in child protective proceedings sometimes allow this testimony
to be used to help prove abuse occurred .... " Newman, supra note 414, at 195 (emphasis in
original).
530. United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-86 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining numerous
courts' observations regarding the inadmissibility of a physician's diagnosis of sexual abuse).
531. Newman, supra note 414, at 196.
532. State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 700 (N.H. 1993); see also State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d
1116, 1125 (La. 1993) (rejecting CSAAS evidence due to the impossibility of testing its accuracy,
the court opined: "This untestability comes from its very nature as an opinion as to the causes of
human behavior, and the fact that the methods for testing the results of psychoanalysis are rife
with the potential for inaccuracy.").
533. Such conflicting interpretations of behavior permeate other areas of child sexual abuse
evaluations including the physical examination of the child.
For instance, calmness of a child during genital examination is sometimes taken as evi-
dence that he or she is used to having his or her genitals handled, whereas in other cases
a child may struggle during a genital exam, which is sometimes interpreted to mean that
the child has experienced genital trauma through sexual abuse.
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lection of a particular syndrome can dictate the result of whether abuse did or
did not occur.534
An expert's reliance on a cluster of symptoms to support a syndrome
indicating child sexual abuse may also insulate the expert from effective cross
examination. Even if a party discredits several of the "symptoms" relied on by
the expert, the expert "can easily dismiss the critique by saying that her evalu-
ation relies on no one symptom or indicator and that her conclusions still hold
true in light of all the other available factors and her expertise in the
field."
5 35
Another consequence of the geometric growth of psychological syndromes
is that this vast and often conflicting body of scientific evidence allows a
judge to validate expert testimony based on her own personal bias. Commenta-
tors have recently echoed Professor Jasanoff's concern 36 that personal biases
may overtake reasoned conclusions in cases where syndrome evidence takes
center stage:
With new syndromes being offered regularly,. .. the courts have at
times sought refuge in Frye-like general acceptance principles to
create order out of what appears to be a chaotic situation. But court
decisions have also been influenced by strong personal feelings and
opinions, media attention to certain topics, and public opinion about
emotionally loaded charges such as child sexual abuse. 37
The malleability of syndrome evidence thus allows experts and judges to
hide their own "strong personal feelings and opinions" 3' behind a mask of
scientific evidence. The papier-mache like layers of evidence forming the
mask may include significant anti-gay bias. And yet, like papier-mache, the
mask as a whole projects structural integrity established by the expert's appli-
cation of "objective" factual findings to credible scientific theory.
The potential for bias does not mean that all syndrome evidence offered
for any purpose should be rejected. For example, in some cases syndrome
evidence may be helpful to explain to the trier of fact that certain of the
child's behaviors which may seem counterindicative of sexual abuse, such as
failing to reveal the abuse for a long period of time or recanting the allega-
tions, are not unusual for sexually abused children. 39 On the other hand,
syndromes should not be relied upon for rendering an absolute determination
that sexual abuse has or has not occurred."4 Thus, rather than being blindly
Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 13.
534. The actual impact of syndrome evidence on the trier of fact is unknown. Limited experi-
mentation has indicated that jurors are somewhat skeptical about an expert's opinion on alleged
sexual abuse if that opinion is based on syndrome evidence. See Kovera et al., supra note 472, at
664. The experiment did not, however, test the impact of the evidence in a case tried to a judge.
Id.
535. Cressey, 628 A.2d at 701.
536. See Jasanoff, supra note 89, at 82.
537. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 11.
538. Id.
539. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19,
43-44 (1987).
540. Id. at 41 (noting that "research has indicated that children react in incredibly diverse
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accepted or automatically rejected, syndrome evidence, as well as resulting
expert opinions, should be carefully screened to determine whether it meets
the threshold requirements of reliability and trustworthiness as required by
Frye, Daubert, and the most rudimentary rules applicable to all categories of
evidence. Properly done, this screening will reveal any anti-gay bias as well as
scientific shortcomings of syndromes as a diagnostic tool.
The heightened scrutiny of syndrome evidence begins by questioning
whether the "syndrome" actually exists in the scientific arena from which it
purportedly comes. 4' This inquiry is partially answered by the amount of
text (or lack thereof) devoted to the syndrome in scientific journals and
treatises and the content of the texts. The potential error rate associated with
application of the syndrome must also be revealed.542 If the potential for er-
rors (measured by the numbers of false positives and false negatives predict-
ably produced through application of the syndrome) has not or cannot be cal-
culated, the court should seriously question the scientific validity of the evi-
dence.543 Other key questions for testing the validity of a syndrome are
whether the data on which the syndrome is based was "gathered in ways that
allowed researcher preferences to influence the results,"5" and whether there
have "been inadequate replications of the findings""54 compared to a claim of
a syndrome culled from a very narrow data base." Of course, a showing
must also be made that the syndrome has achieved some degree of general
acceptance in the relevant discipline. Most important, courts must be ex-
tremely wary of experts who rely on syndrome evidence as the definitive diag-
nostic tool for determining whether the sexual abuse occurred.
If the court is satisfied that the syndrome itself meets the basic require-
ments for credible scientific evidence, it must further review the expert testi-
mony for potential trouble spots in the application of the syndrome to the facts
of the case at issue. For example, an expert who ignores the presence or the
omission of certain behaviors inconsistent with the syndrome cannot have
made a credible scientific determination based on the syndrome.
3. Expert Opinion Based on Psychological Tests and Profiles
A battery of psychological tests is routinely used by mental health profes-
sionals to ascertain whether an individual suffers from a particular disorder
and to help identify an appropriate course of treatment.547 Like syndrome
evidence, these tests have not been validated as an accurate means of deter-
mining whether a child has been sexually abused or whether the accused was
ways to sexual abuse" and that mental health professionals have been unsuccessful in their efforts
to identify specific reactions common to all sexually abused children).
541. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 15.
542. This is specifically demanded by Daubert and the general rules of evidence which re-
quire exclusion of untrustworthy evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 594-95 (1993).
543. See generally Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 14-15.
544. Id. at 15.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Schultz, supra note 14, at 5-6.
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the perpetrator. In an article cautioning evaluators charged with determining
the veracity of sexual abuse allegations raised in custody battles, two experts
explained:
When using psychological testing in custody and/or sexual abuse
evaluations, it is essential to recognize their limitations and communi-
cate those limitations to the court or official agency involved. It must
be clearly stated that there is no one-to-one correspondence between
test results and the tendency to commit inappropriate sexual acts. No




Despite such caveats which arguably render expert testimony based on
these tests inadmissible under both the Frye and Daubert standards, some
experts still attempt to rely upon results of tests such as the Multiphasic Sex
Inventory II, the Sexual Abuse Legitimacy Scale, the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI), and even the psychological interpretation of the
alleged victim's art work549 as proof that specific child sexual abuse allega-
tions are true or false.55° In addition, comparisons of personality traits exhib-
ited by the accused to traits associated with pedophiles have also been offered
not only to prove that the abuse occurred but that the accused was or was not
the perpetrator.55' Experts have also claimed that they can use MMPI results
and other data to identify personality traits of persons likely to make false
allegations of sexual abuse. 52
Courts have been appropriately suspicious of expert testimony predicated
on this type of data.555 For example, in State v. Foret,54 the Louisiana Su-
548. Cooke & Cooke, supra note 3, at 59.
549. Schultz, supra note 14, at 5-6.
550. Id. at 5; see also Sandra Morris, From Marital Ruins, Unthinkable Torment for Young
Innocents, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at 16 (written by an attorney who defends the use of
MMPI and profile evidence in childhood sexual abuse cases); S.V. v. R.V., No. 94-0856, 1996
Tex. LEXIS 30, at *37 (Tex. Mar. 14, 1996) (admitting expert testimony regarding MMPI results
of alleged victim of childhood sexual abuse and alleged accuser in repressed memory case).
551. For example, Blush and Ross suggest that personality profiles of the accuser, accused,
and child can help determine the veracity of sexual abuse allegations made in the context of di-
vorce proceedings. See Blush & Ross, supra note 3, at 6-8; see also Catherine M. Brooks &
Madelyn S. Milchman, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations During Custody Litigation: Conflicts Be-
tween Mental Health Expert Witnesses and the Law, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 21, 25 (1991) (reporting
that a psychiatrist who testified that the accused could not have abused his son because he did not
match a pedophile profile was among the seven child sexual abuse experts who testified in one
case); Myers et al., supra note 39, at 127-44 (providing comprehensive discussion of psychiatric
literature and data on pedophiles, psychological methods for assessing and treating sexual offend-
ers, and the largely unsuccessful efforts by prosecutors and others to admit profile evidence to
establish guilt of person accused of sexually abusing a child).
552. Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Personality Characteristics of Parents Making
False Accusations of Sexual Abuse in Custody Disputes, 2 ISSUES CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS
121, 121-36 (1990).
553. See, e.g., United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that no
judicial decision or scientific treatise had accepted the use of sex offender profile evidence to
determine whether sexual abuse had occurred); State v. Elbert, 831 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Mo. App.
1992) (holding inadmissible the expert evidence proffered by the defendant that he could not be
guilty of child sexual abuse because his MMPI results did not fit the profile of a sex offender);
State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (N.J. 1982) (excluding expert testimony proffered by crimi-
nal defendant that he did not match the profile of a rapist); Minn v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64
[Vol. 74:1
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS
preme Court applied the Daubert standards to overturn a conviction for at-
tempted molestation of a juvenile. An expert's opinion that the child had been
sexually abused was based on the result of certain unspecified "emotional
tests" done on the daughter and the fit between "dynamics" revealed by the
tests and the factors of CSAAS.555 The Foret court faulted the trial and inter-
mediate appellate courts for failing to consider "the significant problems that
this type of testimony has created in other jurisdictions" '556 due to the "fear
of prejudice resulting from [its] potential inaccuracy" '557 and further cau-
tioned:
[T]he introduction of expert opinion testimony as to the psychological
characteristics of the victim or her testimony is fraught with serious
res nova constitutional and evidentiary problems. While this type of
evidence is absolutely not admissible for some purposes ... but
might be admissible for others, it should be allowed only after careful
study and under strict control by the trial court .... "'
Psychological testing of the accused is especially troubling. A psychologi-
cal profile based on the results of an MMPI, Rorschach and even phallometric
assessment 59 could be offered to bootstrap conclusions not only that abuse
occurred but also that the accused was the perpetrator. Such evidentiary gym-
nastics are highly inappropriate because "[t]he question of determining wheth-
er or not a person has committed a sexual offence is not one that clinical
assessment can address. There are no psychological tests or techniques that
indicate whether someone has engaged in sexual behaviors with chil-
dren ....
Moreover, as is the case with syndrome evidence, virtually any behavior
or personality trait demonstrated by the accused can be interpreted as fitting
the profile of a child molester.5 61 If the accused is tearful and highly emo-
(Minn. 1981) (rejecting evidence based on "battering parent profile").
554. 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
555. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1119-24.
556. Id. at 1120-21.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 1121 (quoting concurrence in State v. Brossette, 599 So. 2d 1092 (La. 1992))
(ellipses in original).
559. For a discussion of the psychological and physiological tests used to assess suspected
child molesters and the deficiencies in each, see Judith V. Becker & Vernon L. Quinsey, Assess-
ing Suspected Child Molesters, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 169 (1993). See also S.V., 1996 Tex.
LEXIS 30, at *37-38 (explaining expert testimony based on MMPI, Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory, and penile plethysmograph tests in case focusing on allegedly repressed memory of
childhood sexual abuse).
560. Becker & Quinsey, supra note 559, at 169; see also St. Pierre, 812 F.2d at 417; S.V.,
1996 Tex. LEXIS 30, at *46 (noting that while the accused "had many of the characteristics of a
sex abuser, he did not match a characteristic profile, and even if he had, it would not prove that
he abused" his daughter); McCord, supra note 539, at 55-57 (explaining that profile evidence is
generally prohibited in criminal cases); Myers et al., supra note 39, at 142 ("[T]here is no psycho-
logical test or device that reliably detects persons who have or will sexually abuse children.").
561. See Blush & Ross, supra note 3, at 7-8; S.V., 1996 Tex. LEXIS 30 at *37 (noting that
psychological tests given to defendant "showed traits similar to those of sexual offenders: narcis-
sistic traits like self-centeredness, overvaluation of self, high need for recognition, and a high need
for control; reality distortion; and problems in his ability to express emotions, especially negative
ones").
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tive, for example, those behaviors are judged indicative of guilt; conversely,
the accused's projection of a deep sense of calm throughout the interrogation
may be interpreted as classic denial or sociopathic behavior. 62 In short, psy-
chological "profiles" may be the subject of legitimate curiosity and study in
the mental health field, but they are not sufficiently determinative of child
sexual abuse to meet the legal standards for reliability and general acceptance
required by Frye or Daubert.
4. Conclusions Regarding the Expert's Interpretation of Factual Data
In a perfect world, objectively harvested facts could be fed into a scientif-
ically validated computer program to test the truth of allegations of child sexu-
al abuse and, if necessary, identify the perpetrator. Neither the sciences nor the
law have produced such a system, and the dissonance within the two disci-
plines as well as the conflict between them suggests that infallibility, while a
laudable goal, is unrealistic. Thus, we must operate with the system we have,
being ever alert to its shortcomings and pitfalls.
Another harsh reality is that courts-already overcrowded, possessing mis-
conceptions about child sexual abuse, and possibly retaining bias against gay
or lesbian parents based on long-disproved myths-may resist undertaking the
comprehensive examinations of expert witness evidence suggested in this arti-
cle. Nevertheless, the heightened evidentiary scrutiny proposed herein neither
requires a high degree of scientific sophistication nor poses an unduly onerous
burden on the court, especially when contrasted against the burden on the
accused to prove her innocence. Effective screening merely requires the court
to make the types of determinations already required of it by the rules of evi-
dence governing expert testimony and to apply the standards of justice re-
quired by federal and state constitutions.
Moreover, the court does not shoulder this burden alone. Virtually all
questions concerning an expert's qualifications and methodologies should be
raised by counsel in a motion for summary judgment or motion in limine.563
Thus, the parties' legal counsel play a significant role in educating the court
regarding applicable evidentiary standards and the reasons why the specific ex-
pert evidence at issue meets or falls short of those standards. Other options
available to the court to reduce its burdens when handling expert witness testi-
mony in child sexual abuse cases are presented immediately below."M
562. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 13.
563. A summary judgment motion filed by the accused, for example, might argue that the
sexual abuse allegations should be rejected as a matter of law because the accuser does not have
sufficient expert testimony to prove the allegations. A motion in limine would similarly challenge
the expert's qualifications and validity of his expert opinions offered in the case. Through these
pretrial vehicles, many of the issues outlined in this article could be resolved prior to trial.
564. Critics of the current practice of using experts retained by litigants have also suggested
that judges with significant expertise in various disciplines should be recruited to preside over
specialized courts, thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony to assist the finder of fact.
See, e.g., Edward V. DiLello, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the
Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 473 (1993). While this proposal has many attractive aspects,
one obvious shortcoming is that, unlike the use of "outside" experts who can be voir dired and
cross examined at length, it provides no mechanism for determining the biases and prejudices
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D. The Use of A Court-Appointed Expert
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and analogous state rules empower a court
to appoint an expert witness sua sponte or upon the request of a party. 51 De-
spite the liberal attitude expressed in the rules regarding this procedure, courts
historically have declined to employ this option. Practical reasons for this
reluctance include the courts' perception that parties will not fully cooperate
and that communication between the court and the expert may be strained due
to ex parte concems."6 On a philosophical basis, "[j]udges' devotion to the
adversarial presentation of evidence causes them to reserve this procedure for
those rare cases in which the adversarial system fails to provide information
necessary for a reasoned and principled decision. 567
In the context of a heated custody or visitation dispute, an appointed ex-
pert can be helpful in assessing "the family and [can] provide the courts, the
parents, and the attorneys with objective information and recommenda-
tions."5" Such objective findings are especially useful when the parties' own
experts offer "extreme variation" of opinions and thus do not serve to clarify
complex issues.
5 69
In theory, a court-appointed expert offers objectivity because she ap-
proaches the case from a different perspective than does an expert retained by
a litigant. While the individually retained expert aids the litigant's attorney in
preparing a case for trial and testifying on the litigant's behalf, the court-ap-
pointed expert is, as previously noted, charged with providing an "objective"
report assessing the child's best interests.57 Appointment of an expert is,
however, hardly a guarantee of neutrality. "Truly neutral experts are difficult,
if not impossible, to find; though they will have no commitment to any party,
they do not come to the case free of experience and opinions that will predis-
pose (even if only subconsciously) ... them in some fashion on disputed
which the expert/judge/finder of fact may bring to a particular case.
565. FED. R. EVID. 706 provides that "[tihe court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed
upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection." Rule 706 also re-
quires the court to fully inform the expert as to his specific duties and the expert must advise the
parties of his findings. In civil actions the court determines a reasonable fee for the expert and
apportions the costs to the parties. FED. R. EVID. 706. Appointment of an expert by the court does
not preclude the parties from selecting their own experts. FED. R. EVID. 706(d).
566. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed Experts in Federal
Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 41, 46 (1994).
567. Id.
568. Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Model Standards of Practice for Child
Custody Evaluation, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 504, 504 (Jan. 1994) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Standards of Practice].
569. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 999-1000, 1010
(1994) [hereinafter Cecil & Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation]. The article also contains
empirical data demonstrating that court appointment of experts is not uncommon and that federal
judges have generally been satisfied with the work of the experts they have appointed. Id. at 1004-
1008.
570. See generally SHUMAN supra note 6, at 13-6, 13-7; Cooke & Cooke, supra note 3, at 56
("The evaluator should be independent and objective and serve as an advocate for the child rather
than for either parent.").
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issues relevant to the case."57'
When a single expert is appointed in lieu of the parties retaining their own
experts, the expert is vested with tremendous power in deciding the fate of the
parties and the child. This awesome responsibility led one mental health expert
to conclude that "[riarely in psychological practice is the potential for harm as
great as in court-ordered custody evaluations. 572
Like any witness, an expert appointed by the court must be examined for
potential bias toward or against a party or a particular issue.573 One commen-
tator suggests that a single court-appointed evaluator is inappropriate in cases
"in which the court is being asked to reach a decision outside the community
norm," because a single expert will not be able to present a fully balanced
view of the situation.5 74 A situation in which a homosexual parent charged
with sexually abusing the child is seeking visitation or custody arguably pres-
ents the paradigm of "outside the community norm." '575 But other than stating
that privately-retained experts "may be helpful in assuaging the judge's or
jury's reaction to a nontraditional result," '576 the commentator offers no fur-
ther rationale for avoiding a court-appointed expert in nontraditional cases.
The potential value of a court-appointed expert should not be readily dis-
missed, even in a case as "nontraditional" as one involving a homosexual
parent charged with child sexual abuse. The advantages are obvious: the child
and parents may be subjected to evaluation by a single source, the expenses
are relatively contained, and the resolution of the litigation is not delayed-as
it was in the Hertzler case-while the litigants retain multiple experts to con-
duct a series of interviews and evaluations.
On the other hand, the "nontraditional" case may involve many issues
about which a single expert may be unqualified to testify.577 For example, a
medical doctor who has conducted hundreds of forensic evaluations of chil-
dren where sexual abuse was suspected578 may not possess the requisite ex-
perience to evaluate a parent's relative parenting skills and may have no famil-
iarity with the general empirical data on gay and lesbian parents. Conversely,
a psychologist competent to testify about the parent's skill and the impact (if
571. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 110 (3d ed. 1995).
572. Deed, supra note 11, at 76.
573. Cecil & Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation, supra note 569, at 1000 (citing Gates
v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 1983)).
574. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-7.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. The Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation promulgated by the Association
of Family and Conciliation Courts suggests the level of education, training, and knowledge which
should be required of a court-appointed evaluator. See Standards of Practice, supra note 568, at
506. Obviously, more than one expert might need to be appointed to satisfy the requirement that
the evaluator have "an understanding of the many issues, legal, social, familial, and cultural in-
volved in custody and visitation." Id.
578. A physical examination of children would seem the most competent, objective evidence
of sexual abuse; unfortunately, it is often as inconclusive as the psychological evaluations. See
generally EVALUATION OF THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD: A MEDICAL TEXTBOOK AND PHOTO-
GRAPHIC ATLAS (Astrid Heger & S. Jean Emans eds., 1992); Jan E. Paradise, The Medical Evalu-
ation of the Sexually Abused Child, 37 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 839 (1990).
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any) on the child from the parent's sexual orientation might not be qualified to
conduct a forensic interview or to offer an expert opinion based on the foren-
sic data gathered by others. In a worst-case scenario, a single, court-appointed
expert may be called upon to provide expert evidence on issues outside her
areas of expertise. 79
In addition, appointment of a single evaluator does not necessarily mean
that the work can be completed quickly. Multiple sessions may be required
before a proper rapport is established between the child and evaluator,"' and
additional sessions are required with the adults involved."' Another major
drawback to having a single evaluator is that no other expert is involved to
expose the potential flaws in the court-appointed expert's methodology and
conclusion which may stem from incompetence or the expert's preconceived
notions about gay and lesbian parents.
Due to the multitude of variables inherent in "nontraditional" visitation
and custody disputes, it is impossible to determine the appropriateness of a
court-appointed expert in every case where a homosexual parent is accused of
sexually abusing a child.582
Three general rules, however, are appropriate when a court-appointed
expert is being considered. First, the qualifications of the proposed expert must
be broad enough to encompass all of the issues upon which she will be called
to testify. Second, the parties participating in the evaluation must be informed,
by both the court and the expert, of the expert's role and the relationship be-
tween the expert, the court, and the parties. 83 Third, any hint of anti-gay bi-
as should disqualify the proposed expert from appointment.
The difficulty in finding a single, non-biased expert with sufficiently
broad expertise to address all of the issues raised in cases where a homosexual
parent is charged with child sexual abuse strongly militates in favor of the
team-oriented evaluation approach discussed immediately below.
579. In United States v. Whitted, for example, the court held that a nurse/physician's assistant
and a medical doctor were unqualified to give expert psychiatric testimony regarding child sexual
abuse. II F.3d 782, 782 (8th Cir. 1993).
580. Cooke & Cooke, supra note 3, at 57.
581. id. at 58-60.
582. In the Hertzler case for example, the trial court's denial of Pamela's request for a single,
court-appointed expert resulted in the parties retaining four experts to evaluate the children and
testify at trial. The cost, both financial and emotional, was significant. After the trial, the court
ordered the parties to jointly select yet another expert to counsel the children and report back to
the court. When that expert reported that the children had not been sexually abused, the court re-
jected the expert's conclusion in favor of its own determination of the issue. See supra Part Il1.
Thus, even with the wisdom provided by hindsight, it is very difficult to conclude whether the
initial appointment of a single expert would have resulted in an earlier and more accurate adjudi-
cation of the sexual abuse allegations in the Hertzler case.
583. Parents who agree to the use of a single expert must be informed that they:
lose the right to voluntary choice of psychologist, the right to initiate or to terminate the
relationship with the evaluator, or the right to determine the goals of their involvement
with the psychologist. They also lose their right to determine the direction of the ses-
sions, to explore issues of their choice, or to avoid areas they would rather not discuss.
They also lose, for the duration of their court-ordered involvement, any right to confi-
dentiality between themselves and the court.
Deed, supra note I1, at 76.
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E. The Value of a Team-Oriented Expert Evaluation
A determination of child sexual abuse generally requires physical and
psychological examinations and it is difficult to find a single expert competent
to perform both aspects of the evaluation. On the other hand, taking a child to
a series of experts-such as Drs. Jenny, Bloom, Brungardt, Moriarty and Mr.
Rhodes in the Hertzler case-involves tremendous repetition of effort and
expense and tremendously increases the stress on the parents and child. In
contrast, utilization of a well-qualified and coordinated team of experts, wheth-
er retained by an individual litigant or appointed by a court, minimizes the
disruption in the child's life while providing important data regarding the
allegations from a variety of disciplines and perspectives.584 The collabora-
tion of several mental health professionals may also help lessen the individual
discomfort experienced by these professionals who are asked to determine the
objective truth when, as therapists, they base their evaluations on the subjec-
tive reality presented to them by their patients.585
One team-oriented model which proved quite viable, for example, consist-
ed of a social worker who interviewed the parents, a child psychologist who
conducted an extensive psychological evaluation of the alleged victim, a pedia-
trician who secured a medical history and conducted a medical examination of
the child, and a nurse, all of whom were associated with a single clinic." 6
The team then rated the likelihood of abuse in each case as "low," "possible,"
"moderate," or "high" based upon their collective findings. '58 7
Due to the ambiguous nature of much of the "evidence" of sexual abuse,
there is no way to gauge whether the team approach resulted in more accurate
diagnoses.88 It is probable, however, that any errors in judgment or evalua-
tion made by individual team members were detected by other team members.
Moreover, the opportunity to fully integrate "the social, psychological, and
medical information needed to make accurate diagnoses" '589 suggests that "a
skilled interdisciplinary assessment is probably the optimal approach to diag-
nosing sexual abuse."5"
The team approach could also help neutralize the impact of any anti-gay
bias held by a single member of the team. It is possible, of course, that most
or even all members of a court-appointed team would possess anti-gay bias,
but appropriate gatekeeping by the trial court to screen proposed experts for
bias should negate such an occurrence.
584. See generally Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 689 (discussing the benefits of a team-
oriented evaluation).
585. Underwager et al., supra note 442, at 54-55.
586. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 689.
587. Id. at 690.
588. There is also a concern that the hierarchical nature of the medical profession may drive
team members to defer diagnosis to the individual with the highest credentials, such as a psychia-
trist or other medical doctor, rather than acting independently.
589. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 693.
590. id. at 692.
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F. Allowing Expert Witnesses to Educate the Court Regarding Gay and Les-
bian Parents
It is beyond dispute that "[tlo affect change in a system that treats homo-
sexuals as second-class citizens, counsel for gay and lesbian parents must take
an active role in educating the court, by introducing expert testimony that
rebuts the myths and assumptions made about homosexuals."59' Undoubtedly,
experts play a critical role in educating the trial judge on subjects, such as the
competency of gay and lesbian parents592 and the falsity of stereotypes, on
which the court may have limited or incorrect information. But all of these
evidentiary efforts are for naught if the court will not allow itself to be edu-
cated on these subjects. 93 The courts' selective use of the expert testimony
before them in cases involving gay and lesbian litigants is well-docu-
mented.594
Simply stated, a judge charged with determining a child's best interests is
not free to reject the empirically sound insights offered by competent experts
in favor of a ruling which correlates with the judge's own instincts and predis-
positions. 95 Rather, in addition to carefully screening proffered experts for
competency and credibility, a court must be receptive to the information being
conveyed by the experts, regardless of whether it corresponds with whatever
personal feelings the judge may have about gay and lesbian parents."'
Judges do not satisfy their responsibility for education, however, simply
by being open to the information provided by counsel and experts.597 The
numerous publications cited in this article are readily available to help guide a
court through the complexities of a case involving child sexual abuse allega-
tions.59 Judges should also take advantage of bar association seminars and
591. Fowler, supra note 9, at 373.
592. A comprehensive summary of relevant empirical data with an annotated bibliography has
been published by the American Psychological Association (APA) in LESBIAN AND GAY
PARENTING: A RESOURCE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS (1995). The APA has also provided amicus curiae
briefs on this topic to numerous courts, as have Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
American Civil Liberties Union, National Center for Lesbian Rights and the state counterparts of
these entities.
593. Nugent, supra note 26, at 58-59; see also Joshua Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: Gay
Rights Biggest Roadblock, 5 Civ. LIB. REv. 19, 26 (1979).
594. See generally Falk, Prevalence of Social Science, supra note 433.
595. See generally Goldstein et al., supra note 142, at 21-31; Nugent, supra note 26, at 40-
41; see also Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that the trial judge
erred in allowing his own anti-gay bias to impact his decision); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525
N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (recognizing that the evidence of record, rather than the court's
"[plersonal conceptions of morality," must serve as the basis for resolution of a custody dispute).
596. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct directs that "A judge shall perform the duties
of judicial office impartially and diligently," and further states that a judge is prohibited from
manifesting "by words or conduct" bias based on sexual orientation when performing his official
duties. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, Rule B(5) (1990).
597. A judge's education also includes information received outside of the courtroom. See
Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting-Part I-Tentative First
Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1994).
598. Many of the medical as well as legal publications cited herein are available on Lexis and
Westlaw. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A JUDI-
CIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (Josephine Bulkley & Claire Sandt eds., 1994) (discussing
judicial treatment of child sexual abuse).
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judicial college courses which spotlight the inherent myths underlying many
biases.'" And, "[iln addition to actively seeking education, judges should.
also perform a self-inventory of potential bias."'  After compiling a mental
list of potential biases, judges must ask themselves, in every case, whether any
of these might affect their decision. 1 As a state judge recently appointed to
the federal bench advises, "[i]f a bias could potentially infect their decision-
making process, they should make a conscious effort to set that bias
aside."W2 If a judge cannot set aside a bias, judicial ethics demand that she
recuse herself from the case. 3
V. CONCLUSION
Cases involving allegations of sexual abuse of a child are incredibly com-
plex due to family dynamics and the inexactness of medical and psychological
techniques for determining whether the abuse occurred and, if so, identifying
the perpetrator. When the sexual orientation of a party is brought to the fore,
the impeccable sense of balance needed to resolve these cases is further dis-
rupted. The suggestions outlined in this article are offered to help re-establish
the balance demanded by fairness, due process, the rules of evidence and de-
rivative case law, and basic respect for human dignity.
"Bias is nearly inevitable, for all psychologists, lawyers and judges have
first been members of families. The challenge is to recognize and to neutralize
bias .... ."o Accordingly, one of the most important steps to assuring accu-
rate adjudication of the sexual abuse allegations is not directly governed by
rules of procedure or evidence. Rather, it requires personal commitments by
judges and experts to examine their own biases regarding gay and lesbian
parents.
To foster the best interests of the child, judges and experts must recognize
and set aside personal prejudices and preconceived notions about gay and
lesbian parents and examine the actual, credible evidence of record. This focus
requires sensitivity to the many insidious ways that anti-gay bias can taint the
gathering and analyzing of information surrounding the many complicated
questions posed by allegations of child sexual abuse. Failure to do this results,
as in the Hertzler case, in a legally-sanctioned form of gay-bashing. In this
instance, however, the blood on the hands of biased experts and judges is not
only that of the accused, but of the children as well.
599. Nugent, supra note 26, at 58.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 58-59. Judge Nugent served as an Ohio common pleas judge for eight years and
Ohio court of appeals judge for three before being elevated to the federal district court in 1995. Id.
at 59 n.2.
603. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr Canon 3, Rule E(l)(a) (1990) (a judge must dis-
qualify herself where her impartiality may be compromised by "a personal bias or prejudice con-
ceming a party").
604. Deed, supra note 11, at 80.
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